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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Autonomy of Church and State 
Since the end of World War II, two visions of the proper 
relationship between church and state have vied for preeminence in 
U.S. law: one emphasizing the separation of church and state,1 and 
the other finding greater space for the accommodation of religion in 
public life.2 A third approach has prevailed in much of Europe, 
allowing for a much thicker interrelationship, engagement, and 
cooperation between church and state.3 
 1. For a representative sample of defenses of separationism, see THOMAS CURRY, THE 
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1986); DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND 
THE COURSE OF AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS (1991); LEONARD LEVY, THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); LEO PFEFFER, 
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1967); Mark V. Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of 
Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, The 
Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701 (1986). For a recent comprehensive critique 
of separation, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002). 
 2. For a representative sample of defenses of accommodationism, see CHESTER JAMES 
ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT FORMATION AND EARLY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964); GERARD V. BARDLEY, 
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); ROBERT L. CORD, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); 
MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and 
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990). 
 3. See generally CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) [hereinafter EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION]. As 
will be readily apparent, I have benefited from and relied extensively upon Carolyn Evans’s 
excellent book about the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning 
freedom of religion or belief. I highly recommend her book for anyone interested in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on this topic. See also MALCOLM D. 
EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 6–171 (1997); BAHIYYIH 
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In this Article, I will argue that each of these approaches has 
more in common with the other two than might appear on the 
surface. I will suggest that a single concept, autonomy, underlies 
each of these viewpoints, but that each of these visions of the proper 
relationship between church and state is animated by a strikingly 
different conception of what autonomy means and what is required 
for its exercise.4 Separation is animated by a conception of autonomy 
calling for stark independence of church and state.5 Engagement or 
cooperation is animated by a conception of autonomy calling for 
interdependence of church and state.6 In this view, the autonomy of 
both church and state depends upon mutual cooperation and 
support. Accommodation is animated by a conception of autonomy 
calling, somewhat counter intuitively, for what I term inter-
independence.7 According to this conception, autonomy requires 
independence, but also requires inclusion, and rests upon respect and 
empowerment. In addition, the law in this area is concerned with 
three distinct sets of autonomy interests—the autonomy of churches, 
the autonomy of the state, and the autonomy of individuals.8 
G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL PROTECTION 63–247 (1996); Javier Martínez-Torrón & Rafael Navarro-Valls, The 
Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe, in FACILITATING 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 209–38 (Tore Lindholm, W. Cole. 
Durham, Jr. & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds., 2004). 
 4. In arguing that competing conceptions of autonomy underlie the separationist, 
accommodationist, and cooperationist viewpoints, I do not mean to suggest that courts 
consistently utilize the framework of autonomy for analyzing disputes in this area. For the 
most part, they have not and do not. Rather, my argument is that different conceptions of 
autonomy do in fact underlie these competing positions, and advocates of separation, 
accommodation, or cooperation have an obligation to defend as superior the particular 
conception of autonomy that animates their position. 
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
 6. See infra Part III.B. 
 7. See infra Part III.C. 
 8. Others have emphasized the importance of autonomy in analyzing the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, and I am indebted to their insights and analysis. See, e.g., 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); 
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995); Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. 
Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 
1291 (1980); Gerard V. Bradley, Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy in the Constitutional 
Order: The End of Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057 (1989); Jesse H. Choper, The 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 
(1980); Perry Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A 
COMPARATIVE SURVEY 117 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001); Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment 
Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. 
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Outcomes of cases involving the relationship of church and state 
or individual religious liberty are often determined by the underlying 
conception of autonomy adopted or assumed in a particular case, 
coupled with the understanding that autonomy interests are taken as 
preeminent. Unfortunately, both the Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights only intermittently appear to 
appreciate the centrality of the concept of autonomy in this area of 
the law. Often a particular conception of autonomy lies in the 
shadows of a case, but that conception is neither made explicit nor 
defended. Neither the Supreme Court nor the European Court of 
Human Rights does an adequate job of acknowledging and 
analyzing the autonomy interests that are implicated by a particular 
case, especially when the autonomy of the state lies at the heart of 
the case. The result of these failures is a body of law that is deeply 
unsatisfying. The U.S. Supreme Court, in particular, vacillates 
between different conceptions of autonomy and varying doctrinal 
tests, which results in church-state and religious liberty jurisprudence 
that is widely criticized as inconsistent, incoherent, and 
incomprehensible.9 
The goal of this Article is twofold. First, I hope to explain the 
differences between these three conceptions of autonomy and how 
they manifest themselves in the church-state and religious liberty 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
European Court of Human Rights. I argue that these competing 
conceptions of autonomy animate and undergird, though not always 
explicitly, current law regarding the relationships among church, 
state, and individual. Second, the Article aims to explain the 
differences between these three conceptions of autonomy and, by 
identifying the philosophical ground underlying each of these 
REV. 347 (1984); Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment 
Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071 (2002); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, 
Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1579 (1987); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 
91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981); 
Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment 
Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987); Thomas R. McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A 
Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249 
(1986). 
 9. See infra note 14. 
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conceptions, to help focus and further the discussion concerning 
which conception of autonomy provides the best model for guiding 
jurisprudence in this area of the law. The strengths, weaknesses, 
limits, and implications of the separationist, cooperationist, and 
accommodationist positions can more readily be assessed if the 
respective visions of autonomy underlying each of these positions are 
made explicit and subjected to scrutiny. I conclude, that in order to 
bring coherence and consistency to the case law, courts must do a 
better job of identifying and analyzing the autonomy interests at 
stake in a particular case and articulating and defending a conception 
of autonomy that will guide the resolution of the dispute. If a 
particular conception of autonomy (either one that I identify and 
describe here, or some other, better conception) provides a superior 
account of what individual and institutional autonomy entails and 
what the conditions are in which autonomy can thrive, then this 
conception will have a strong claim to provide a better doctrinal 
rubric than existing tests and approaches for analyzing and deciding 
cases in this difficult and controversial area of the law.10 
The Article will proceed as follows. Part II is a brief survey of the 
historical background of church-state issues and the jurisprudential 
frameworks for resolving them in the United States (under the 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment) and in Europe (primarily under Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights). Part III discusses three 
conceptions of autonomy—independence, interdependence, and inter-
independence. Parts IV and V address how these conceptions of 
autonomy manifest themselves in the religious liberty and church-
state jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court 
of Human Rights. Specifically, Part IV focuses on institutional 
autonomy and is divided into two parts, the first addressing issues 
concerning the autonomy of churches, and the second addressing 
issues concerning the autonomy of the state. And Part V focuses on 
liberty issues that implicate individual autonomy. 
 10. As may become evident, I believe the inter-independence conception of autonomy to 
be the most forceful and appealing account of autonomy; however, my purpose here is not to 
persuade readers of the superiority of this conception of autonomy but to explain the 
differences between these competing conceptions of autonomy, the philosophical 
underpinnings and assumptions of each, and the ways in which these conceptions animate and 
guide the attitudes of separation, accommodation, and cooperation. 
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Part VI focuses upon several significant current issues in the 
United States involving the interaction of church and state and how 
these different conceptions of autonomy suggest resolving those 
issues. These issues include (1) school prayer, (2) vouchers and other 
forms of indirect aid to churches, (3) charitable choice, or the ability 
of religiously affiliated institutions to qualify for receiving state 
funding for social welfare programs, (4) the posting of the Ten 
Commandments and other religious monuments in public spaces, 
and (5) the constitutionality of including the phrase “under God” in 
the Pledge of Allegiance. 
I conclude in Section VII that, while the Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights have utilized a variety of doctrinal 
constructs to evaluate issues involving religious liberty and the 
interaction of church and state, autonomy is the most important and 
useful concept in analyzing such controversies. In order to bring 
coherence and consistency to this area of the law, courts should first 
identify the autonomy interests at stake in a case, then articulate and 
defend a conception of autonomy that explains the conditions that 
will facilitate the relevant autonomy interests. In so doing, the stage 
will be set for a more successful approach to deciding cases involving 
the interactions of church and state as well as cases involving claims 
based upon individual freedom of religion or belief. 
B.  The United States and Europe: Why Compare? 
One might reasonably suppose that a comparative analysis of 
U.S. and European approaches to religious liberty issues might be of 
little value because the jurisprudential, historical, and philosophical 
contexts in which issues involving the freedom of religion or belief 
are adjudicated in the United States and Europe are so dissimilar.11 
The most obvious difference between Europe and the United States 
is that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution includes both 
a free exercise clause and a nonestablishment clause,12 whereas the 
concept of nonestablishment is inapplicable in the European context 
where there is a wide spectrum of views about the proper 
 11. See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 12. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend I. 
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relationship between the dominant church and the state, and several 
countries still have established or quasi-established state churches.13 
Additionally, the religious liberty jurisprudence of both the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights is often 
criticized as being confused and chaotic.14 To a large extent such 
criticisms are valid and reflect the reality that the issues and problems 
in this area are extremely vexing and difficult to resolve. The fact that 
the jurisprudence of both the United States and Europe on matters 
of religious liberty is so severely criticized might be thought to be an 
additional reason why a comparative analysis is unlikely to shed 
much, if any, illumination. 
But in spite of—indeed in large measure due to—these 
differences and difficulties, a comparative analysis is valuable because, 
among other reasons, in examining and comparing the approaches 
taken towards similar issues, it becomes easier to identify the 
 13. Some commentators suggest that because the U.S. Establishment Clause dictates 
the separation of church and state, and because no such consensus exists in Europe, there is 
little benefit from comparing the approaches taken in the United States and Europe. For 
example, Carolyn Evans asserts that “the large and sophisticated literature that has developed 
around religious freedom in the United States is of limited use when considering why religious 
freedom is important in Europe and what values underlie its adoption by so many States with 
different religious backgrounds.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 22. 
 14. For an example of criticism concerning the religious liberty jurisprudence in the 
United States, consider MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247 (1988) (finding the constitutional law of religion to be 
“incoherent”); Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding of the Establishment 
Clause, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 400 (2002) (arguing that religious liberty jurisprudence 
has departed from a true understanding of the Establishment Clause, “has become illogical, has 
undermined the values of both democracy and community, and has exacerbated political 
divisiveness”); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and Accommodation: Tensions in 
American First Amendment Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION 63, 64 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000) 
(expressing the virtual consensus that the law of religious freedom in this country is “chaotic, 
controversial and unpredictable”). 
An example of the criticism of religious liberty jurisprudence in Europe is available in 
Carolyn Evans’ work. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 2. Professor Evans 
concludes that the bodies responsible for protecting the freedom of religion and belief under 
the European Convention have 
approached their task in an incoherent and inconsistent manner. The principles 
which they have developed to assist in interpreting articles relevant to freedom of 
religion or belief have generally been favourable to States and have given little 
consideration to the importance of freedom of religion and belief, both to those 
whose freedom is being denied, and to the development of pluralistic and tolerant 
democracies where the risk of serious persecution based on religion or belief is less 
likely to occur. 
Id. 
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assumptions and philosophical viewpoints that underlie the 
respective approaches, which might otherwise go unnoticed. And in 
spite of the fact that the U.S. Constitution is much older than the 
European Convention, almost all of the religious liberty 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has been developed since World 
War II, so the time frame in which these issues have been addressed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human 
Rights is quite similar.15 
C.  Caveats 
Several important caveats must be stated at the outset. First, I 
will try to sketch with broad strokes the similarities and differences in 
the jurisprudential, historical, and philosophical approaches to 
religious liberty issues in the United States and Europe. This is a 
broad, complex topic, and I am mindful that identifying general 
themes and characteristics always results in oversimplification.16 In 
addition, my focus will be primarily upon the differing philosophical 
underpinnings that inform the development of the law in this area. 
This focus will also contribute to the relatively general nature of my 
observations and conclusions. 
Second, I do not maintain that the Supreme Court or the 
European Court of Human Rights has utilized autonomy 
consistently as an analytical rubric in church-state and freedom of 
religion or belief cases, much less that these courts have been 
sensitive to the different conceptions of autonomy that undergird 
 15. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: 
HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT xi (2001) (“Prior to 1940 the Supreme Court of the United States had never 
upheld a claim of free exercise of religion, had never found any governmental practice to be an 
establishment of religion, and had never applied the religion clauses of the First Amendment to 
the states. . . . Beginning in 1940 the Court changed all that.”). The European Convention 
entered into force in September 1953, and currently, forty-four states are parties to the 
Convention. See Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, at 
http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2004). 
 16. To illustrate, a leading U.S. casebook on the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment includes citations to over 600 cases. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. 
DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY xxiii–xxxviii (1996). Moreover, a 
summary of cases decided under the European Convention through the year 2000 includes 
references to sixteen cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights and sixty cases 
heard by the European Commission on Human Rights that relate just to Article 9, the primary 
provision of the European Convention that addresses religious liberty issues. See BARBARA 
MENSAH, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CASE SUMMARIES 1179–80 (2002). 
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cases in this area of the law. Rather, the Supreme Court, as well as 
the European Court of Human Rights, has utilized a variety of 
doctrinal tests and approaches in this area, resulting in a varied and 
fragmented set of outcomes that are difficult to reconcile and fit 
together. I do argue, however, that autonomy, both of institutions 
and of individuals, represents the deep, fundamental issue at stake in 
cases involving church-state relations and individual freedom of 
religion or belief. Since autonomy is the core issue in church-state 
relations, I suggest that explicit considerations of autonomy provide 
a more helpful analytical framework than the doctrinal tests the 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights have 
employed in this area of the law. 
Third, in an important sense the comparison between the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights is 
artificial because one institution is the court of last resort of a 
sovereign state, whereas the other institution is a court created by a 
multilateral treaty involving over forty European countries, each with 
different histories, political systems, and constitutional and legal 
systems. The European Court of Human Rights is a remarkable and 
unprecedented institution, a revolutionary attempt to create a pan-
European court in which individual petitioners have standing to 
pursue a claim against their states.17 From the perspective of the 
states involved, the European Court of Human Rights represents a 
significant leap of faith to place what has historically been viewed as 
one of the primary rights of sovereignty into the hands of a 
multinational body over which each state in a particular case has 
relatively little control.18 Given the political sensitivities involved, it is 
nothing short of amazing that an institution such as the European 
Court of Human Rights even exists, and it is to be expected that the 
 17. See LUKE CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE 
CONVENTION 1–15 (1996) (discussing the development, challenges, growth, and adjustments 
that the Convention and Court of Human Rights have made as the number of contracting 
countries expands and the number of cases explodes); MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, 
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 87–96 (discussing the remarkable role and growth of the 
court and its effect on bringing human rights violations to light). 
 18. The European Court of Human Rights is composed of a number of judges equal to 
the number of contracting states (currently forty-four). There is no restriction on the number 
of judges of the same nationality, and thus, there is no guarantee to a country of judicial 
representation on the court. See European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background, 
Organisation and Procedure, at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2004). 
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Court has exhibited a relatively high degree of deference to states 
and what might be viewed as timidity on their part.19 Such criticisms, 
while having some merit, must be viewed within the wider context of 
the remarkable fact that the institution exists at all and operates as 
well as it does. Additionally, each European state has its own legal 
and often constitutional protections of religious liberty and other 
human rights, so the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights represents something more like a shared minimum 
standard rather than an accurate picture of the full extent of human 
rights protection in any particular state.20 
II.  RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL  
GUARANTEE AND HUMAN RIGHT 
A.  The Grandparent and Neglected Stepchild of Human Rights 
Religious liberty is at once the grandparent and the neglected 
stepchild of international human rights norms.21 Recognized at least 
since the first century A.D., religious liberty, in this now secular era, 
has lost some of its urgency, perhaps due to the marginalization of 
religious belief, at least among academic and policy elites, and 
 19. See Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 95, 125–36 (2003) (discussing the jurisdiction and role of the 
European Court of Human Rights and its struggle to balance State versus European 
standards). 
 20. For example, in the first case decided by the European Court of Human Rights 
involving a religious liberty claim, Kokkinakis v. Greece, the court stated, “[A] certain margin of 
appreciation is to be left to the contracting states in assessing the existence and extent of the 
necessity of an interference, but this margin is subject to European supervision. . . .” 17 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 397, 422 (1994) (Westlaw). 
 21. Professor Cole Durham has described religious liberties as the “‘neglected 
grandparent’ of human rights.” See W.C. Durham, Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A 
Comparative Analysis, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 1 (J.D. van der Vyver & J. Witte, Jr. eds., 1996); see also Judith A. Berling, Is 
Conversation About Religion Possible? (And What Can Religionists Do To Promote It?), 61 J. 
AM. ACAD. RELIGION 1, 2 (1993) (“Religious Studies, the stepchild of a Supreme Court 
decision in the 1960s, is a newcomer to the university, whose presence is still questioned or 
threatened in a number of institutions.”); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not 
Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341, 366 (1999) (“Religious 
speech is not some stepchild of constitutional law: It is fully protected by the Free Speech 
Clause, and once the government sets up a generally open subsidy program, it can’t 
discriminate against religious speech in operating the program. And education is, of course, 
predominantly speech.”). 
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perhaps due to the inevitable conflicts that arise between religious 
rights and other important human rights.22 
But because of the fundamental importance of religious liberty 
and the horrific problems with religious fanaticism, the once 
neglected grandparent has again moved to the fore. As Arcot 
Krishnaswami observed over forty years ago in his influential study of 
religious liberty, 
[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is 
probably the most precious of all human rights, and the imperative 
need today is to make it a reality for every single individual 
regardless of the religion or belief that he professes, regardless of 
his status, and regardless of his condition in life.23 
Nevertheless, whether viewed with a wide historical lens from 
antiquity—through the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages—or 
 22. JOHN THOMAS NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 44–45 (1998). 
By the first century A.D. there is in the Mediterranean world a religion, which will 
spread widely in the West, that carries the concepts of a God, living, distinct from 
and superior to any human being, society, or state; of obligations to that God, 
distinct from and superior to any society or state; of authorized teachers who can 
voice these obligations and judge any society or state; of an inner voice of reason 
that is one way God speaks as well as by His authorized teachers. According to these 
concepts as taught by this religion, each person, individually and not as part of a 
family, tribe, or nation, will have to account to God as Judge for every thought and 
deed. Collectively, these concepts are at the core of liberty of conscience and liberty 
of religion. 
Id.; see also Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, The Right to Religious 
Freedom and World Public Order: The Emerging Norm of Non-Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. 
REV. 865, 873 (1976) (“Even so fundamental a freedom as that of religious inquiry, belief and 
communication must, of course, be exercised and protected with due regard for the 
comparable rights of others and for the aggregate common interest in the preservation of all 
basic human rights.”). Critics of religious liberties often create an opposition between 
“fundamentalism” and human rights, and lump all religious liberties concerns into the category 
of fundamentalism. See, e.g., Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious 
Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under the United 
Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 271, 273 (1997) (“Religious fundamentalism 
poses the most acute problems for women’s equality, but many conservative religious groups 
share substantial areas of doctrine with the fundamentalists. The two groups are often 
differentiated solely by the political activism of fundamentalists rather than by significantly 
different religious beliefs. This political activism throws into sharp relief the conflicts between 
rights of religious freedom and women’s rights of liberty and equality.”). 
 23. ARCOT KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF 
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 
60.XIV.2 (1960), reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 2 (Tad 
Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998). 
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through a prism focused on the terrible middle years of the last 
century and the attempted extermination of the Jewish people, or 
with a focus on the events of September 11, 2001, religion has 
served as a factor in much of the pain and suffering that human 
beings inflict upon one another.24 Given the importance of religious 
liberty and the dangers associated with religious fanaticism and 
hatred, finding and developing appropriate approaches that allow for 
freedom of religion or belief while guarding against atrocities such as 
those mentioned above must be counted as one of the most pressing 
and vexing problems facing the world today.25 
 24. Some commentators blame virtually all of the world’s ills on religion. See, e.g., Linda 
L. Ammons, What’s God Got To Do With It? Church and State Collaboration in the 
Subordination of Women and Domestic Violence, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1207 (1999) (arguing 
that Judeo-Christian doctrines, ideologies, and institutions promote the subordination of 
women and condone domestic violence); Fawaz A. Gerges, Islam: Enduring Myths and 
Changing Realities: Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America, 588 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 73, 81 (2003) (asserting that in the eyes of the United States, “terrorism is 
basically religiously inspired, lacking any nationalist inspiration”); JAMES A. HAUGHT, HOLY 
HORRORS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS MURDERS AND MADNESS (1990) 
(documenting that “[f]rom the times of religiously motivated battles recorded in the Old 
Testament through the days of the Crusades and the Jihad to the present day, much blood has 
been spilt in the name of religion and religious reclamation and dominance”); William P. 
Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 844 (1993) (suggesting that, in 
accordance with Dostoevsky’s view, “the needs of humanity can lead to the creation of a 
church, which in order to make people happy, denies freedom and invites intolerance and 
persecution”). John Locke presents a contrasting, optimistic view of religion by asserting that 
religious activity of some kind is necessary for peaceful coexistence in a political community. 
See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 27, 51 (J. Tully ed., 1983). Other 
commentators also have focused on the positive aspects of religion and religious practice. See, 
e.g., Lisa G. Shah, Faith in Our Future?, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 183 (2001) (proposing that a 
neutral and informed exposure to religious principles in U.S. public schools would help 
alleviate increasing problems with drugs, alcohol, suicide, rape, and abortion); Rodney K. 
Smith, Is American Progressive Constitutionalism Dead? Ethical and Historical Themes in 
Progressive Constitutionalism: The Role of Religion in Progressive Constitutionalism, 4 WIDENER 
L. SYMP. J. 51, 74–75 (1999) (arguing that “religion and religious exercise are positive and 
warrant special protection” because religion presents a unique way of knowing, which is based 
on faith rather than on reason and the scientific method). 
 25. See William E. Nelson, Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century 
Constitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 102–03 (1995). 
[T]he world bears constant witness to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and religious 
fanaticism, and even in America, intolerance and fear of difference appear to be 
increasing. Whether we like it or not, the central task for anyone who today believes 
in equality is to end discrimination based on ethnicity and culture. Emphasis upon 
the experience of Catholics and Jews in mid-twentieth-century New York establishes 
that this task can be accomplished. Emphasis, in contrast, upon the intellectual 
conceptions needed to accomplish it shows how much work remains to be done. 
Id. Gerard Bradley asserts that 
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B.  Historical Background and Jurisprudential Framework 
1.  The United States 
The pursuit of religious liberty was one of the most powerful 
forces driving early settlers to the American continent and remained 
a powerful force at the time of the founding of the American 
republic.26 According to James Madison, who drafted the Bill of 
Rights, the free exercise of religion is a right “precedent both in 
order of time and degree of obligation to the claims of Civil 
Society.”27 
The extensive jurisprudence of the United States regarding 
religious liberty is primarily based upon the interpretation of sixteen 
words of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”28 The first provision, 
somewhat misleadingly labeled the “Establishment Clause,” among 
other things forbids the United States from having a state church.29 
The second provision, known as the “Free Exercise Clause,” protects 
individuals and churches from governmental coercion.30 
[t]here are other reasons for a renewed look at the relationship among Christianity, 
separation of church and state, and religious liberty in contemporary American 
society. One is that the debate of recent memory is pretty much spent. Accusations 
against secular humanists by fundamentalists, and by secular humanists against 
fundamentalists have become tiresome, as are charges of godliness and fanaticism. 
Scholarly criticism of the Supreme Court’s church-state corpus has grown so caustic, 
and is so widespread, that almost any new departure would be welcome. 
Bradley, supra note 8, at 1060–61. 
 26. See generally NOONAN & GAFFNEY, supra note 15, at 158–200 (Foundation Press 
2001). 
 27. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON, 4 vols., 1:163–64 (William C. Rives & Philip R. Fendall eds., 1865). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 29. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of 
religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can set up a church.”). 
 30. Justice Kennedy described the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause as follows: 
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different mechanisms. 
Speech is protected by ensuring its full expression even when the government 
participates, for the very object of some of our most important speech is to persuade 
the government to adopt an idea as its own. The method for protecting freedom of 
worship and freedom of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In 
religious debate or expression the government is not a prime participant, for the 
Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom of all. The Free 
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The First Amendment, along with the other rights included in 
the Bill of Rights, originally only applied against the federal 
government. It was not until after the Civil War and the passage of 
the Fourteenth Amendment that the First Amendment was 
“incorporated” against the states—that is, found by the Supreme 
Court to apply to the actions of state governments as well as the 
federal government.31 As they have been interpreted, the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses apply to both the federal 
government and to state governments, and are sometimes in tension 
with each other—the Establishment Clause prohibiting the 
government from taking actions that benefit religion and the free 
exercise clause protecting religion, which is itself a benefit.32 
Debates rage about the original purpose and intent of the 
Framers in adopting the religion clauses.33 Echoing Father Thomas 
Curry, Professor Fredrick Gedicks has argued that in the founding 
era, an “establishment of religion” was understood to “refer to a 
church which the government funded and controlled and in which it 
used its coercive power to encourage participation, like the Anglican 
Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close 
parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment, but the Establishment 
Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with 
no precise counterpart in the speech provisions. The explanation lies in the lesson of 
history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that 
in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious 
views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. A state-created orthodoxy puts 
at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that 
religious faith is real, not imposed.  
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591–92 (1992) (internal citations omitted). But see Mark V. 
Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 72 (2001) (asserting 
that “[c]ontemporary constitutional doctrine may render the Free Exercise Clause redundant” 
because “[m]uch religious activity is speech, pure and simple, and therefore protected by the 
Free Speech Clause”). 
 31. The Free Exercise Clause was first applied to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Establishment Clause was first applied to the states in Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 32. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2002). 
 33. See Frank Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial 
Philosophy: Originalism and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 362 (1993) 
(“What does the ‘Quest for Originalism’ in the church-state debate say about the ‘Case for 
Originalism’ in the larger interpretive debate? If the historical data is plentiful, as both sides 
maintain, and if the two sides can look at the evidence and reach two very different 
conclusions, then one might argue that there is no clear-cut, definitive ‘Framers’ intent.’ Or, if 
there is an obvious Framers’ intent, then some scholars cannot see it, or choose not to, because 
of their own political predilections.”). 
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Church in England or the Roman Catholic Church in southern 
Europe.”34 It appears that there were three primary concerns that 
drove the adoption of the Establishment Clause. First, there was 
concern about the church exercising the coercive power of 
government, including the power to enforce criminal laws that 
reflected the church’s denominational and moral requirements.35 
Second, early Americans worried about direct financial support of the 
church in aid of its worship, rituals, and other denominational 
activities, through general tax revenue.36 Third, they were also 
concerned with control by the state over the church, particularly in 
its definition of doctrine and selection of leaders.37 These concerns 
seem to indicate that the Founders did not view what I term 
interdependence as a viable conception of autonomy within the 
United States. 
Concern for the autonomy both of the church and of the state is 
at the heart of each of these three concerns.38 From this perspective, 
if churches perform governmental functions, the autonomy of the 
state is threatened; if the state funds churches, the autonomy of 
churches is threatened, and the autonomy of the state may be 
jeopardized as well if a powerful church receives all or a predominant 
share of state funding since that church might exert considerable 
power in the political process; and if the state controls church 
doctrine, the autonomy of the church is undermined. Indeed, the 
primary purpose underlying the Establishment Clause and Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is the preservation of 
autonomy—of the state, of religious institutions, and of individuals.39 
This purpose, however, has often gone unrecognized and has been 
obscured by doctrinal constructions utilized by the Supreme Court. 
As a result, jurisprudence under the religion clauses is fragmented 
 34. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 1091 (2002) (citing THOMAS J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO 
CHRISTENDOM 16, 37, 109 (2001)); see also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: 
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 191–92 
(1986). 
 35. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 1098. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1; MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE 
WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
(1965); Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953). 
 39. See infra Parts IV–VI. 
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and inconsistent.40 Confusion and incoherence is supplemented by 
the fact that autonomy is a complex concept that bears multiple 
interpretations. 
Since the end of the Second World War, two visions of the 
relationship between church and state have vied for preeminence in 
the United States, one emphasizing the ideal of “separation” of 
church and state,41 and the other finding greater space for the 
“accommodation” of religion and public life.42 As I will argue in 
greater detail below, the separationist and accommodationist 
positions each reflect very different conceptions of autonomy, with 
separationism favoring a conception of autonomy based upon strict 
independence and accommodationism favoring a conception of 
autonomy based upon the ideal of inter-independence. 
Separationists argue that “the original purpose of the 
establishment clause was to create an absolute separation of the 
spheres of civil authority and religious activity by forbidding all forms 
 40. Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been notable for its apparent inconsistency 
and incoherence. For example, in the 1980s the Supreme Court ruled that religiously affiliated 
organizations could participate in a federally funded program to provide counseling to 
pregnant teenagers, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), but that it was unconstitutional 
for public school teachers to travel to parochial schools to provide remedial English and math 
instruction to needy children on the premises of their own school, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 
402 (1985). Although the Court reversed Aguilar twelve years later in Agostini v. Felton, 521 
U.S. 203 (1997), “the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leading up to Agostini has been a 
conglomeration of mixed messages,” Daniel P. Whitehead, Note, Agostini v. Felton: Rectifying 
the Chaos of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 639, 645 (1999). The 
Supreme Court has also ruled that the government is required to compensate Sabbatarians 
who refuse to work on Saturdays, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), but not required 
to accommodate those who can demonstrate dire financial consequences from Sunday closing 
laws, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The Court’s inconsistent religion clauses 
jurisprudence has produced a debate about the constitutional validity of religion-based 
exemptions. See William Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionality of Compelled Free 
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1990); Michael McConnell, The Origins 
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); 
Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemption, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990). 
 41. For an elaboration and defense of the separationist position, see, supra note 1. For a 
historical perspective on the impact of separationist ideas on the American Founders, see Arlin 
M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559 
(1989). 
 42. For an elaboration and defense of the accommodationist position, see, supra note 2. 
For an overview of the birth and growth of the accommodationist perspective, see Steven G. 
Gey, Why Is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990). 
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of government assistance or support for religion.”43 This view was 
perhaps most forcefully articulated by Justice Hugo Black in the 
1947 case, Everson v. Board of Education,44 in which he stated that, 
“[T]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another.”45 
A conception of autonomy based upon the idea of independence 
has had a strong influence upon much of the religion-clauses 
jurisprudence in the United States.46 Most famously, Jefferson’s 
metaphor of a “wall of separation”—dividing religion on the one 
hand and the state on the other—is a clear example of a vision of 
autonomy that rests upon stark independence.47 On this view, the 
domain of the state and the domain of churches are divided into 
respective spheres, and the mandate of the First Amendment 
prevents either from intruding upon the precincts of the other.48 
Territorial metaphors prevail, and the wall becomes an apt symbol 
for the ideal relationship—even if imperfectly realized—between 
church and state.49 Because, according to this view, autonomy 
 43. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 47–48. 
 44. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (permitting state reimbursement of 
costs of busing children to parochial schools). Perhaps ironically, in spite of its strongly 
separationist rhetoric, the outcome in Everson was accommodationist, permitting state aid to 
parents to pay for busing their children to religious schools. 
 45. Id. at 15. 
 46. As noted below, a counter-theme in U.S. Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
accommodation. See infra text accompanying notes 51–52. 
 47. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 332 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). President Thomas Jefferson, in 
his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, declared “a wall of separation between Church 
and State.” Id. For commentary on Jefferson’s “wall of separation,” see, for example, Daniel L. 
Dreisbach & John D. Whaley, What the Wall Separates: A Debate on Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of 
Separation” Metaphor, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 627 (1999); Stephen J. Safranek, Can Science 
Guide Legal Argumentation? The Role of Metaphor in Constitutional Cases, 25 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 357 (1994); Jeffrey W. Stiltner, Note, Rethinking the Wall of Separation: Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills School District—Is This the End of Lemon?, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 823 (1994). 
 48. The “theory of a high and impregnable wall of separation between government and 
religion mandates that the public sphere must be secular. Religion is swept away and confined 
to the private sphere of home, family, church and other places of worship.” Laurie Messerly, 
Reviving Religious Liberty in America, 8 NEXUS J. OP. 151, 156 (2003). 
 49. Another territorial metaphor of the garden and the wilderness was popularized by 
Roger Williams. See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 
ARIZ. L. REV. 293 (2002). Carter describes the garden and wilderness metaphor as follows: 
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requires independence, the religion clauses mandate “mutual 
noninterference by church and state in each other’s affairs.”50 
In contrast, accommodationists argue that governmental aid to 
religious institutions is permitted as long as it is imparted in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion.51 Accommodationists explicitly reject 
Jefferson’s wall-of-separation metaphor. For example, in a dissenting 
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[t]he 
‘wall of separation between church and state’ is a metaphor based on 
bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to 
judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.”52 
To a large extent, the history of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, especially over the past thirty years, has been a story of 
the struggle for dominance between the separationist and 
accommodationist viewpoints.53 One problem with both 
For Williams, the garden was the place of God’s people, the community of people of 
faith, who gathered together to determine what the Lord required of them, 
nurturing and building their religious understanding in relative tranquility. Outside 
the garden was the unevangelized world, what Williams called the wilderness. And 
between the two, separating the wilderness from the garden, was a high hedge wall, 
constructed to protect the people of the garden in their work of religious nurture. 
The hedge wall existed to keep the wilderness out, not to keep the people of the 
garden hemmed in. It was the vital work of the garden, not the less vital work of the 
wilderness, that the wall was built in order to protect. 
Id. at 296. Adams and Emmerich assert that the 
American Founders were influenced profoundly by philosophers and theologians 
who reflected on the religious conflicts that occurred in the wake of the 
Reformation. From Martin Luther and John Calvin they inherited the view that 
God had instituted “two kingdoms”—a heavenly one where the church exercised its 
spiritual authority and an earthly one where the civil magistrates exercised temporal 
authority. 
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 41, at 1561; see also PHILIP HAMBURGER, supra note 1 
(discussing Roger Williams’ use of the wall metaphor); HOWE, supra note 38.  
 50. NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 505 (2d ed. 1999). 
 51. See Peter J. Weishaar, School Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. 
L. REV. 543, 545 (1994) (“The ‘nonpreferential accommodationists’ . . . claim that the 
religion clauses of the Constitution permit various forms of nonpreferential government 
support for religion. They argue that government may aid all religions, as long as it does not 
prefer one religion over another.”). 
 52. 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (striking down a state statute 
authorizing a moment of silence in public schools on grounds that there is no secular purpose 
underlying the statute). 
 53. See Raymond W. Mitchell, A Small Departure from the Truth: When Private 
Religious Speech Runs Afoul of the Establishment Clause, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 867 (1992). 
Courts and commentators have noted that in the contemporary debate over the 
meaning of the Establishment Clause and the appropriate standard of review, both 
3SCH-FIN 12/1/2004  7:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1236 
 
“separation” and “accommodation” as doctrinal rubrics is that 
neither concept contains a principle to explain its limits. Thus, 
regardless of the analytical starting point, one is left without clear 
guidance with respect to the questions of how much separation or 
how much accommodation is required or permitted. The Supreme 
Court has utilized a number of different doctrines—including the so-
called Lemon test,54 variations of that test emphasizing 
“endorsement,”55 and tests focusing upon “coercion”56—as 
constitutional tests for differentiating between permissible and 
impermissible interactions between church and state. None of these 
doctrinal approaches, however, has received widespread support, and 
none appears up to the task of providing a satisfying analytical 
sides in the debate have scoured primary sources in an effort to assemble an 
historical record permitting them to claim the legacy of the Framers’ original intent. 
This debate has generally broken down into two opposing factions: separationists 
and accommodationists. 
Id. at 869. 
 54. The Lemon test, as it has come to be known, stipulates: “[first, a statute] must have 
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) 
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 55. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
According to Justice O’Connor’s reformulation, “[T]he purpose prong of the Lemon test asks 
whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.” Id. at 690. The 
effect prong requires that “a government practice not have the effect of communicating a 
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.” Id. at 692. Justice 
O’Connor’s approach is endorsed in Arnold H. Loewy, Rethininking Government Neutrality 
Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s 
Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986). The “endorsement” test was later adopted by a 
majority of the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 56. The “coercion” test was used by the Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 
(holding that public school graduation prayer violates the Establishment Clause). 
The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does 
not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It 
is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government 
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or 
otherwise act in a way which “establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends 
to do so.” 
Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). With regard to school 
prayer specifically, “[W]hat to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable 
request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to 
the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a 
religious orthodoxy.” Id. at 592. 
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framework for addressing problems that arise under either the 
Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.57 
2.  Europe 
The potential ways in which the relationship between church and 
state is organized are virtually limitless, ranging from near 
identification of the church and the state (for example, Iran)58 to an 
adversarial posture where church and state are viewed as antagonists 
(for example, the former USSR).59 While no members of the Council 
of Europe fall in either of these extremes, “nevertheless a wide 
variety of relationships exist between religions and States in” 
Europe.60 
Several European states, such as France.61 and Turkey,62 adopt a 
strong separationist and secularist conception of the state. At the 
 57. See, e.g., Kenneth Mitchell Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court’s New 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1984) (arguing that after the 
Lynch decision, “the Court’s apparent trend toward basing establishment clause analysis on the 
pervasiveness or historical significance of government-supported religious activities represents 
an undesirable move away from strict examination of the questionable law or activity under the 
Lemon test”); David Felsen, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis: 
Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 395 (1989) (arguing that the Court’s use of the 
Lemon test has resulted in an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is confused and 
unprincipled); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the 
Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (1987) (suggesting that the Lemon test should be 
radically altered); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83 (1986) (pointing to the Lemon test’s internal inconsistencies); Amy 
Louise Weinhaus, The Fate of Graduation Prayers in Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 71 
WASH. U. L.Q. 957, 957–58 (1993) (“Weisman departs from the settled framework which has 
guided Establishment Clause analysis for more than twenty years and creates uncertainty as to 
the proper legal standards applicable in church-state jurisprudence.”). 
 58. See SAID AMIR ARJOMAND, THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN: THE ISLAMIC 
REVOLUTION IN IRAN (1988) (charting the historic rise of modern Iran from the 
Constitutional Revolution of the early 1900s to the present day Islamic Republic); H. E. 
CHEHABI, IRANIAN POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS MODERNISM: THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT 
OF IRAN UNDER THE SHAH AND KHOMEINI (1990); NIKKI R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN: 
ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION (2003); DAVID MENASHRI, POST-REVOLUTIONARY 
POLITICS IN IRAN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND POWER (2001). 
 59. See PEDRO EVENS, CROSS AND THE COMMISSAR: THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN 
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR 42–54 (1987) (tracing the relationship of the Soviet 
government and religion over four historical periods, ending in 1987). 
 60. The following brief summary of the variety of relationships between church and 
state in Europe is largely drawn from EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 19–22. 
 61. See LA CONSTITUTION [Const.] art. 77 (Autonomy) (Fr.). Article 2(1) of the 
French Constitution states, “France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic. 
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other end of the spectrum, in Greece, there is a very close supportive 
relationship between the Greek Orthodox Church and the state;63 in 
Iceland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is still established as the 
National Church, which according to the Constitution is to be 
“supported and protected by the State”;64 and, in Italy, the Catholic 
Church lost its status as the state religion only in 1984, and the 
constitution continues to recognize that the “State and the Catholic 
Church are each within its own ambit, independent and 
sovereign.”65 The Church of England remains the established church 
of the United Kingdom.66 The Spanish Constitution specifically 
states that there is no established church,67 but Spain has entered 
into a Concordat with the Catholic Church that grants the church 
significant financial and other privileges that are not available to all 
other religions in the state. Ireland does not have an established 
church, although the dominance of the Catholic Church is evident in 
a number of constitutional provisions (such as abortion and 
blasphemy), and the constitution states that the “State acknowledges 
that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall 
hold his name in reverence and shall respect and honour religion.”68 
Other states, such as Germany69 and the Ukraine,70 have 
constitutional provisions requiring separation of church and state, 
It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction as to origin, race, or 
religion. It respects all beliefs.” Const. art. 2(1). 
 62. See CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURK. pt. II, ch. I, art. 24 (Freedom of Religion 
and Conscience) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and 
conviction.”) 
 63. See CONST. OF GREECE sec. II, arts. 3 (Relations of Church and State) & 13 
(Religion). 
 64. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF ICE. arts. 63 & 64 (detailing the relationship between 
church and state). 
 65.  COSTIZIONE [Cost.] arts. 7 (Relation Between State and Church) & 8 (Religion) 
(Italy). 
 66. While the United Kingdom has no constitution, it does publish an authoritative 
statement of legal framework on its International Constitutional Law Web site, 
http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/uk00000_.html. See U.K. LEGAL SYS. sec. 18 (Freedom 
of Religion). 
 67. CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] arts. 16 (Religion, Belief, No State Church) & 44 (Religion) 
(Spain). 
 68. IR. CONST. art. 44 (Religion). 
 69. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 4 (Faith, Religion, Conscience, Creed) 
(F.R.G.). 
 70. CONST. OF UKRAINE art. 35 (detailing the relationship between the individual, the 
state, and the church). 
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although the level of cooperation between the state and the 
dominant church is much greater than in the United States. 
Despite the wide variety of attitudes toward the proper 
relationship between church and state, “almost all member States 
have adopted constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of religion and allowing for freedom of 
religion. The provisions take different forms but demonstrate a 
reasonably strong level of consensus that freedom of religion is an 
important, European-wide principle.”71 
The primary pan-European basis for protecting religious freedom 
in Europe is the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the “European Convention” or 
“Convention”).72 One distinctive characteristic of the European 
Convention is that it provides a forum of last resort for individuals, 
not just states, to press claims against states who are party to the 
Convention.73 
The main provision of the European Convention dealing with 
freedom of religion or belief is Article 9.74 Article 9 establishes a two-
tier structure for protecting religious liberties. First-tier rights, at 
 71. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 22. 
 72. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. Various 
European States have separate provisions addressing religious liberty, which often provide 
greater protection of religious liberty than that provided under the European Convention.  
Thus, the decisions under the European Convention should be viewed as a floor of protection 
rather than a description of the entire edifice protecting religious freedom and belief, which 
varies from state to state. 
 73. Prior to November 1998, a petition to the European Commission on Human 
Rights could be filed by “any person, nongovernmental organization or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set 
forth in [the European Convention].” Id. at art. 25. 
 74. Article 9 reads: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. at art. 9. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 is identical to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 is very similar to Article 18, Paragraph 3 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although the reference to “necessary in a 
democratic society” is missing. 
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least in theory, are absolute and include “the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion,” as well as the “freedom to 
change [one’s] religion or belief.”75 Second-tier rights involve 
“manifestations” of religion or belief “in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance,” in “public or private,” “either alone or in 
community with others,” which may be subject to limitations 
provided that such limitations meet certain conditions, including 
conditions that (1) such limitations are “prescribed by law,”76 (2) 
such limitations are necessary in a democratic society,77 and (3) such 
limitations serve a legitimate aim in that they either (a) are necessary 
in the interests of public safety and for the protection of public 
order,78 (b) are necessary for the protection of health,79 (c) are 
 75. Id. at art. 9, para. 1. 
 76. To date, no Article 9 case has succeeded because a restriction on freedom of religion 
or belief was not prescribed by law. Generally, the European Court of Human Rights has 
explicitly held that the legislation under which State action was taken was prescribed by law, 
despite strong criticism of this approach by some dissenting members of the court. EVANS, 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 139. 
 77. The European Commission on Human Rights and European Court of Human 
Rights engage in a balancing test to determine whether a limitation is necessary, and the court 
has developed the notion of a “margin of appreciation,” which is quite deferential to state 
determinations of necessity. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 
(1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (“By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the 
vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on 
the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them.”). The court also 
sometimes conducts a “proportionality” analysis to determine whether a restriction is necessary 
in a democratic society. See, e.g., Nat’l Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
578, 595 (1979–80), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (determining proportionality based upon 
whether “the disadvantage suffered by the applicant is excessive in relation to the legitimate 
aim pursued by the Government”); Larissis and others v. Greece, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
363 (1998–V), 27 E.H.R.R. 329 (1999) (Lexis) (upholding convictions of military officers for 
unlawful proselytizing of men under their command on grounds that this was proportionate to 
the end of preventing abuses to the rights and freedoms of others). 
 78. As Professor Evans explains, “There is clearly a need to allow restrictions to protect 
public order and safety, as some religious groups may be involved in inciting or organizing acts 
of violence.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 150; see, e.g., Omkaranda and 
the Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, 25 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 105 (1981), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (imprisonment of leader of religious group which he led in acts of 
criminal violence); X v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 62 (1975), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (right of free expression does not include right to incite others to 
desert army, to murder officers, and to supply weapons to the enemy). Nevertheless, “the 
public order limitation also has the potential to be interpreted very widely to allow States to 
intervene in religious practices at any time that they become inconvenient or annoying to those 
in power.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 150; see, e.g., Hakansson v. 
Sweden, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297 (1983), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (upholding the conviction 
of man who loudly proclaimed the evils of alcohol on grounds that doing so was necessary to 
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necessary for the protection of morals,80 or (d) are necessary for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.81 
In the language of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Article 9’s first-tier protections apply to the forum internum, and the 
second-tier protections apply to the forum externum. Given the 
wording of Article 9(1), one might expect there to be a large sphere 
of religious freedom that is absolute, including the right to change 
one’s religion, and cannot be subject to derogation by the limitations 
on “manifestations” of religion that are contemplated in Article 9(2). 
But while the “Court has emphasized the importance of freedom of 
religion or belief, in particular at the level of the internal, individual 
conscience,” it has not “given much consideration to the content of 
the freedom.”82 
protect public order); ISKON and others v. United Kingdom, 76-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 
& Rep. 90, 91 (1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (enforcing local planning laws against a 
Hindu temple to restrict uses to which the temple could be put and the number of people who 
could attend); Manoussakis and others v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1347, 1369 
(1996–IV), 23 E.H.R.R. 387 (1996) (Westlaw) (Martins, J., concurring) (noting that while 
the requirement of prior authorization for building a place of worship may be appropriate in 
some circumstances, it could also be used to disguise intolerance). 
 79. “There have been a number of cases that have come before the [European] 
Commission [on Human Rights] that suggest that the State does have a right to force 
protection of health even on those who have a serious religious reason for rejecting the 
protection.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 156. 
 80. Although “[a]llowing a State to justify restrictions on the right to manifest a religion 
or belief by reference to morality potentially poses serious problems,” Professor Evans notes 
that “the [European] Court [of Human Rights] and [European] Commission [on Human 
Rights] have tended to grant States a wide margin of appreciation” in such cases. Id. at 159–
60. 
 81. Conflicts with the rights and freedoms of others might involve conflicts between the 
religious beliefs of one party and the religious beliefs of another party, or might involve a 
conflict between a religious belief of one party and a nonreligious right or freedom of another 
party. One area where the possibility and likelihood of conflict appears to be particularly high is 
between conservative or traditional religious groups or believers on the one hand, and equality 
rights of women on the other hand. Professor Evans notes that “[a]lthough it has not been a 
particular issue in the Convention case law, there is significant potential for conflict between 
the rights of women and the right to freely practice a religion that may include practices that 
emphasize the subordinate status of women.” Id. at 161 n.147. Evans also notes that 
“sometimes the vague way in which ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ is used suggests that 
the limitations clause may have a wider scope than the rights under the Convention.” Id. at 
161. 
 82. Id. at 68. Evans notes that “[a]t the most basic level, [the freedom of religion] 
could be considered simply the right to hold opinions silently (on religious or other important 
issues) without interference by the State.” Id. If so, the “content of the right is minimal,” 
perhaps limited to limitations “against the dehumanizing techniques adopted in a police state.” 
Id. 
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The court has tended to analyze religious liberty issues, even 
those involving the right to change one’s religion, under the rubric 
of the scope of permissible limitations upon manifestations of 
religious belief permitted by Article 9(2).83 At other times, the court 
simply assumes that a case involves a “manifestation” of religious 
belief without considering whether the case might involve a tier-one 
nonderogable right of conscience or religion.84 For example, in 
Buscarini v. San Marino,85 a Grand Chamber of the court held that a 
requirement that members of the parliament of San Marino “take an 
oath swearing on the Gospels” to perform their duties violated 
Article 9 since it “required them to swear allegiance to a particular 
religion.”86 But the court did not analyze the requirement under 
Article 9(1)’s absolute protection of “the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion.”87 Rather, the court held that the 
required oath was an impermissible limitation under Article 9(2) 
because the oath was not necessary in a democratic society.88 Rather 
than consider the effect of requiring a non-Christian to make an oath 
on a Christian Bible, the court chose to focus on the manifestation 
such a requirement made concerning a particular religion. 
In addition to Article 9, Article 14 of the European Convention 
contains a broad nondiscrimination provision prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of religion, among other grounds.89 
Article 2 of the First Protocol to the European Convention provides 
that “[n]o person shall be denied the right to an education” and 
requires states when exercising functions in relation to education and 
teaching to “respect the rights of parents to ensure such education 
 83. See, e.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993), 17 E.H.R.R. 
397 (1994) (Westlaw). 
 84. See EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 68. 
 85. Buscarini and others v. San Marino, App. No. 24645/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), 30 
E.H.R.R. 208 (2000) (Westlaw). 
 86. Id. at para. 34. 
 87. European Convention, supra note 72, at art. 9, para. 1. 
 88. Buscarini, App. No. 24645/94, at paras. 35–40; see also EVANS, FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION, supra note 3, at 68. 
 89. Article 14 of the European Convention reads, “The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set out in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any grounds 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a minority, property, birth or other status.” European Convention, supra note 
72, at art. 14. 
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and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions.”90 
The history of the interpretation and application of the European 
Convention can be divided into two chapters, before and after 
November 1998, when Protocol 11 to the Convention took effect. 
Prior to November 1998, two bodies existed to “ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken” by the Contracting 
Parties—the European Commission of Human Rights (the 
“Commission”) and the European Court of Human Rights (the 
“European Court”).91 The role of the Commission and the 
European Court was quite complex. In order for a petition to the 
Commission to be admissible, an applicant must have exhausted all 
domestic remedies,92 the application could not be anonymous,93 and 
the petition could not be “incompatible with the provisions of the 
present Convention, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right 
of petition.”94 If the Commission found a case to be admissible, then 
it attempted to negotiate a friendly settlement between the parties,95 
and if a solution was not achieved, it prepared a report giving its 
opinion whether or not there had been a breach of the 
 90. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, Mar. 
20 1952, protocol I, art. II. Carolyn Evans explains that “[t]his Article was one of the most 
controversial in the Convention and had to be included in a separate Protocol because 
agreement on its wording could not be reached in time for the signing of the main 
instrument.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 6. The European Convention 
contains other provisions that might be relevant to the protection of religious freedom or 
belief, including Article 8 (concerning private and family life), Article 10 (concerning freedom 
of expression), and Article 11 (concerning freedom of peaceful assembly), but these provisions 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 91. European Convention, supra note 72, at art. 19. 
 92. Id. at art. 35, para. 1. 
 93. Id. at art. 35, para. 2(a). 
 94. Id. at art. 35, para. 3. According to Carolyn Evans, 
[t]he power to determine that petitions were ill-founded allowed the Commission 
summarily to dismiss cases that were not procedurally inadmissible but that would 
clearly fail if taken to the merits phase. It allowed the Commission to weed out weak 
and hopeless cases at an early stage in order to expedite proceedings and avoid 
wasting time on cases with little or no merit. 
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 9. 
 95. European Convention, supra note 72, at arts. 28 & 30. Such settlements were 
reached in a number of freedom of religion cases. See, e.g., Pentidis and others v. Greece, 39 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 983, 990 (1997-III), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int; Hazar, Hazar and 
Acik v. Turkey, 73 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 111 (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int 
(friendly settlement). 
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Convention.96 Commission reports were not binding upon states, 
and states (but originally not the petitioners)97 could refer the matter 
either to a Committee of Ministers98 or to the European Court, both 
of which had the right to make a final decision whether a state had 
breached an obligation under the European Convention, and to 
make decisions, including awarding “just satisfaction” to injured 
petitioners, which were binding upon the Contracting Parties.99 
When the Council of Europe adopted Protocol 11, it abolished the 
Commission, limited the role of the Council of Ministers, and 
established a new court, which is able to sit in smaller panels, 
enabling it to deal with a larger number of cases.100 
In comparison with the United States, one distinctive feature of 
church-state relations in Europe is that in many countries a much 
greater degree of cooperation or engagement of religion and the 
state is deemed appropriate. I will argue that like separation and 
accommodation, this cooperationist viewpoint is based upon a 
 96. European Convention, supra note 72, at art. 31. 
 97. Id. at art. 38 (original text). With the adoption of Protocol 9, petitioners as well as 
states gained the right to bring a case to the European Court, although a panel of the court 
was authorized to evaluate petitions to determine whether they raised a “serious question 
involving the interpretation or application of the Convention.” 
 98. If a State referred a matter to the Committee of Ministers and the Committee 
determined that there was a breach of the Convention, this conclusion was binding upon the 
parties, but the Committee never overruled the Commission in relation to any Article 9 
complaints, and so it is largely irrelevant to the interpretation of Article 9. See EVANS, 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 9. 
 99. See European Convention, supra note 72, at arts. 50–53. 
 100. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 10. The Plenary Court, comprised 
of a number of judges equal to the number of member states, sits only for administrative 
matters, European Convention, supra note 72, at art. 21 (as amended). Committees of three 
judges can decide by unanimous vote whether a case is admissible, id. at art. 28 (as amended), 
and Panels of seven judges decide the admissibility of cases that are not unanimously decided 
by Committees and also hear the merits of cases, id. at art. 29 (as amended). When a Chamber 
believes a matter is sufficiently significant, it may refer the case to a Grand Chamber of 
seventeen judges, id. at art. 30 (as amended). Parties may also request a Grand Chamber to 
consider cases, id. at art. 43 (as amended). Some commentators have suggested that 
[s]ome cases that have been summarily dismissed . . . require analysis . . . [, especially] 
cases that are found to be inadmissible on the basis that they are manifestly ill-
founded . . . because often the failure of the Commission to deal seriously with these 
cases demonstrates its conservative approach to Article 9. Also, some members of 
the Court have suggested that sometimes the technical provisions that can be used 
to deem a case inadmissible (such as failure to exhaust domestic remedies) have been 
used by the Court to avoid looking into difficult or controversial areas. 
 EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 10 (citing case).  
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particular conception of autonomy, one which emphasizes 
interdependence.101 
In Europe, the state is much less likely to be seen as an enemy of 
freedom and is much more likely to be seen as the champion or 
promoter of freedom. This is true with respect to liberty in general, 
as well as religious liberty in particular. For example, in describing 
the German experience with industrialization, Leonard Krieger 
suggests that the experience “set up the relationship between 
individuals and the authoritarian state in which the state was both 
favorable and necessary to the material side of personal freedom and 
in which the individual, consequently, was both beholden to the 
state and, to evade this dependence, withdrawn from it.”102 Much 
the same could be said about the relationship of the individual and 
the state with respect to spiritual freedom. According to Krieger, the 
Reformation resulted in 
increased ecclesiastical powers of Lutheran and Catholic princes 
alike, a development which received theoretical expression for 
Lutheran princes in the doctrine of the jus episcopale. Ultimately 
both the fact and the doctrine, which conferred upon the prince 
the prime responsibility and the supreme power for the 
organization and maintenance of religion in his territories, were to 
contribute signally to the extension of authority which led to the 
organization of the sovereign state . . . .103 
This resulted in what became a “familiar mixing of [the prince’s] 
private and public capacities,” and the prince became “the agent of 
spiritual freedom for his society as well as of political power over 
it.”104 
 101. Carolyn Evans argues that “one of the reasons that the [European] Court and 
Commission have not developed an adequate jurisprudence on religious freedom is that they 
have not taken seriously the importance of understanding the rationale for religious freedom.” 
Id. at 33. Evans suggests that “[t]he argument from autonomy seems to be the best approach 
for the [European] Court to take to interpreting Article 9.” Id. While I agree with Professor 
Evans that the concept autonomy appears to provide a promising basis for interpreting Article 
9, as I argue throughout this paper, I believe that a certain conception of autonomy does 
actually underlie much of the European Court’s and the Commission’s approach to issues of 
religious freedom and belief, but that the conception of autonomy adopted by the court is 
quite different than the liberal conception favored by Evans. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 102. LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: HISTORY OF A POLITICAL 
TRADITION 39 (1957). 
 103. Id. at 48. 
 104. Id. at 49. 
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The history of the relationship between church and state in 
Europe is extraordinarily complex and far beyond the scope of this 
paper.105 But even today in Europe, in contrast with America, people 
are much less likely to view the state as an enemy or threat to 
religious freedom and more likely to view it as a protector and 
facilitator of religious freedom.106 The clearest evidence of this 
difference in view between the United States and Europe can be seen 
in the jurisprudence concerning the institutional autonomy of the 
state and the institutional autonomy of the church. 
III.  THREE CONCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY 
In Part II of this Article, I suggested that three very different 
approaches to adjudicating issues involving religious liberty and the 
relationship between church and state—separation, cooperation, and 
accommodation—are each based upon competing conceptions of a 
single concept, autonomy. In Parts IV and V of this Article, I will 
illustrate how these three conceptions of autonomy influence 
jurisprudence relating to a wide variety of issues involving 
institutional autonomy (both of churches and of the state) and 
individual autonomy. In Part VI, I will consider the implications of 
these conceptions of autonomy for a few current areas of controversy 
in the United States. Before turning to these tasks, however, I must 
sketch the basic contours of these competing conceptions of 
autonomy. Each of these conceptions is based upon very different 
visions of what autonomy is and what conditions make its exercise 
possible. 
The etymology of the term autonomy is from the Greek autos 
(self) and nomos (rule or law). The term was first applied by the 
Greeks to the concept of the city-state.107 A city was autonomous if 
 105. See CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (J.F. 
Maclear ed., 1995); PHILIP S. GORSKI, THE DISCIPLINARY REVOLUTION: CALVINISM AND 
THE RISE OF THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (2003); NEGOTIATING SECULAR AND 
ECCLESIASTICAL POWER: WESTERN EUROPE IN THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES (Arnoud-Jan A. 
Bijsterveld et al. eds., 1999); see also CHURCH AND STATE IN POSTWAR EASTERN EUROPE: A 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY (Paul Mojzes ed., 1987). 
 106. On the other hand, in states such as France and Turkey, where the emergence of a 
liberal democratic state was in large measure a struggle against a state dominated by a 
particular religious orthodoxy, the degree of separation of church and state that is deemed 
necessary to protect religious freedom is very high. 
 107. I will treat autonomy as a concept that is meaningful for both individual human 
beings and for institutions (both churches and the state). This view reflects both the history 
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its citizens made their own laws and the city was not under the 
control of an outside power. In his study of autonomy, Gerald 
Dworkin notes that the term autonomy is used “in an exceedingly 
broad fashion.” 
It is used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty (positive or negative 
in Berlin’s terminology), sometimes as equivalent to self-rule or 
sovereignty, sometimes as identical with freedom of the will. It is 
equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, 
responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is identified with qualities of 
self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom from obligation, 
with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one’s own 
interests. It is even equated by some economists with the 
impossibility of interpersonal comparisons. It is related to actions, 
to beliefs, to reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other 
persons, to thoughts, and to principles. About the only features 
held constant from one author to another are that autonomy is a 
feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have.108 
Professor Dworkin concludes, “[i]t is very unlikely that there is a 
core meaning which underlies all these various uses of the term.”109 
There are, however, a number of central ideas that seem to be a part 
of all—or nearly all—accounts of autonomy. These ideas are self-
direction, independence, and the ability to choose and implement a 
life plan. 
One disputed issue—perhaps the disputed issue—in the 
philosophy of autonomy is the role or place for the influence of 
others on the individual or entity that is autonomous. What is the 
role of community in the exercise of individual autonomy? Is the 
state’s obligation to stay out of the way, or does it have an 
affirmative duty to create conditions that will facilitate the 
development of human autonomy? And must the state remain 
neutral regarding various conceptions of the good life, or can it take 
measures that will favor some conceptions of the good life over 
others? 
and current usage of the term autonomy, but as will be clear from the discussion below, the 
conditions for exercising autonomy may be different in individual and institutional contexts. 
Institutional autonomy is discussed infra at Part IV, and individual autonomy is discussed 
infra at Part V. 
 108. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 6 (1988). 
 109. Id. 
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The conditions that must prevail in order for individuals or 
institutions to be able to lead autonomous lives is a matter of 
considerable disagreement. I will briefly outline three possibilities—
independence, interdependence, and inter-independence—none of 
which is meant to describe the views of any particular author, but 
each of which illustrates broadly different approaches to 
understanding the conditions that must prevail in order for one to 
live an autonomous life.  
The first conception is based upon an ideal of absolute 
independence. According to this vision, the key condition for being 
able to exercise autonomy is to be left alone, free from the influence 
or interference of others. The basic idea is that people should 
compose their own lives and be able to do so free from coercion in 
matters of fundamental importance. At an institutional level, the 
ideal of separation of church and state reflects this ambition, and the 
guiding metaphor is of a “wall of separation” between church and 
state, dividing each area into its own sphere of activity and influence, 
in which it will remain untouched by the other. 
The second conception of autonomy is based upon an ideal of 
interdependence. According to this vision, autonomy is possible only 
within thickly contextualized social structures, where each person or 
institution has significant obligations to others that must be met in 
order for those others to have the ability to exercise autonomy. 
The third conception of autonomy is based upon an ideal of 
inter-independence, a somewhat counterintuitive idea, which on the 
one hand requires neither separation nor isolation, but which on the 
other hand reserves a larger place for independence than does a 
conception of autonomy based upon interdependence. 
A. Independence 
The first conception, or really group of conceptions, of 
autonomy centers on the idea of independence. Echoing Kant’s 
argument for the fundamental importance of independence of the 
will, Joel Feinberg has stated, “I am autonomous if I rule me, and no 
one else rules I.”110 
This conception of autonomy receives its classic articulation by 
John Stuart Mill in his essay, On Liberty, and was forcefully 
 110. Joel Feinberg, The Idea of a Free Man, in EDUCATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
REASON 161 (1972). 
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articulated in the Eighteenth century by philosophers and politicians 
such as Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat Condorcet, Thomas 
Paine, and Benjamin Constant. In its strongest formulation, 
autonomy requires complete independence from all other 
influences.111 According to Isaiah Berlin, while personal freedom will 
have limits based upon protecting the liberties of others, 
a certain vacuum round him has to be created, a certain space 
within which he may be allowed to fulfill what might be called his 
reasonable wishes. One should not criticize these wishes. Each 
man’s ends are his own; the business of the State is to prevent 
collisions; to act as a kind of traffic policeman and night watchman 
. . . ; simply to see to it that people do not clash with each other 
too much in the fulfilling of those personal ends about which they 
themselves are the ultimate authorities. Liberty means non-
encroachment; liberty therefore means non-impingement by one 
person on another.”112 
 Autonomy is contrasted, in Kant’s terminology, to heteronomy, 
the determination of one’s will by forces outside oneself.113 Strong 
 111. Immanuel Kant and Jean-Paul Sartre, although very different in their ethical views, 
share a conception of autonomy that depends upon individuals living in a social context that 
affords complete moral independence. Kant encourages us to resist the “self-imposed 
immaturity” of trusting in the authority of others. CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF 
MORAL COMPLEXITY 78 (1987); see also IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 440–45 (James W. Ellington trans., 1981). Although Sartre did not 
share Kant’s belief that all rational and autonomous agents will choose to abide a single moral 
law, like Kant, Sartre conceives of autonomous action being the work of independent actors 
operating in willful isolation. For Sartre the most important moral fact is the irrevocable reality 
of fundamental human freedom. Only by accepting one’s radical freedom can a human being 
eschew the “bad faith” of relying upon a misconceived form of psychological determinism and 
recognize that the human will is the absolute origin of its acts. A human being, according to 
Sartre, is capable of acting as a moral agent only when she recognizes her freedom and takes 
complete responsibility for her choices. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 
(Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956). 
 112. ISAIAH BERLIN, FREEDOM AND ITS BETRAYAL: SIX ENEMIES OF HUMAN LIBERTY 
52–53 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). This recently published volume of Isaiah Berlin’s influential 
BBC lectures has recently been posthumously published and provides an early and striking 
example of Berlin’s lifelong occupation with the meaning of liberty and the various ways in 
which that term has been construed. 
 113. KANT, supra note 111, at 440–45. William Galston observes that Kant’s view of 
autonomy combines, to borrow Isaiah Berlin’s terminology, a view of ethics based on positive 
freedom and a view of politics based on negative freedom. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL 
PURPOSES 83 (1991). 
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versions of autonomy require complete independence of the will, 
what I term “stark independence.”114 
Conceptions of autonomy based upon the idea of independence, 
however, need not be conceptualized in such a strong manner. 
Professor Joseph Raz explains that the basic idea behind the ideal of 
personal autonomy is that people should compose their own lives: 
“The autonomous person is a (part) author of [her] own life. The 
ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to 
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive 
decisions throughout their lives.”115 Professor Raz contrasts an 
autonomous life with a life devoid of choices or without awareness of 
choices, of coerced choices, or of simply “drifting through life 
without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose.”116 
Professor Raz’s weaker conception of autonomy does not require 
complete independence, although it does contemplate an absence of 
coercion and invidious forms of psychological manipulation, as well 
as the existence of, awareness of, and the wherewithal to pursue a 
variety of life plans. Following Raz, Professor Carolyn Evans argues 
that 
Coercion in matters of fundamental importance, such as belief in 
the existence of God, or an afterlife, or a religiously based set of 
morals or obligations towards others, would deny people the ability 
to be the authors of their own lives. The fullest personal autonomy 
will exist in a society in which a person sees the availability of a 
range of good choices in regard to religion or belief and is able to 
make meaningful decisions about which, if any, of these choices he 
or she wishes to adopt.117 
A conception of autonomy based upon the idea of independence 
(of both individuals and institutions) had a strong influence on much 
of the religion-clause jurisprudence in the United States.118 Most 
obviously, Jefferson’s metaphor of a wall of separation dividing 
 114. For a critique of the political morality of stark independence, see ISAIAH BERLIN, 
Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 124 (1969); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, 
AFTER VIRTUE 119 (1981); Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered 
Self, 12 POL. THEORY 90–91 (1984).  
 115. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986). 
 116. Id. at 371. 
 117. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 30. 
 118. As noted above, a counter-theme in U.S. Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
accommodation. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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religion on the one hand and the state on the other is a clear 
example of a vision of autonomy that rests upon independence. On 
this view, the domain of the state and the domain of religion are 
divided into respective spheres, and the mandate of the First 
Amendment is to prevent either from intruding upon the precincts 
of the other. Territorial metaphors prevail, and the wall becomes an 
apt symbol for the ideal relationship—even if imperfectly realized—
between church and state. Because autonomy demands 
independence, the religion clauses require “mutual noninterference 
by church and state in each other’s affairs.”119 
B. Interdependence 
In sharp contrast to conceptions of autonomy that are based 
upon various understandings of independence, another group of 
conceptions of autonomy takes a markedly different tact in defining 
the social conditions that must prevail in order for autonomy to 
flourish. A conception of autonomy based upon conditions of thick 
social interdependence maintains that autonomy is possible only when 
exercised within a thick and embracing social setting, and only if one 
is true to one’s “real” self or “true” nature. On this view, the 
possibilities open to an autonomous agent are determined in large 
measure—perhaps almost completely—by the social context within 
which the agent is situated. Such conceptions of autonomy are 
closely related to Isaiah Berlin’s concept of positive liberty.120 
These views diverge significantly from independence-based 
conceptions of autonomy. A conception of autonomy based upon 
interdependence will suggest that human potential or nature can be 
truly realized only within a thick communal context. Religious, 
nonreligious, and a variety of utopian conceptions of the good life 
often posit a single truth or set of truths about human nature, the 
human good (or human flourishing), and the universe that justify 
significantly directing the choices available to a person, all in service 
of his or her own best interests. 
A wide variety of eighteenth-century philosophers held views that 
either explicitly or implicitly endorsed such a conception of 
autonomy. For example, Claude-Adrien Helvetius, who is often 
 119. NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 505 (2d ed. 1999). 
 120. BERLIN, supra note 114, at 118. 
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viewed as a forerunner of Benthamite utilitarianism, believed that he 
had discovered the single principle governing ethics and politics, 
namely the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Armed 
with this knowledge, he asserted that an enlightened political leader 
could enact laws that would maximize pleasure and minimize pain, 
without regard for human rights.121 Jean Jacques Rousseau settled 
the conflict between liberty and authority by defining them as the 
same thing; liberty he defined as wanting that which is good for me, 
that which will satisfy my true nature. And since human nature is 
unitary, what is good for one man will also be good for another. So 
what one person can truly want will never collide with what another 
person truly wants, and a state that forces one to be true to one’s 
nature is really acting to vindicate one’s freedom.122 Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte reaches a similar conclusion by focusing not upon personal 
self-realization, but collective self-realization. According to Berlin, 
Fichte contrasts compositum, which is a mere artificial combination, 
and totum, [or] total nation, which is something organic, single, 
whole, and in which the higher principle dominates, the higher 
principle which may take the shape of a great nation, or of history. 
And the greatest agent of this force is a divine conqueror or leader 
whose business it is to play upon his nation as an artist plays upon 
his instrument, to mould it into a single organic whole, as the 
painter, the sculptor moulds his materials, as the composer creates 
patterns of sound.123 
On this view, individual autonomy is realized when it is made to 
fit harmoniously with the triumphant state by acquiescing to its 
destiny.124 Perhaps most influentially, such a view of autonomy was 
 121. BERLIN, supra note 112, at 13–20. Isaiah Berlin forcefully articulated utilitarianism’s 
hostility towards rights. 
To have a right which nobody may impinge upon, to have a right which nobody 
may trample, to have a right to do or be or have this or that, whether anybody likes 
it or not, is an obstacle to the transformation of society in the direction of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
Id. at 19. For a utilitarian, according to Berlin, rights are (as Bentham insisted) “nonsense on 
stilts.” Id. at 25. Berlin further states, “If the sole criterion of action is happiness and 
unhappiness, these odd rights which stick out in an obstinate way, and may not be smoothed 
over by the legislator, must be flattened out.” Id. at 20. 
 122. See id. at 37–41. 
 123. Id. at 70. 
 124. “Individual freedom, which in Kant has a sacred value, has for Fichte become a 
choice made by something super-personal. It chooses me, I do not choose it, and acquiescence 
is a privilege, a duty, a self-lifting, a kind of self-transcendent rising to a higher level.” Id. at 71. 
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developed by Hegel, who focused upon the triumph of natural 
power in his dialectic of history in which liberty is seen as the 
recognition of necessity, and liberty consists in aligning oneself with 
what is necessary.125 
While these thinkers differ dramatically in their diagnosis and 
prescription of the true purpose or end of human beings, they share 
something important in common: a belief that there is one true good 
for humankind, and a belief that everything that a person can 
rationally want can be harmonized with that vision. As such, 
autonomy does not consist of having space in which there can be no 
interference with human choice, be it good or bad, foolish or wise; 
rather, autonomy is achieved when one realizes one’s true potential, 
and it may take the strong hand of a tutoring state to educate and 
direct one towards that end. 
A conception of autonomy resting upon interdependence has not 
been particularly influential in religious freedom jurisprudence in the 
United States, primarily because of the Establishment Clause. In 
contrast, in Europe where religious establishments are much more 
common, an understanding of the proper relationship between the 
church and the state is heavily influenced by this conception of 
autonomy. 
C. Inter-Independence 
A third conception of autonomy, which I label somewhat 
paradoxically inter-independence, seeks a middle ground between 
conceptions of autonomy based upon conditions of stark 
independence, as well as conceptions of autonomy based upon 
According to Berlin, Fichte identifies “freedom with self-assertion, with the imposition of your 
will upon others, with the removal of obstacles to your desires, and finally with a victorious 
nation marching to fulfill its destiny in answer to the internal demands given to it by 
transcendental reason, before which all material things must crumble.” Id. at 73. 
 125. Isaiah Berlin explains Hegel’s conception of human freedom as follows: 
What is freedom but doing what I wish to do, getting what I want to get, obtaining 
from life what I am seeking for? I can only get this if I do not run against the laws 
which govern the world. If I defy them I shall be inevitably defeated. . . . If I wish to 
be effective historically, I must not set myself against the laws which govern human 
beings and institutions. This non-defiance is not an acquiescence which I 
consciously adopt with resignation, although I would rather be free. To understand 
why things cannot be otherwise is to want them not to be otherwise, because to 
understand things is to understand the reasons from them. 
Id. at 89. 
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conditions of thick interdependence. On this view, stark independence 
is unappealing because in a world where the government plays a 
significant social and economic role in the lives of citizens and 
institutions, requiring stark independence can easily manifest itself as 
indifference or hostility rather than neutrality. Since human beings 
are social creatures, we need some resources in order to be able to 
develop into autonomous agents. On the other hand, thick 
interdependence is unappealing because it is insufficiently respectful 
of the pluralism and diversity that has come to characterize, and in all 
likelihood will continue to characterize, our political communities. If 
the state strongly favors or forces upon its subjects a particular 
conception of the good, then this will retard the development of 
autonomy. 
A conception of autonomy based upon inter-independence is 
difficult to conceptualize and articulate. Autonomy based upon the 
idea of inter-independence will be more willing than independence-
based conceptions of autonomy to recognize that human beings are 
born into and raised within social contexts. When we are born, our 
condition is one of near complete dependence upon others for 
survival and nurture, and even as we mature and become increasingly 
independent, it is evident that the possibilities available to us are in 
large measure defined by the social conditions within which we find 
ourselves. We do not create ourselves ex nihilio, as self-defining 
adults, but emerge, through education and inculcation, as members 
of particular families and communities. If my polity insists on 
isolating me, insists on erecting walls of separation between me and 
its social institutions, and refuses on grounds of eschewing 
paternalism to educate and equip me to survive—and more, to have 
a range of life options and possibilities among which I may choose 
and pursue—such a state, for it would not even begin to qualify as a 
society, much less a community, could not in reality be said to be 
interested in my autonomy. 
On the other hand, unlike conceptions of autonomy based upon 
thick interdependence, a conception based upon inter-independence 
will continue to insist that there must be a distinction between the 
public and private spheres. Such a conception of autonomy will 
recognize that autonomy is not possible if the state, or some other 
authority, discerns and coerces me to follow a particular plan that 
facilitates the realization of my “true” nature or potential. Even if I 
have a single true nature, and a single true course of action is 
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necessary for me to realize my innate potential, I cannot exercise 
autonomy if I am forced to abide by a plan for realizing my natural 
possibilities. 
A conception of autonomy that is based upon relationships of 
inter-independence will view stark independence as a false ideal: 
untrue because autonomy is only possible within social settings; and 
unappealing because many of humanity’s greatest achievements are 
the result of collective, cooperative, and coordinated interaction. 
Likewise, inter-independence will view a conception of autonomy 
based upon thick interdependence as a false ideal: untrue because 
autonomy cannot be forced upon us; and unappealing as an 
empirical matter because history is littered with corpses left by 
theocrats, idealists, tyrants, and despots of every persuasion who 
were dedicated to imposing upon others their view of a single, true 
vision of human nature, potential, and destiny. 
Although a complete development and articulation of the 
conditions for exercising an ideal of inter-independence must await 
another day, a few general observations can be made. 
First, inter-independence is committed to a muscular, though not 
unlimited, independence. Coercion and manipulation, but not the 
ability to influence and be influenced, are destructive of inter-
independence. A life can be meaningfully called autonomous only if it 
is to a considerable extent the creation or composition of the person 
living it. Space must be left for what Isaiah Berlin described as 
negative freedom, a sphere within which we as individual agents are 
free to direct our own lives. This commitment to independence 
presupposes a distinction between private and public life, although 
there will be some overlap between these spheres, and although 
there will be mutual influences between them. 
Second, a conception of autonomy based upon the idea of inter-
independence implies inclusion, being allowed to play an active role 
in a collective community’s social and political life. Inclusion is 
closely related to respect, for meaningful respect is not possible if one 
is ignored or pushed to the margins of public life. Inter-independence 
forbids exclusion. This implies the ability to influence and be 
influenced by others. Ultimately, inter-independence does not 
pretend that autonomous beings are, can, or should be completely 
free from the presence and influence of others. 
Inclusion does not rest upon a hope for complete or perfect 
convergence of moral or social viewpoints. That is the false and 
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dangerous dream of thick interdependence and conceptions of 
autonomy based upon positive liberty.126 A commitment to an 
ongoing, shared normative discourse need not rest upon the belief 
that we will come up with arguments for a moral theory, religious 
doctrine, or social program that no rational person can reject. 
Inclusive discourse is based upon the belief that discussion and 
argument in moral matters is largely about learning to understand 
and respect each other and about taking responsibility for the 
implications of our moral positions.127 This is not to say that moral 
discourse is not about persuasion—it is—but it is not exclusively 
about persuasion. Stephen Macedo, for example, acknowledges that 
when “public reasonableness has done its work,” moral viewpoints 
will remain “plural and divergent.”128 An ideal of autonomy based 
upon inter-independence aims at a polity characterized by political 
moderation and inclusion, for a form of fraternity that goes beyond 
bare toleration. 
Third, inter-independence relies upon a shared commitment to 
mutual respect among autonomous agents. This respect will imply 
tolerance, but it includes more than mere forbearance of others. The 
respect grows out of both sides of the inter-independence ideal—the 
independence side, as well as the relational side. Hostility, 
discrimination, extreme variations in opportunity and access to social 
resources, or marginalization or exclusion of individuals from shared 
social and political life are all destructive of autonomy. Respect, 
however, requires not merely leaving another person alone, but 
helping her equip herself to live a life that can be characterized as 
autonomous, and engaging her in what Stephen Macedo has called a 
discourse of public reasonableness.129 
This type of discourse rests upon a commitment to public 
justification, which aims not only to give good reasons for state 
action, but also “seeks reasons that can be widely seen to be good by 
persons such as they are.”130 Macedo asks, Why public justification? 
He answers: 
 126. See supra Part III.B. 
 127. See STANLEY CAVELL, Knowledge and the Basis of Morality, in THE CLAIM OF 
REASON 247–73 (1982). 
 128. STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 71 (1990). 
 129. Id. at 39–77. 
 130. Id. at 46. 
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We acknowledge, first of all, the permanent fact of pluralism: 
reasonable people disagree not only about preferences and 
interests, but widely and deeply about moral, philosophical, 
religious, and other views. While acknowledging pluralism we, 
secondly, respect as free and equal moral beings all those who pass 
certain threshold tests of reasonableness: we respect those whose 
disagreement with us does not impugn their reasonableness.131 
This discourse of public justification requires listening to others; 
letting others speak; and giving reasons to them that they can 
understand and acknowledge when actions are taken that affect 
them. As Macedo puts it, “[p]ublic justification embodies a complex 
form of respect for persons: it respects both our capacity for a shared 
reasonableness, but also ‘the burdens of reason.’”132 
Fourth, inter-independence relies upon empowerment, having the 
abilities necessary to exercise autonomy. Although, as Joseph Raz has 
pointed out, it is part of the “special character of autonomy that one 
cannot make another person autonomous,” this does not mean that 
others cannot help, particularly in helping secure “the background 
conditions which enable a person to be autonomous.”133 The ideal of 
stark independence, while romantic, makes the mistake of assuming 
that respect for others means just leaving them alone. As Raz points 
out, “There is more one can do to help another person have an 
autonomous life than stand off and refrain from coercing or 
manipulating them,” including helping them develop the “inner 
capacities required for the conduct of an autonomous life.”134 The 
ideal of inter-independence also avoids one of the cardinal mistakes of 
an ideal of stark independence—a mistake, characteristic of arrogant 
youth, of believing that we are entirely self-made persons. 
In the case of personal autonomy, an individual must be 
provided with an education and with enough other opportunities 
and resources that he or she is empowered to exercise independence 
and choice. An autonomous agent must have an adequate range of 
options from which to choose projects and commitments.135 Inter-
independence implies mutual obligation for individuals to help 
 131. Id. at 47. 
 132. Id. at 47 (quoting John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping 
Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 235–38 (1989)). 
 133. RAZ, supra note 115, at 407. 
 134. Id. at 407–08. 
 135. See id. at 410–12. 
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develop the inner capacities—mental, emotional, and physical—of 
others, which will enable them to conduct autonomous lives. 
Autonomy based upon an ideal of stark independence posits that 
we may have nothing in common; autonomy based upon an ideal of 
thick interdependence posits that we have everything in common 
even though we may not have the good sense to realize it. Inter-
independence posits a middle ground—that we share much, although 
not everything, in common, and that while we should cherish and 
nurture that common ground, we must also carve out space for each 
other to exercise our independent visions of who we are and ought 
to be. 
Thus far, I have identified three primary attitudes towards the 
proper relationship of church and state and of the scope of individual 
religious freedom—separation, cooperation, and accommodation. I 
have also argued that each of these attitudes is based upon a different 
conception of a single concept: autonomy. Separation is based upon 
a conception of autonomy that strives for independence. Cooperation 
is based upon a conception of autonomy that strives for 
interdependence. And accommodation is based upon a conception of 
autonomy that strives for what I have called inter-independence. In 
Part III, I have tried to sketch the characteristics and differences 
between these three conceptions of autonomy. In doing so, I have 
set the stage for an exploration of how these three conceptions of 
autonomy are manifested in cases involving religious freedom issues. 
In the next three parts of this Article, I will explore the 
implications of these three conceptions of autonomy for issues 
involving the autonomy of churches, the autonomy of the state, and 
the religious autonomy of the individual. In Part IV, I will focus on 
institutional autonomy—first, the autonomy of churches, and 
second, the autonomy of the state. In Part V, I will turn to issues 
involving religion and personal autonomy. In Part VI, I will explore 
the implications of each of these conceptions of autonomy for several 
current controversies in the United States involving the relationship 
of church and state. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
In trying to determine the appropriate contours of interaction 
between church and state, the autonomy of two types of institutions 
is implicated: the autonomy of churches and the autonomy of the 
state. What autonomy means and what is required for church and 
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state to have autonomy will depend upon one’s conception of 
autonomy. I will argue that in the United States since World War II, 
two conceptions of autonomy (one based upon the independence of 
church and state and the other based upon the inter-independence of 
church and state) have vied for dominance. In Europe, a third 
conception of autonomy based upon the interdependence of church 
and state has been dominant in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court. In Part IV.A, I will discuss a number of contexts in which the 
autonomy of the church is a primary concern, and in Part IV.B, I will 
focus upon situations in which the autonomy of the state is at 
stake.136 
A. The Autonomy of the Church 
Issues concerning the autonomy of churches arise in a number of 
contexts, including: whether or not a state church is permitted; 
whether and the extent to which direct state aid to churches is 
permissible; whether churches qualify for and are permitted to 
receive tax exemptions; whether states can provide aid to religious 
schools, and if so, what the limits are on that aid; whether and the 
extent to which the state can influence or dictate decisions involving 
church property, officials, and doctrine; whether churches are 
entitled to have a distinct legal personality with standing to seek 
protection of its legal rights; and whether and the extent to which 
churches can qualify for exemptions from general laws. 
In addition to their institutional dimension, many of these issues 
have implications for individual religious liberty as well, especially the 
freedom of religion or belief of people who find themselves in the 
minority with respect to matters of religion or belief. Thus, to some 
extent the outcomes of cases concerned with institutional autonomy 
also have implications for individual autonomy. 
1. State church 
An established church would clearly be unacceptable under a 
conception of autonomy based upon independence. It would also be 
 136. As will be apparent, classification is sometimes difficult and disputable. In many 
instances, a particular issue will implicate both the autonomy of the church and the autonomy 
of the state (for example, in the case of a state church). I have tried to classify issues according 
to the autonomy interest that seems to me to be primarily implicated, but the classification of 
an issue is more a matter of impression and convenience than of metaphysics. 
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unacceptable under a conception of autonomy based upon inter-
independence, because a state church would not have the degree of 
independence required to realize the inter-independence ideal of self-
direction and composition. From the perspective of inter-
independence, an established church would present too great a 
possibility for coercion and manipulation of church affairs by political 
overseers. The possibility of church self-direction would be 
compromised, and the distinction between public and private spheres 
would be significantly weakened. 
In contrast, a conception of autonomy based upon 
interdependence would permit a state religious establishment, since 
the roles and purposes of the state and the church are viewed as 
being complimentary and mutually reinforcing. If church-state 
relations are based upon the interdependence of church and state, a 
religious establishment will not necessarily be viewed as being 
inimical to the autonomy of the state, to the autonomy of the 
church, or to religious freedom. A shared state or national identity 
may be seen as important for social and political stability, and the 
role and purposes of the church and the state may be seen as being 
mutually supportive and reinforcing. Religion may be viewed as the 
social glue that holds society together. Overt coercion of 
membership may be recognized as being inconsistent with individual 
autonomy, but the existence of a church that is endorsed, supported, 
and even given preferential treatment by the state may not be seen as 
violating religious freedom human rights guarantees and as being 
not only fully consistent with but supportive of the autonomy of 
both the church and the state. 
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the European 
Court concerning a state church reflect different conceptions of 
autonomy. 
United States: The Establishment Clause clearly forbids the 
United States from having a national church,137 although it did not 
originally prohibit states from having state churches. By the time the 
Free Exercise Clause138 and the Establishment Clause139 were 
 137. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black stated that, “[t]he 
‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can set up a church.” Id. at 15. 
 138. The Free Exercise Clause was first held to apply to the states in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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incorporated to apply to action by states as well as by the federal 
government (following the Civil War and the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment), no state still had an established church.140 
The prohibition in the United States of a state church is consistent 
with a conception of autonomy based upon the ideal of complete 
independence of church and state, as well as a conception of 
autonomy based upon inter-independence. 
Europe: The European Convention permits an established state 
church. This conclusion was confirmed in Darby v. Sweden, in which 
the European Court held that an established church does not violate 
the Convention.141 The court did say, however, that a state church 
cannot force people to become members or prohibit people from 
leaving the church.142 The European Court’s conclusion reflects a 
conception of autonomy based upon the interdependence of church 
and state. 
2. Direct state aid to churches 
A conception of autonomy based upon the independence of 
church and state would clearly prohibit direct state aid to churches. 
Although it may be viewed as a closer call, the same outcome would 
be expected from the inter-independence conception of autonomy, 
since independence, even if not perfectly realized, will be jeopardized 
by financial dependence of churches upon the state. While a 
prohibition on both direct and indirect state aid to churches 
comports with a conception of autonomy based upon independence, 
some aid, especially if it is indirect rather than direct, might be 
permitted by a conception of autonomy based upon inter-
independence. However, such aid would be scrutinized based upon 
the purpose and effect such aid has upon the independence of 
churches and the independence of the state. On the other hand, a 
conception of autonomy based upon interdependence might easily 
permit significant levels of direct aid from the state to a favored 
church or group of churches. 
 139. The Establishment Clause was first applied to the states in Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 140. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the 
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1591. 
 141. Darby v. Sweden, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990), 13 E.H.R.R. 774 (1990) 
(Lexis). 
 142. Id. at para. 45. 
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United States: Under United States law, neither the federal nor 
state governments are permitted to provide direct aid to religion,143 
reflecting a conception of autonomy consistent with both 
independence and inter-independence. The distinction between direct 
and indirect aid, however, is not always clear, and as the recent 
debate about charitable choice illustrates, separationist and 
accommodationist viewpoints diverge sharply upon the permissibility 
of allowing religiously affiliated organizations to participate in such 
programs.144 As will be discussed in greater detail below, allowing 
parochial schools to benefit from tuition voucher programs, allowing 
church-affiliated entities to qualify for state funding grants for social 
service programs, and allowing scholarships to be used by students 
studying for the clergy are examples of state aid to religion that 
could jeopardize the independence of churches to an extent that 
would violate the principle of independence. Thus, on the question of 
state aid to churches, in the United States there appears to be a 
significant movement from a conception of autonomy based upon 
independence to a conception based upon inter-independence. 
Europe: In contrast, under the European Convention a relatively 
high degree of cooperation, support, and preferential treatment for a 
particular church is permissible. For example, in Darby v. Sweden, the 
court held that the state may directly collect taxes for an established 
church, and in order for an individual to be exempt from such a 
requirement, the state can require a person to notify the state that 
she has changed religious affiliation.145 In addition, a nonbeliever 
may be required to pay the proportion of taxes to a state church that 
the church uses for carrying out “secular functions,” such as keeping 
records of births and deaths, performing marriages, and arranging 
funerals, even if the nonbeliever opposes such involvement of the 
church in secular functions.146 A large degree of direct state aid to a 
particular church reflects a conception of autonomy based upon 
interdependence of church and state. 
 143. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 9, 15 (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another.”). 
 144. Charitable choice is discussed in greater detail infra Part VI.C. 
 145. 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). 
 146. Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB and others v. Finland, 85-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 29 (1996), 22 E.H.R.R. CD 69, 69 (1996) (Westlaw). 
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3. Tax exemptions 
Autonomy conceived as requiring strict independence of church 
and state would not only permit, but also probably guarantee, tax-
exempt status to churches. Thus, while separation is sometimes 
viewed as being hostile to religion, strict independence is not always 
inimical to the interests of churches. Autonomy based upon inter-
independence would appear to permit a tax exemption for churches 
since doing so would facilitate churches’ ability to utilize donations 
to pursue their self-defined missions and would reduce troubling 
entanglements of churches with the state. It is less likely, however, 
that inter-independence would view tax exemptions as required in 
order to preserve the autonomy of church and state, since a mild 
degree of engagement between church and state would be viewed as 
being permissible. Especially if churches are able to receive a 
significant degree of direct or indirect financial support from the 
state (for example, by being able to participate in access to state 
funds through finance social service programs), the payment of taxes 
as an ordinary burden of citizenship and participation in the program 
of public benefits may be seen as justifying the inclusion of churches 
in tax programs. Thus, under a view of autonomy based upon inter-
independence, certain types of generally applicable taxes, such as sales 
tax on religious literature and perhaps even property taxes, would 
appear to be permissible. Autonomy based upon interdependence 
would not necessarily require or permit a tax exemption, since 
concerns about engagement and entanglement of church and state 
are much less likely to be perceived as problematic. Under 
interdependence, favorable tax treatment for preferred churches 
would be expected. 
United States: Tax exemptions that benefit churches have been 
permitted under the Establishment Clause, but such benefits must be 
equally available to all churches and must be equally available to 
nonreligious charitable organizations. U.S. churches are exempt 
from paying taxes, not as a matter of constitutional right, but 
pursuant to legislative enactment. Churches are included in the list 
of charitable and other nonprofit organizations that can qualify for 
tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code.147 The Supreme Court has held that the tax-exempt status of 
 147. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
3SCH-FIN 12/1/2004  7:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1264 
 
churches does not violate the Establishment Clause on the grounds 
that it is a neutral benefit available to all churches and to other 
nonprofit organizations.148 Churches have also been exempted from 
certain generally applicable tax laws. For example, in St. Martin 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, the Supreme Court 
held that a church-sponsored school was exempt from paying 
unemployment compensation tax required under federal law.149 
In addition, the Supreme Court has disapproved of laws that 
disadvantage a particular religion but not religions generally. For 
example, in Larson v. Valente, the Court struck down a state statute 
requiring religious organizations that receive less than half their total 
contributions from members or affiliated organizations to register 
and report their income.150 The statute in question affected only the 
Unification Church, and the Court stated that the exemption 
scheme violated the “clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause,” namely that “one religious denomination cannot be 
officially preferred over another.”151 
The approach to tax-exemption issues in the United States has 
reflected the presumptions and concerns of a conception of 
autonomy based upon inter-independence. Tax exemptions are not a 
matter of constitutional right as one would expect from a conception 
of autonomy based on strict independence. The indirect benefits to 
churches created by a tax exemption are not constitutionally 
required, but neither are they constitutionally forbidden. Instead, tax 
exemptions may be permissible when the autonomy interests of 
churches are significantly implicated. For example, the Court has 
reasoned that tax exemptions are permissible because they reduce the 
entanglement of church and state, which is problematic from the 
perspective of inter-independence. Requiring laws that provide an 
 148. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672–73 (1970). Although the Court analyzed 
tax-exemptions from the perspective of neutrality (the government was exercising “benevolent 
neutrality towards churches and religious exercise generally so long as none was favored over 
others and none suffered interference”), autonomy would appear to be a much more 
promising basis upon which to justify the Court’s outcome. While neither outcome would be 
neutral towards churches (since they benefit from an exemption and are burdened by a tax 
obligation), the autonomy of church and state is enhanced when the state’s taxing authority 
does not cover churches. 
 149. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 
(1981). 
 150. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). 
 151. Id. at 244. 
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indirect benefit to religion not to discriminate against some religions 
is also consistent with the mandate of inter-independence for mutual 
respect and inclusion. 
On the other hand, in cases involving commercial activities such 
as the sale of religious literature, the Supreme Court has held that 
the Establishment Clause does not exempt churches from paying a 
generally applicable sales tax.152 If autonomy required complete 
independence, such taxes should be prohibited. But when churches 
are participating in the commercial world, which falls squarely within 
the states’ domain, inter-independence does not prohibit being 
included in a general tax mechanism.153 The concept of inter-
independence allows a degree of entanglement but places bounds on 
the extent of entanglement between church and state that would be 
permitted in an environment of interdependence. For example, in 
Larson, because the Minnesota Act in question had a “valid secular 
purpose” when viewed as a whole,154 the Court did not rule out the 
idea that “the burdens of compliance with the Act would be 
intrinsically impermissible if they were imposed evenhandedly.”155 
Thus both when allowing and disallowing exemptions from taxation, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has followed a path illuminated by a 
conception of autonomy based upon inter-independence. 
Europe: The Commission has approved of tax arrangements that 
provide benefits to one or some churches to the exclusion of other 
 152. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
 153. In Swaggart, the Court focused on the commercial nature of the literature sales 
rather than the religious nature of the literature: 
The sorts of government entanglement that we have found to violate the 
Establishment Clause have been far more invasive than the level of contact created 
by the administration of neutral tax laws.  
  . . . .  
  . . . [T]he imposition of the sales and use tax without an exemption for 
appellant does not require the State to inquire into the religious content of the items 
sold or the religious motivation for selling or purchasing the items, because the 
materials are subject to the tax regardless of content or motive. From the State’s 
point of view, the critical question is not whether the materials are religious, but 
whether there is a sale or a use, a question which involves only a secular 
determination. 
Id. at 395–96. 
 154. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 248 (“Appellants assert, and we acknowledge, that the State 
of Minnesota has a significant interest in protecting its citizens from abusive practices in the 
solicitation of funds for charity, and that this interest retains importance when the solicitation 
is conducted by a religious organization.”). 
 155. Id. at 253. 
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churches. In Iglesia Bautista ‘El Salvador’ and Ortega Moratilla v. 
Spain,156 the Commission held that a tax system that gave 
preferences to the Catholic Church, but not to Protestant churches, 
did not violate Article 9 or Article 14. In that case, the Catholic 
Church received a tax exemption from property tax, based upon a 
Concordat between the Catholic Church and Spain, and a Protestant 
church argued that it too should be exempt from property tax. The 
Commission denied the claim that the preferential tax system 
violated Article 9, on the grounds that there is no right to an 
exemption from ordinary tax obligations and there were “objective 
and reasonable” justifications for the difference in treatment.157 
Thus, according to Professor Evans, under the jurisprudence of the 
European Court, “the State may legitimately tax one Church and 
not another, and give financial assistance to one Church and not 
another, if there is some arrangement between the privileged Church 
and the State which imposes reciprocal obligations on the two 
parties.”158 
This outcome reflects a conception of autonomy based upon 
interdependence of church and state. From this point of view, the 
state is not required to be neutral toward religion or to give equal 
treatment among churches. Thus it is entirely natural for the state to 
view one church as having a particularly significant role in the life of 
the nation, and receiving favorable treatment from the state not only 
enhances the ability of that institution to perform that distinctive and 
valuable role, but also benefits the state through the social good 
accomplished by the favored church. Under a conception of 
autonomy based on interdependence, the state is viewed as being 
competent to make differentiations based upon “objective and 
reasonable” justifications for which religious institutions deserve 
special treatment and support. On this view, the autonomy of both 
the state and the favored church are reinforced by the mutually 
symbiotic relationship between these institutions. 
 156. 72 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 256 (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
 157. In the Iglesia Bautista case, the Catholic Church had undertaken such reciprocal 
obligations by placing its historical, artistic, and documentary heritage at the service of the 
Spanish people in exchange for benefits from the state including the property tax exemption. 
Id. at 261. 
 158. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 83. 
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4. State aid to religious schools 
Autonomy conceived as requiring independence of church and 
state would not permit state aid to religious schools, whether direct 
or indirect. A view of autonomy based on interdependence would 
have no difficulty with such aid. A view based on inter-independence 
would be very skeptical of aid from the state to religious schools, 
since such aid might create dependence of religious schools upon the 
state and might also result in situations where church autonomy is 
threatened by conditions placed by the state upon access to the aid. 
Nevertheless, inter-independence might view certain types of aid as 
being permissible if the programs were carefully structured and 
limited. A conception of autonomy based upon inter-independence 
would consider the effects of such programs upon the independence 
of both church and state and the importance of inclusion and the 
impact upon the distinction between public and private spheres of 
life, as well as whether exclusion would evince hostility and 
discrimination, and whether participation is necessary for the 
empowerment required to exercise autonomy. 
United States: State aid to parochial schools has been very 
controversial and the subject of extensive litigation in the United 
States.159 The Supreme Court has struggled mightily to construct a 
coherent approach to such cases, and the result has been a complex, 
convoluted, and internally inconsistent series of cases. In 1947 in 
Everson v. Board of Education,160 the first case that applied the 
Establishment Clause to the states, the Court upheld a state program 
that reimbursed parents for the costs of busing their children to 
religious schools, but the Court employed strongly separationist 
rhetoric.161 This case provided the wellspring for both separationist 
 159. For a sampling of the sheer number of state and Supreme Court cases addressing 
state aid to parochial schools, see, for example, Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Constitutionality, 
Under State Constitutional Provision Forbidding Financial Aid to Religious Sects, of Public 
Provision of Schoolbus Service for Private School Pupils, 41 A.L.R. 3d 344 (1972); A.G. Barnett, 
Annotation, Furnishing Free Textbooks to Sectarian School or Student Therein, 93 A.L.R. 2d 986 
(1964); C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Public Payment of Tuition, Scholarship, or the Like, as 
Respects Sectarian School, 81 A.L.R. 2d 1309 (1962). 
 160. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black reasoned that busing was a “public function” akin 
to providing fire and police services, and did not promote a “religious function.” Id. at 17–18. 
 161. “Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in 
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the 
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation 
between church and State.’” Id. at 16. 
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and accommodationist arguments and outcomes in a long line of 
cases over the next several decades. 
In cases dealing with state aid to religiously affiliated schools, the 
Supreme Court has vacillated between a conception of church-state 
autonomy requiring separation and independence and a conception 
based upon inter-independence, allowing for greater accommodation 
and inclusion. Some cases have reflected a view of autonomy based 
upon stark independence of church and state. For example, in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman,162 the Court held that states may not reimburse 
religious schools for the salaries of teachers of various secular subjects 
and that the state may not provide state-approved instructional 
materials to religious schools.163 The Court also held that the 
Establishment Clause was violated by state salary supplements to 
teachers at religious schools who taught only subjects offered in 
public schools using materials used in public schools.164 It also struck 
down grants to parochial schools that served low-income families to 
maintain and repair school facilities,165 as well as small (fifty-dollar) 
tax credits for low-income parents of children attending religious 
schools. In addition, the Court struck down payments for state-
mandated examinations prepared by teachers at religious schools,166 
and instructional materials such as maps, films, and laboratory 
equipment, provided to religious schools.167 Finally, the Court struck 
down programs providing therapeutic services, such as remedial 
speech and hearing therapy, on the premises of religious schools168 
and the reimbursement of bus transportation for children attending 
religious schools to participate in educational field trips.169 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has moved away from a 
strongly separationist stance with respect to state aid to religious 
schools and has permitted certain types of aid that are generally 
 162. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 163. Id. at 606–07. 
 164. Early v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 165. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973); 
see also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (reimbursements). 
 166. Id. 
 167. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 
229 (1977); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 476 (1973). 
 168. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
 169. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 225. 
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available to both religious and nonreligious private schools.170 The 
concerns of inter-independence have been evident in a number of 
cases. For example, in Board of Education v. Allen,171 the Supreme 
Court upheld a state policy allowing public school boards to lend 
textbooks to religious schools.172 The Court allowed remedial 
instruction off school grounds,173 later allowed remedial services on 
religious school premises174 (reversing two earlier cases175), allowed 
state reimbursement to religious schools for instructional materials 
such as maps and films176 (reversing earlier cases177), therapeutic 
services such as speech and hearing therapy at religious schools178 
(reversing an earlier case179), and reimbursement to religious schools 
for the costs of bus transportation for educational field trips180 
 170. See infra Part VI.B in which I discuss the Supreme Court’s move away from a 
separationist stance with vouchers and other forms of indirect aid to churches. For an 
interesting perspective on Supreme Court “flip-flops” on Establishment Clause issues, see 
Christopher E. Smith, Supreme Court Surprise: Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Move Toward 
Moderation, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 459 (1992). 
 171. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
 172. Id. at 243. In dissent, Justice Black advocated the view that the Establishment 
Clause requires complete independence of church and state. 
It is true, of course, that the New York law does not as yet formally adopt or 
establish a state religion. But it takes a great stride in that direction and coming 
events cast their shadows before them. The same powerful sectarian religious 
propagandists who have succeeded in securing passage of the present law to help 
religious schools carry on their sectarian religious purposes can and doubtless will 
continue their propaganda, looking toward complete domination and supremacy of 
their particular brand of religion. 
Id. at 251. 
 173. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248 (1977). 
 174. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234–35 (1997). 
 175. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412–13 (1985) (holding that the use of federal 
funds to pay salaries of public school employees who taught in religious schools violated the 
Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (holding 
that a school district’s programs that provided classes to nonpublic students in leased 
classrooms at nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause). 
 176. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000). 
 177. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (holding that a state’s loan of 
instructional materials, such as maps and laboratory equipment, violated the Establishment 
Clause); Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250 (same). 
 178. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793. 
 179. Meek, 421 U.S. at 371 (holding that state expenditures for auxiliary services “gave 
rise to a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state”). 
 180. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793. 
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(reversing an earlier case181). These cases represent a significant 
movement on the part of the Court from a conception of autonomy 
based upon independence to a conception of autonomy based upon 
inter-independence. 
The Court exhibited a similar movement as it became 
increasingly willing to allow state funds to flow to the benefit of 
religious institutions. In Tilton v. Richardson, the Supreme Court 
allowed a program providing federal construction grants to church-
related colleges for facilities devoted exclusively to secular 
educational purposes.182 Later, the Court approved a state revenue-
bond program permitting church-related colleges to borrow funds 
for constructing buildings at low interest.183 The Supreme Court has 
also allowed private religious colleges to participate in a state 
program providing noncategorical grants for nonsectarian use,184 
permitted a blind student to participate in a state vocational 
rehabilitation assistance program that paid the student’s tuition to a 
private Christian college,185 allowed the state to provide an 
interpreter to a deaf student at a sectarian school,186 and given 
religiously affiliated organizations permission to participate in a 
federally funded program to encourage innovative services to deal 
with the problems of adolescent pregnancy.187 The Supreme Court 
has become more accepting of aid that reaches religiously affiliated 
schools indirectly. For example, if vouchers are given to parents to 
spend at the school of their choice for the education of their 
children, the Supreme Court has allowed parents to direct that aid to 
religiously affiliated schools.188 
In sum, in the United States in cases involving state aid to 
religious schools, there has been a general trend over the past thirty 
years away from a conception of autonomy based upon independence 
towards a conception based upon inter-independence. 
 181. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255 (holding that state funding of field trips created excessive 
entanglement and therefore violated the establishment clause). 
 182. 403 U.S. 672, 675 (1971). 
 183. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
 184. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
 185. Witters v. Wa. Dept. of Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
 186. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
 187. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
 188. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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Europe: Under the European Convention, states may subsidize 
religious schools and may pay for certain types of religious education 
in both public and private schools if it so desires, but the state 
cannot be required to provide funds to private religious schools.189 
According to Carolyn Evans, “The concern of the drafters of the 
Convention was not (compared with the framers of the United 
States Constitution) to keep the State out of religion, including 
religious education, but rather to ensure that the State was not 
subject to financial demands that it did not wish to meet.”190 
However, the European Court has stated that the state has an 
obligation to respect the beliefs of parents within the public school 
system, even in areas not directly related to denominational 
instruction, and that it is not enough to allow parents to opt out of 
public schooling altogether and send their children to religious 
schools.191 The opportunity to opt out of specific religious 
instruction, however, has been held to satisfy the requirements of 
Article 9, even when doing so results in teacher and peer pressure to 
participate.192 
 189. See W and KL v. Sweden, 45 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143, 148–49 (1985), 
9 E.H.R.R. CD 247 (1987) (Westlaw) (allowing a state to means-test for grants available to 
students at private school even though aid was automatic in State schools); X and Y v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 9461/81, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 210 (1982) (holding that a 
State need not subsidize education at a private school even when parents feel their children 
must be educated there to receive an education consistent with their philosophical views); X. v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 7782/77, 14 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 179, 180 (1978) 
(allowing the State to provide less subsidies to a nondenominational private school than it did 
to a non-State-run schools).  
 190. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 89. 
 191. See, e.g., Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) 25, para. 53 (1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (holding that a State could impose an 
integrated “sex education” curriculum in spite of parental objections based upon religious 
belief, but requiring the State to convey information in “an objective, critical and pluralistic 
manner” and prohibiting the state from pursuing “an aim of indoctrination that might be 
considered as not respecting parents’ religious and philosophical convictions”); see also 
Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982), 4 E.H.R.R. 293 
(1982) (Westlaw) (extending the requirement that schools respect parents’ wishes in a case of 
parents wishing to prevent their children from being subjected to corporal punishment). 
 192. See Bernard and others v. Luxembourg, 75 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 57 
(1993); C.J., J.J. and E.J. v. Poland, 84-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46 (1996), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (holding that religious instruction was “voluntary” when a student 
was required to wait in the corridor, received frequent questioning from teachers and pressure 
from a teacher and other students to take the classes, and eventually capitulated, against her 
father’s wishes, and joined the class). Professor Evans notes that the Commission  
did not explore how voluntary a decision by a child in such a situation of social 
pressure could really be. It also refused to deal in any detail with the claim by the 
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The approach taken by the European Court in cases involving 
state aid to religious schools reflects a conception of autonomy based 
upon the interdependence of church and state. State subsidies to 
religiously affiliated schools are permitted, although some concern is 
expressed for the autonomy interests of dissenters who wish to opt 
out of religious instruction. 
5. Church property, officials, doctrine 
One area where the differing attitudes toward institutional 
autonomy are most striking is in controversies that arise with respect 
to church property, personnel, and doctrine. A conception of 
autonomy based upon independence, and to a slightly lesser extent a 
conception based upon inter-independence, would be highly 
suspicious of state involvement in the direction of the internal affairs 
of a church. In contrast, a conception based upon interdependence 
would be much less sensitive to negative impacts upon autonomy 
from state involvement in such affairs. 
United States: The Supreme Court has demonstrated a high 
(although not absolute) degree of protectiveness of churches from 
interference by the state in controversies involving church property, 
officials, and doctrine. In an early case involving a property dispute 
between two groups claiming ownership of the same church 
property, the Court deferred to the Church’s own internal rules for 
determining which group had the legitimate claim, an approach that 
the Court has generally followed in subsequent cases.193 However, in 
a more recent case that did not involve an ownership dispute over 
church property, City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court upheld a general 
statute on historic preservation that prevented a church from adding 
other applicant student (whose school offered the option of instruction in ethics as 
an alternative to religious instruction) that widespread social discrimination against 
non-Catholics, for example in the Labour market, meant that there was pressure to 
take religious instruction rather than ethics. 
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 96. 
 193. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 
(1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 
(1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). But see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 
(1979) (allowing a state to resolve a church property dispute based upon “neutral principles of 
law”); The Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 
1 (1890) (upholding the seizure of church property of Mormons on grounds that polygamy 
did not constitute religious belief). 
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to the size of its existing building.194 Church autonomy was not 
viewed as a sufficient reason to create an exemption from a generally 
applicable zoning ordinance. This case was significant also because it 
was the vehicle the Supreme Court used to strike down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, in which Congress had attempted to 
restore the compelling state interest standard to free exercise 
jurisprudence.195 
The Supreme Court has been very protective of church 
autonomy in matters relating to personnel and doctrine. The state 
cannot dictate to a church who it hires or fires as a minister, or what 
the church’s doctrine will be.196 Indeed, church autonomy over 
personnel and doctrine extends beyond employees with a directly 
 194. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 195. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that laws that burden 
religion need not be subject to heightened scrutiny, but are valid if neutral and of general 
application). Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), which attempted to restore the compelling-state-interest test. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb 
to 2000bb-4 (1993). The Supreme Court declared the RFRA unconstitutional in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Boerne case elicited a broad scholarly response. In 
support of the Court’s finding RFRA unconstitutional, see, for example, Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79; Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (1998); Ira C. Lupu, Why 
the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right—Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 793 (1998). For a sampling of scholarly criticism of the Court’s decision 
in Boerne, see, for example, David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. 
Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31; Robert F. 
Drinan, Reflections on the Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 86 GEO. L.J. 101 
(1997); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 743 (1998); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997); John T. Noonan, Jr., Religious Liberty at 
the Stake, 84 VA. L. REV. 459 (1998). 
 196. See, e.g., Harold P. Southerland, Theory and Reality in Statutory Interpretation, 15 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 32 (2002) (asserting that “it would be hard to imagine a more flagrant 
interference with the free exercise of religion than for Congress to dictate to a respectable 
church . . . whom it might or might not choose as its minister”); Laura L. Coon, Note, 
Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the 
Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
481, 531 (2001) (“Courts holding that the adjudication of negligent hiring and supervision 
claims against church employers necessarily violates the First Amendment emphasize that in all 
decisions regarding hiring, firing, or discipline, the church’s determination is necessarily guided 
by religious doctrine and practice. These courts reason that, regardless of whether or not a 
religious institution has a doctrinal reason for the challenged employment decision, examining 
church employment policies regarding ministerial employment to determine what is reasonable 
conduct necessitates ‘inappropriate governmental involvement’ in violation of the Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses.” (footnote omitted)). 
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ecclesiastical function. For example, in Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop v. Amos,197 the Court unanimously held that even a church-
owned nonprofit organization that did not have a directly religious 
mission was exempt from the general law prohibiting discrimination 
in employment based upon religion. In that case, the Church 
operated a gymnasium and was allowed to limit employment to 
individuals who adhered to certain religious tenets. The Court’s 
reasoning invoked autonomy concerns, noting that a religious-
employment exemption alleviated “significant governmental 
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and 
carry out their religious missions.”198 
As these cases illustrate, in sensitive matters involving church 
property, personnel, and doctrine, the Supreme Court has based its 
jurisprudence on a conception of autonomy that reflects a high 
degree of concern for the independence of churches, although in 
recent cases that degree of concern has apparently diminished. 
Europe: The European Court has allowed quite a high degree of 
state involvement in issues involving church property, officials, and 
doctrine. For example, in Holy Monasteries v. Greece, the court 
dismissed a claim from a church involving transfer of land from 
monasteries to the government.199 
The European Court has also been deferential to state control of 
personnel and doctrine of a state church. For example, in Knudsen v. 
Norway, the Commission upheld the right of the state to dismiss a 
pastor of a state church on the grounds that the pastor had revoked 
his oath of loyalty to the state, thus implying that if there is an 
established church, the state has the right to set forth conditions for 
employment in the church generally or for a particular post.200 In 
another case, Karlsson v. Sweden, the Commission upheld the 
 197. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). For additional cases concerning corporeal punishment, see 
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 93 n.132. 
 198. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. 
Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization’s religious 
mission, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is 
thus a means by which a religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church’s 
ability to do so reflects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious 
organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well. 
Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 199. 301 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1347 (1994), 20 E.H.R.R. 1 (1994) (Westlaw). 
 200. 42 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247 (1985), 8 E.H.R.R. CD 63 (1985) 
(Westlaw). 
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decision of an employment board to deny a position to a pastor 
because he opposed the ordination of women.201 
State control of nonestablished churches is more limited. In Serif 
v. Greece, the court held that the Greek government violated Article 
9 by prosecuting a man who claimed to be the Mufti of a local 
Muslim community, when another man had been appointed Mufti 
by the Greek government.202 The court stated that to punish a 
person “for merely acting as the religious leader of a group that 
willingly followed him can hardly be considered compatible with the 
demands of religious pluralism in a democratic society.”203 The 
court’s holding was quite limited, however, noting that a different 
outcome might be warranted if the Mufti attempted to carry out 
functions with legal effect, such as marriage ceremonies.204 
In an established church, the court has held that the state has the 
right to control church doctrine, and ministers can be required to 
comply or resign. For example, in X. v. Denmark, the state 
disciplined a clergyman in the state Church of Denmark who 
attempted to impose a requirement that parents take five lessons of 
religious instruction before he would baptize their children.205 The 
Commission upheld the state’s control over the clergyman’s 
behavior, taking the position that clergymen’s “individual right of 
thought, conscience or religion is exercised at the moment they 
accept or refuse employment as clergymen, and their right to leave 
the church guarantees their freedom of religion in case they oppose 
its teachings.”206 State control of religious doctrine was affirmed 
again by the Commission in Knudsen v. Norway, a case in which the 
state-appointed minister of religion was permitted to dismiss a 
clergyman who refused to carry out certain of his functions in protest 
of a new liberal abortion law.207 
In cases involving church property, personnel, and doctrine, the 
European Court has based its jurisprudence upon a conception of 
autonomy that reflects the assumptions of interdependence of church 
 201. 57 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 172 (1988), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
 202. App. No. 38178/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14, 1999), 31 E.H.R.R. 20 (1999) 
(Westlaw). 
 203. Id. at para. 51. 
 204. Id. at para. 52. 
 205. 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 157, 158 (1976). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Knudsen, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD 63. 
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and state. A very high degree of state involvement in church affairs 
has been permitted.208 
6. Church standing 
From the perspective of independence and inter-independence, a 
church’s standing to sue to protect its legal rights would be viewed 
as an elementary component of church autonomy. A conception of 
autonomy based upon interdependence, on the other hand, would be 
less concerned with the ability of churches to have standing to 
pursue and vindicate their rights. 
United States: The Supreme Court has long recognized standing 
for both individuals and churches in Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause disputes. Churches have standing in U.S. courts,209 and for 
the most part standing issues have not been important in religious 
liberty jurisprudence in the United States.210 The Court’s 
jurisprudence involving standing issues reflects the view that church 
autonomy is based upon a degree of independence. 
Europe: The autonomy of churches was dealt an early blow by 
the Commission in the 1968 case of Church of X v. the United 
Kingdom,211 in which the Commission dismissed the case on the 
 208. The degree to which state involvement is permitted, however, may turn, to some 
degree, on whether the state is regulating a state church or another religion. When the state is 
regulating the state church, it will, of course, have greater latitude than when it is regulating 
other religions. In either scenario, though, the degree of state involvement permitted is 
demonstrative of interdependence. 
 209. See, e.g., United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 
487 U.S. 72 (1988) (holding that the Catholic church had standing to challenge a district 
court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 
(1982) (holding that a church and its followers had standing to challenge the Minnesota 
Charitable Solicitations Act).  
 210. But see Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (denying 
standing to the respondent in a high school religious club controversy); Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying 
standing to a citizen/taxpayer group in a constitutional challenge of the conveyance of a 
military hospital to a church-related college under a statute permitting “surplus property” to 
be conveyed to nonprofit, tax-exempt educational institutions).  
 211. 13 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 306 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) (1968), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. In Church of X v. United Kingdom, a church brought a complaint 
claiming its rights of religious freedom had been violated when the British government made a 
determination that it was a “cult” that was dangerous to society and took a variety of measures 
to limit the activities of the church, including deregistering its educational institutions, refusing 
to allow individuals into the country who wished to study or work with the church, and 
refusing entry to hundreds of delegates to an international conference of the church. The 
church, which was a corporation, brought the action on its own behalf and on behalf of its 
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grounds that a church does not have standing. The Commission 
reasoned that “a corporation being a legal and not a natural person, 
is incapable of having or exercising the rights mentioned in Article 9, 
paragraph 1 of the Convention and Article 2 of the First 
Protocol.”212 In 1971 the Commission reiterated that churches have 
no standing in X v. Sweden,213 although it revised its decision and 
granted standing to a church in the 1979 case, X and the Church of 
Scientology v. Sweden.214 The Commission explained that it was 
overruling its earlier decisions that denied standing to churches, 
stating that the Commission was 
now of the opinion that the . . . distinction between the Church 
and its members under Article 9(1) is essentially artificial. When a 
church body lodges an application under the Convention, it does 
so in reality, on behalf of its members. It should therefore be 
accepted that a church body is capable of possessing and exercising 
the rights contained in Article 9(1) in its own capacity as 
representative of its members.215 
This change of view represents some movement away from a 
view of autonomy based upon interdependence towards a view of 
autonomy based upon a measure of independence for religious 
institutions. But Professor Evans notes, “[t]he right of a Church to 
bring a claim is derivative, however, based on aggregating . . . the 
rights of its members. It cannot claim a breach of its own rights.”216 
Thus, even under the revised doctrine, religious institutions still do 
members, but no individual member was a named party to the complaint. Carolyn Evans 
maintains that “[t]he dismissal of cases on the grounds that they were brought by Churches 
rather than individuals allowed the Commission to refuse to deal with cases of widespread 
government action against particular religious groups on largely technical grounds.” EVANS, 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 15 & n.76 (acknowledging that in Church of X v. 
United Kingdom, the Commission stated that even if the case had been brought by individuals, 
none of the actions taken by the United Kingdom amounted to a violation of a right under the 
Convention). 
 212. 13 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 314. 
 213. Karnell and Hardt v. Sweden, 14 Y.B. Conv. on H.R. 676 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) 
(1971) (denying standing under Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Evangelical-
Lutheran Church of Sweden to bring an action regarding religious education in schools). 
 214. 16 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68 (1979) (granting standing to the Church of 
Scientology in a challenge to prohibitions of advertisements of the “E-meter,” a device which 
the Church said measured individual mental well-being). 
 215. Id. at 70. 
 216. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 14 (citing X & the Church of 
Scientology, 14 Y.B. Conv. on H.R. at 70). 
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not have standing in their own rights, but only as an aggregation of 
the rights of their members. The Commission has confirmed this 
view by holding that a legal person cannot exercise freedom of 
conscience,217 and in continually denying standing to for-profit 
corporations who have lodged complaints regarding freedom of 
conscience or religion under Article 9.218 Thus, the European 
Court’s jurisprudence on church standing does not reflect a 
conception of autonomy requiring a muscular institutional 
independence of churches. 
7. Church right to have organization and legal personality 
Even more fundamental than the right to have standing to sue in 
order to protect one’s rights is the right to organize oneself as a legal 
entity. A conception of autonomy based on independence and inter-
independence would view the right to have a legal personality as a 
basic requirement for churches to have a measure of autonomy. A 
conception of autonomy based upon interdependence, however, 
might not recognize the importance of being able to organize a 
church and have a legal personality. 
United States: In the United States anyone can create a church 
under the nonprofit corporation statutes of any state.219 No 
permission of any government official or body is required. Having a 
legal personality is viewed as a basic requirement of exercising church 
autonomy. This is consistent with a conception of autonomy based 
upon independence or inter-independence. 
Europe: While Article 9 states that the right to manifest one’s 
religion is to be protected “either alone or in community with 
 217. Kontakt-Information-Therapie and Hagen v. Austria, 57 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 
& Rep. 81, 88 (1988), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. Although the legal person at issue was a 
drug rehabilitation center and not a church, the Commission seemed to state the general rule 
and specifically mentioned that churches do not have rights of freedom of religion. 
 218. See, e.g., Company X. v. Switzerland, 16 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 85 
(1979) (dismissing a claim that requiring a company to pay ecclesiastical taxes breached its 
freedom of religion on grounds that it had no rights under Article 9(1)). 
 219. See HOWARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, 
ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 1099–119 (6th ed. 1994) (discussing the various tax 
exempt and nonprofit incorporations available to religious organizations); see also Catherine M. 
Knight, Must God Regulate Religious Corporations? A Proposal for Reform of the Religious 
Corporations Provisions of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 42 EMORY L.J. 721, 
721 n.3 (1993) (“Religious corporations are both a subset of and distinct from general 
nonprofit corporations. The lack of regulation over nonprofit corporations is an oft-sung 
lament in legal commentary.”). 
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others,” and the Commission has recognized a group dimension to 
certain religious liberty rights,220 the Commission has also stated that 
Article 9 does not entitle a religious group to be formally recognized 
or registered as a religion and that states are permitted to distinguish 
between recognized and non-recognized religions. In X v. Austria, 
the court upheld the government’s refusal to allow followers of 
Reverend Moon to set up a legal association on the grounds that this 
did not interfere with the group’s right to worship in association 
with others because it was not “necessary” to have a legal association 
in order for members to be able to practice their beliefs.221 On the 
other hand, the court has held that state interference with the ability 
of a minority religion to set up a place of public worship can result in 
a violation of rights of worship and observance.222 More recently, in 
the case of Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, the court held that 
every religious denomination has the right not only to de facto 
existence, but also to be granted legal personality under rules that are 
fair and similar to those applied to other denominations.223 
The European Court’s jurisprudence in this area reflects an 
increasing degree of concern about the institutional independence of 
churches, although much of the court’s work in this area reflects a 
conception of autonomy reflecting the assumptions and concerns of 
interdependence. 
8. Exemptions from general laws for churches 
One of the most significant recurring problems in church-state 
relations is the extent to which churches and individuals224 should be 
exempt from generally applicable laws. If churches are always exempt 
from such laws, then churches are in an important sense above the 
 220. See X v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 27, 33 (1981), 4 
E.H.R.R. 126 (1982) (Westlaw) (ruling that a Muslim school teacher who wished to take time 
off on Friday afternoons to attend worship at a local mosque was not sufficiently 
accommodated by being given a room within the school where he could pray in private). 
 221. 26 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 89 (1981). 
 222. Manoussakis and others v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1347, 1361 (1996–
IV), 23 E.H.R.R. 387 (1996) (Westlaw). 
 223. 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 (1999) (Westlaw); see also Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. 
Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2001), http://hudoc.ehr.coe.int 
(stating that Article 9 includes right of new churches to obtain legal personality on conditions 
equal to registered churches). 
 224. The subject of exemptions is also addressed below in the section on individual 
autonomy. See infra Part V.F. 
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law. On the other hand, if the state is unwilling to make exceptions 
for churches and religious adherents in order to protect religious 
observance, then the state can interfere significantly in the 
independence and self-direction of the church and of religious 
adherents. 
If stark independence is the goal, then a concern for church 
autonomy and the autonomy of religious adherents might seem to 
require an extensive network of exemptions when state laws conflict 
with religious beliefs and obligations, since the state might 
vigorously try to create a separated social space for religious 
activity.225 If autonomy is based upon inter-independence of church 
and state, a more limited set of exemptions would seem to be 
recognized. Desired exemptions would be evaluated based upon 
their impact upon the independence of churches and their adherents, 
and based upon the independence and autonomy of the state. For 
example, exemptions that are deemed to threaten the state’s ability 
to fulfill its functions of protecting public safety and morals would 
not be recognized. A conception of autonomy based upon 
interdependence would recognize an even narrower set of 
exemptions, since what is good for the state and what is good for the 
church might be seen as being harmonious. When interdependence 
prevails, the state is likely to be quite sensitive to the religious needs 
of majority religion adherents, and laws that facilitate religious belief 
and observance of powerful religions would be commonplace. A 
high degree of concern for the needs and claims for exemptions from 
adherents of minority religions, however, would be much less likely 
to prevail. 
 225. While it would seem that independence would recognize the need to protect 
religious exercise from encroachment (based upon a commitment between church and state to 
mutual noninterference), the reality is rather more complicated. It is possible that a conception 
of autonomy based upon independence could result in very limited recognition of exemptions. 
For example, if the realm of protected religious independence is limited to “belief” and the 
realm of government oversight is said to encompass everything that includes “action,” then as 
a practical matter most assertions of a right to an exemption will be denied (since religious 
beliefs often require specific actions), while the state will claim (somewhat disingenuously) to 
be protective of institutional and individual independence with respect to religious freedom. 
This approach has been common in United States free exercise jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (“Congress was deprived of all legislative power 
over mere opinion [or belief], but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of 
social duties or subversive of good order.”); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
877 (1990). 
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United States: In recent cases the Supreme Court has exhibited 
remarkably little concern for church autonomy in situations 
involving religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. This 
was not always the case. Historically, churches have been granted 
exemptions from certain generally applicable laws, which had the 
effect of preserving the autonomy of both churches and religious 
adherents. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court 
granted an exemption to Amish school children based upon freedom 
of religion from a state law requiring compulsory education until the 
age of sixteen.226 The Court focused on whether the exemption in 
question was based upon religious belief or more general cultural 
factors and concluded that the Amish objection to compulsory 
education beyond the eighth grade was based upon religious 
belief.227 
Additionally, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,228 the Court 
ruled that church-run schools were exempt from a national law 
requiring schools to recognize unions.229 And in Corporation of 
Presiding Bishop v. Amos,230 the Court upheld a federal statute that 
exempted religious organizations from Title VII requirements 
forbidding discrimination on the basis of religion in hiring for 
church-related nonprofit enterprises that did not have a directly 
religious function. In that case, the Court explicitly invoked 
autonomy concerns in justifying its holding.231 
 226. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 227. In Wisconsin v. Yoder the Supreme Court exhibited a high degree of concern for the 
autonomy of the Amish religion. The Court held that laws that impose burdens on religious 
belief must be subject to heightened scrutiny. This means that the state must show a 
compelling state interest in order to justify such burdens. Id. at 210–11. 
 228. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
 229. The Court determined that “[t]he church-teacher relationship in a church-operated 
school differs from the employment relationship in a public or other nonreligious school. We 
see no escape from conflicts flowing from the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in 
church-operated schools and the consequent serious First Amendment questions that would 
follow.” Id. at 504. 
 230. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 231. Id. at 345–46 (“Sensitivity to individual religious freedom dictates that religious 
discrimination be permitted only with respect to employment in religious activities. Concern 
for the autonomy of religious organizations demands that we avoid the entanglement and the 
chill on religious expression that a case-by-case determination would produce. We cannot 
escape the fact that these aims are in tension. Because of the nature of nonprofit activities, I 
believe that a categorical exemption for such enterprises appropriately balances these 
competing concerns.”). 
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The right of churches and religiously affiliated organizations to 
receive exemptions, however, has never been unlimited, especially 
when exemptions apply to commercial for-profit operations. For 
example, in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of 
Labor,232 the Court held that a religious organization’s commercial 
enterprises were not exempt from the requirements of a labor 
statute. The Supreme Court also struck down a state statute that 
granted a sales tax exemption to religious publications but not other 
publications233 and upheld a state sales tax that covered the sale of 
religious materials.234 
A conception of autonomy based on inter-independence would 
predict that a lesser degree of autonomy would be granted to 
churches when they are engaged in commercial activities as opposed 
to more overtly religious or nonprofit activities, since the regulation 
of economic affairs is an area of high engagement of churches with 
the regulatory powers of the state. If stark independence were the 
goal, then it would seem that exemptions for commercial activities 
should exist as well as other types of exemptions.235 Rather than 
treating sales of religious literature as ordinary commerce, a stark 
independence view would endeavor to separate transactions by 
churches from ordinary commerce. 
In Oregon v. Smith,236 the Supreme Court retreated dramatically 
from its earlier approach of subjecting general laws that burden 
religion to heightened scrutiny (which required a compelling state 
interest and further required that the state employed the least 
restrictive available means of effecting the interest). Instead, the 
Court held that a law that burdens religion is permissible, as long as 
it is general and neutral, and does not specifically target religious 
belief.237 
 232. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 233. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 234. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
 235. As noted above, this assertion must be qualified because the belief-action distinction 
can be used to bring all religious “action,” including commercial transactions, within the 
sphere of state regulation. So interpreted, an independence-based conception of autonomy 
would not recognize assertions of exemptions involving action as opposed to pure belief. 
 236. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Supreme Court subsequently struck down as 
unconstitutional a federal statute enacted to return free exercise jurisprudence to a pre–Oregon 
v. Smith footing. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 237. The Smith decision elicited a wide range of scholarly commentary. In defense of 
Smith, see, for example, William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 
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The Court’s approach in Smith reflects a view of autonomy that 
approaches the European interdependence conception of autonomy. 
If autonomy requires independence, or even inter-independence, then 
one would expect a higher degree of concern about the religious 
beliefs and needs of minority religious adherents.238 Instead, a view 
of autonomy based on interdependence would be satisfied if laws are 
neutral on their face and general in application, since the interests 
and needs of churches and the state are not viewed as being in 
conflict with each other. It is unlikely that majority or powerful 
religions will be burdened by laws that are on their face neutral and 
general, but as the Smith case illustrates, it is much less likely that the 
religious claims and needs of minority religions will be protected.239 
Since Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
religious exemptions has exhibited a general pattern of transition 
from a conception of autonomy based on independence of church 
and state, to a conception based on inter-independence (for example, 
involving for-profit activities of churches), to a conception in Oregon 
v. Smith that approaches a model of autonomy based on 
interdependence of church and state. 
Europe: There do not appear to have been any cases decided as of 
yet by the European Court concerning claims that churches are 
entitled to an exemption from generally applicable laws. There are, 
however, cases involving individual claims (based upon religion) for 
exemptions from generally applicable laws, which are discussed in 
Part V.F below. 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991). In opposition to the Court’s holding in Smith, see, for 
example, Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1109 (1990). 
 238. In Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), Justice Scalia acknowledges that the 
approach taken by the Court affords less protection to minority religions. Justice Scalia wrote, 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodating to the political process will place at 
a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but 
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a 
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the 
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 
Id. at 890. 
 239. Thus while sacramental use of peyote by the Native American Church may not be 
exempted, it is much more likely that sacramental use of wine in a Catholic Mass will receive 
legislative protection. 
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9.  Summary of church autonomy issues 
Figure 1 summarizes the approaches of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the European Court to issues involving the autonomy of 
churches. 
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Figure 1 
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In cases generally involving church autonomy in the United 
States, there has been a struggle between a conception of autonomy 
based on independence and a conception of autonomy based on 
inter-independence. This struggle has been particularly apparent with 
respect to laws concerning state aid to religious schools, where a 
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view of autonomy based on independence has been supplanted by a 
view based on inter-independence. In Europe, a conception of 
autonomy based on interdependence has been dominant in cases 
involving the autonomy of churches. 
For those who believe that interdependence is not a compelling 
conception of autonomy to guide U.S. church-state relations, one 
area of potential concern in the United States is the availability to 
churches of exemptions from generally applicable laws. The cases in 
this area have evinced a gradual movement from a conception of 
autonomy based on independence to a conception based on inter-
independence, and ultimately towards a conception based on 
interdependence. 
B.  Autonomy of the State 
In church-state relations there are two dimensions to the concern 
about institutional autonomy. A highly integrated relationship 
threatens not just the independence of the church, but also creates 
the possibility of domination of the state by a church. 
Concern for the autonomy of the state can be seen in a variety of 
contexts, including cases involving various forms of religious 
expression or teaching of religious viewpoints in public schools, cases 
involving religious expression in the public sphere outside of schools, 
cases concerning the permissibility of churches conducting functions 
usually associated with the state, and cases about the permissibility of 
state policies that converge with or reflect religious beliefs. 
In each of these areas, the Supreme Court has vacillated between 
a conception of autonomy based upon the independence of church 
and state, which has exerted a particularly strong influence in the 
public school setting, and a conception of autonomy based on the 
inter-independence of church and state. In Europe, cases involving 
the autonomy of the state have for the most part reflected a 
conception of autonomy based on the interdependence of church and 
state. 
1.  Religious expression in public schools 
If autonomy requires independence of church and state, then 
religious expression in public schools would be prohibited. If 
autonomy is based on interdependence, then a high degree of 
religious expression in public schools would be permitted, at least of 
3SCH-FIN 12/1/2004  7:07 PM 
1217] The Autonomy of Church and State 
 1287 
favored religious views. A view of autonomy based on inter-
independence would be sensitive to concerns about the independence 
of the state and so religious expression in public schools will be 
limited, especially when there is concern that a particular religious 
viewpoint is exerting a dominant force. On the other hand, some 
religious expression would be tolerated in view of countervailing 
concerns such as the burdens of exclusion and the requirements of 
mutual respect. 
United States: Religion in public schools has been a source of 
tremendous controversy in the United States, and the Supreme 
Court’s concern for the autonomy of the state is perhaps more 
evident in this context than in any other group of cases. Compared 
with other contexts where state autonomy is an issue, a conception 
of autonomy based on the independence of church and state is much 
more prevalent in public schools than in other settings. To some 
extent this is understandable, since public education is of particular 
importance to maintaining and preserving the autonomy of the state. 
Because public schools are subject to a high degree of local control, 
the threat posed by churches to state autonomy is unusually high, 
since in a particular school district it is much more likely than on a 
larger political stage that one religion might be dominant. As a 
result, public school settings are perhaps the single place where the 
Supreme Court of the United States has had the greatest concern 
about religious expression. Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
evinced a high degree of concern for the autonomy interests of 
children in the public school setting. Young children are viewed as 
particularly vulnerable and impressionable, and the Court has 
expressed concern that their autonomy may be compromised by 
allowing high levels of sectarian religious expression. 
Europe: In Europe, by contrast, a much higher degree of 
religious expression and teaching is permissible in public schools. As 
discussed earlier, under the jurisprudence of the European 
Convention, a state can subsidize religious education in public 
schools, and can pay for certain types of religious instruction in 
either state-sponsored or religiously sponsored schools. As Professor 
Evans explains, “The concern of the drafters of the Convention was 
not (compared with the framers of the United States Constitution) 
to keep the State out of religion, including religious education, but 
rather to ensure that the State was not subject to financial demands 
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that it did not wish to meet.”240 The European Court has, however, 
set some parameters on religious speech in schools. For example, in 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark,241 although the 
court rejected parents’ complaint that an integrated sex education 
curriculum violated their right to choose the religious and moral 
education of their children, the court stated that the State “must 
take care that information or knowledge included in this curriculum 
is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The State 
is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be 
considered as not respecting parents’ religious and philosophical 
convictions.”242 
I will survey three areas of concern about religious speech in 
public schools in the U.S. and Europe: (a) cases involving release 
time (the practice of excusing students from secular school activities 
to receive religious instruction); (b) cases involving mandatory Bible 
reading, prohibitions on the teaching of evolution, and requirements 
for posting the Ten Commandments; and (c) cases involving access 
to public school facilities by private groups that are religious in 
nature. 
 
a.  Release time from public schools. One early dispute concerning 
the constitutional limits upon the interaction of church and state in 
public schools involved “release time,” the practice of excusing 
students from class to receive religious instruction. If the autonomy 
of church and state requires complete independence, then release 
time during the school day would violate the Establishment Clause, 
regardless of the particulars involved. In contrast, if the autonomy of 
church and state is based on the interdependence of church and state, 
then religious instruction in the schools would be permissible and 
the formalities of release time would not be needed. If the 
relationship between church and state is based on a conception of 
autonomy that emphasizes inter-independence, attention would focus 
on the particular context and implications of the different types of 
release time programs. 
United States: The approach taken by the Supreme Court in the 
release time cases reflects sensitivity to the inter-independence of 
 240. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 89. 
 241. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 26, para. 53 (1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
 242. Id. 
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church and state. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of 
Education,243 the Supreme Court struck down a release time 
program that allowed public school students to be dismissed from 
their secular instruction for a period of time to receive optional 
religious instruction on school premises. Emphasizing the 
independence of church and state, the Court stated that “[T]he First 
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and 
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left 
free from the other within its respective sphere.”244 The Court also 
emphasized the important individual autonomy concerns at stake, 
declaring that neither the federal government nor a state “can force 
or influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against 
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”245 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter defended an even more 
strongly separationist vision of the Establishment Clause, especially 
in the public school setting. 
Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for 
promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people, 
the public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement 
in the strife of sects.  The preservation of the community from 
divisive conflicts, of Government from irreconcilable pressures by 
religious groups, of religion from censorship and coercion however 
subtly exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to 
instruction other than religious, leaving to the individual’s church 
and home, indoctrination in the faith of his choice.246 
Justice Frankfurter concluded, “If nowhere else, in the relation 
between Church and State, ‘good fences make good neighbors.’”247 
Based upon the strong separationist rhetoric in McCollum, one 
might have thought that any release time program would violate the 
Establishment Clause. A few years later, however, in Zorach v. 
Clauson,248 the Supreme Court allowed a release time program in 
 243. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
 244. Id. at 212. 
 245. Id. at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)). 
 246. Id. at 216–17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter states, “In no activity 
of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing, 
not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart.” Id. at 231. 
 247. Id. at 232. 
 248. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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which religious instruction took place off school property.249 In 
Zorach the Court retreated from the ideal of stark separation.250 
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas said, “The First 
Amendment . . . does not say that in every and all respects there shall 
be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the 
manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or 
union or dependency one on the other.”251 The Court noted that 
the release time program in Zorach involved neither the expenditure 
of public funds nor the use of public school classrooms and 
concluded that there is no system of coercion to get public school 
students into religious classrooms.252 
 249. Some years later, in School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Supreme Court explained the different outcomes 
in McCollum and Zorach as follows: 
The difference in symbolic impact helps to explain the difference between the cases. 
The symbolic connection of church and state in the McCollum program presented 
the students with a graphic symbol of the ‘concert or union or dependency’ of 
church and state. This very symbolic union was conspicuously absent in the Zorach 
program. 
Ball, 473 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted). By focusing on symbolic “concert or union or 
dependency,” the Court focused on the institutional autonomy of both church and state. 
 250. The retreat is accompanied, however, by a denial that a retreat is being made. The 
majority opinion in Zorach states, 
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the 
philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference 
with the ‘free exercise’ of religion and an ‘establishment’ of religion are concerned, 
the separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the 
scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. 
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312. 
 251. Id. at 306. That, the Court states, is 
the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to 
each other—hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could not be 
required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to 
render police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped 
parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in 
our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief 
Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; ‘so help me God’ 
in our courtroom oaths—these and all other references to the Almighty that run 
through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First 
Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication 
with which the Court opens each session: ‘God save the United States and this 
Honorable Court.’ 
Id. at 312–13. 
 252. Id. at 308–11. 
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When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with 
religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to 
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then 
respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the 
public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not 
would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the 
government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That 
would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those 
who do believe.253 
In the release time cases, the stage is set for much of the debate 
between separation and accommodation over the next fifty years in 
the U.S. Much of the rhetoric in favor of a strict independence of 
church and state can be traced to McCollum, and much of the 
rhetoric calling for an accommodation of religion in public life can 
be traced to Zorach. 
Forbidding release time on school property but permitting it off 
school property might appear to be a distinction without a 
difference, but such a division is quite sensitive to the concerns of 
inter-independence and the different implications of the programs for 
state autonomy. On the one hand, the independence of churches 
from the state and of the state from churches is one of the primary 
ideals the Establishment Clause was meant to protect. On the other 
hand, the Court identifies a number of undesirable implications of a 
conception of autonomy that rests upon an ideal of stark separation. 
The legitimate threat to the autonomy of the state that exists when 
children receive religious instruction in public schools during the 
school day is significantly ameliorated when the instruction takes 
place off school property and without the expenditure of public 
funds. The possibility of “concert,” “union,” or “dependence” of 
church and state, and the risk of “coercion” is less when religious 
instruction takes place off school premises. A small degree of 
cooperation with religion and encouragement of religious instruction 
is seen to be consistent with the relational dimension of church 
autonomy, and also consistent with state autonomy. 
Europe: In Europe, the state is permitted to sponsor religious and 
devotional exercises in public schools, so the issue of release time 
does not arise. Students do have a right to opt out of religious 
instruction, but the European Court has been quite insensitive to the 
 253. Id. at 313–14. 
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subtle coercive pressures that can exist in such situations. In C.J., J.J., 
and E.J. v. Poland, the Commission denied admission of applicants’ 
claims that discrimination that resulted from a student’s decision not 
to participate in religious instruction did not constitute a violation of 
the student’s Article 9 rights.254 The decision was made in spite of 
the pressure that both students and teachers put on the student to 
attend and evidence that she was ostracized until she finally 
conceded. The European approach to these issues rests upon a 
conception of autonomy based on interdependence, which permits a 
high degree of cooperation and mutual support of church and state. 
 
b.  Requiring Bible reading, prohibiting teaching evolution, and 
posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools. Another 
controversial set of issues involving the interactions of church and 
state in public schools has been various state and local laws that 
attempt to inject religious instruction or viewpoints into the official 
school day, by requiring Bible reading, forbidding the teaching of 
evolution (or permitting it only if it is accompanied by teaching of 
creation science), or requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in public school classrooms.255 
Autonomy based upon independence would forbid such infusions 
of religion into public schools, whereas autonomy based upon 
interdependence would probably permit such efforts to include 
religious speech of favored religions in public schools. Autonomy 
based upon inter-independence would take a highly contextualized 
approach to analyzing whether the required religious expression in 
question threatens the ability of the school to conduct its educational 
mission, or whether the requirements represent an effort by a 
particular religious viewpoint to dominate or dictate the content of 
public education. The key question is whether the religious 
expression poses a threat to the independence of the state, or of 
individual school children. 
United States: In the United States, cases involving required 
Bible reading, forbidding the teaching of evolution or requiring the 
teaching of creation science, and requiring schools to post copies of 
the Ten Commandments are examples of efforts by a particular 
 254. 84-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
 255. Another example is school prayer, which I discuss in detail below. See infra Part 
VI.A. 
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religious viewpoint to infuse the public school curriculum with 
teachings that reflect particular religious ideology or tenets. The 
independence of the state is undermined when it is used as a vehicle 
for conveying the doctrinal views of particular religious groups. 
Thus, it is not surprising that these cases have elicited strong 
separationist responses from the Supreme Court. 
For example, in Abington Township v. Schempp, which held that 
requiring Bible reading in public schools violates the Establishment 
Clause, the Court stated that the purpose of the Establishment 
Clause was not merely to outlaw the official establishment of a single 
sect, “[i]t was to create a complete and permanent separation of the 
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively 
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.”256 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas surveyed several ways in which 
an establishment of religion could be achieved. 
The church and state can be one; the church may control the state 
or the state may control the church; or the relationship may take 
one of several possible forms of a working arrangement between 
the two bodies. . . . The vice of all such arrangements under the 
Establishment Clause is that the state is lending its assistance to a 
church’s efforts to gain and keep adherents. Under the First 
Amendment it is strictly a matter for the individual and his church 
as to what church he will belong to and how much support, in the 
way of belief, time, activity or money, he will give to it.257 
The key to the autonomy of church and state is freedom from the 
control or domination of one institution by the other. Justice 
Brennan strikes a similar chord of concern for the autonomy of 
church and state in his concurring opinion in Abington. 
What Virginia had long practiced, and what Madison, Jefferson and 
others fought to end, was the extension of civil government’s 
support to religion in a manner which made the two in some 
degree interdependent, and thus threatened the freedom of each. 
The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that the 
 256. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963) (quoting Everson v. 
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1947)). 
 257. Id. at 227–28 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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national legislature would not exert its power in the service of any 
purely religious end.258 
A similar concern for the autonomy of the state from the 
injection of sectarian doctrines into public education is evident in the 
cases involving the teaching of evolution. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 
the Supreme Court held that a state statute that made it unlawful for 
public school teachers to teach evolution is unconstitutional.259 
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas stated that the statute violates 
the Establishment Clause because it “selects from the body of 
knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the sole 
reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious 
doctrine.”260 The Court voiced similar concerns about the autonomy 
of the state from the imposition of religious viewpoints in Edwards v. 
Aguillard, in which the Court held that a state law forbidding the 
teaching of evolution unless accompanied by instruction in creation 
science violates the Establishment Clause.261 The Court concluded 
that “[t]he preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was 
clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being 
created humankind.”262 According to the Court, the autonomy of 
the state is jeopardized when schools become tools for teaching 
religious doctrine, and the state’s autonomy is arguably jeopardized 
to a greater degree when religious viewpoints are used to censor or 
restrict what may or may not be taught in public schools. 
Similarly, in Stone v. Graham, in which the Supreme Court 
struck down a statute requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in public school classrooms, the Court was 
 258. Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420, 465 (1961)). Justice Brennan suggests that rather than focusing on whether Jefferson or 
Madison would have found a particular religious exercise to be permissible, “[a] more fruitful 
inquiry . . . is whether the practices here challenged threaten those consequences which the 
Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence 
between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id. at 236. 
 259. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 260. Id. at 103. The Court states, 
In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its 
teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief 
of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the 
origin of man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas’ law may be justified by 
considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens. 
Id. at 107. 
 261. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 262. Id. at 591. 
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concerned about efforts of one religious viewpoint to dominate or 
dictate classroom content.263 In striking down the statute, the Court 
held that it had no secular purpose, “and no legislative recitation of a 
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.”264 The Court 
said, 
Posting of religious texts on the wall serves no [appropriate] 
educational function. If the posted copies of the Ten 
Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce 
the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and 
obey, the Commandments. However desirable this might be as a 
matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state objective 
under the Establishment Clause.265 
In cases involving efforts to promote a particular religious 
viewpoint in public schools, the Supreme Court has responded by 
vigorously rejecting such efforts. In doing so, the Court has based its 
reasons, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, upon a 
conception of autonomy that reflects the concerns of independence. 
Europe: I have not been able to locate any cases decided by the 
European Court concerning challenges to the permissibility of Bible 
reading, teaching evolution, or posting the Ten Commandments in 
public schools. This is not surprising, since concern about such 
practices reflects a conception of autonomy that is concerned 
primarily with independence, whereas the European approach in such 
cases rests upon a view of church-state relations reflecting 
interdependence. 
 
c.  Use of public school facilities for religious clubs. A third set of 
public school cases has involved claims for equal access by religious 
clubs who want to use school facilities for religious instruction or 
worship on the same basis as other student clubs. Autonomy based 
on independence would suggest that such access should not be 
allowed, whereas autonomy based on interdependence would find the 
inclusion of religious groups unobjectionable. A conception of 
autonomy based on the idea of inter-independence would be 
concerned not only with the independence of the state, but also the 
 263. 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 264. Id. at 41–42; see also J. David Smith, Jr., Stone v. Graham: A Fragile Defense of 
Individual Religious Autonomy, 69 KY. L.J. 392 (1981). 
 265. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42. 
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demands of mutual respect and the possibility that exclusion might 
reflect hostility rather than neutrality. 
United States: In a series of cases involving equal access claims by 
religious groups, the Court has evidenced sensitivity for the 
independence of the state but, at the same time, has been sensitive to 
the autonomy consequences for religious groups if they are excluded 
from forums that are generally open. In this area, the Court has, for 
the most part, reflected a view of autonomy sensitive to the concerns 
of inter-independence, taking a position that autonomy does not 
require religion to be separated from the state, but rather requiring 
equal treatment with respect to religious and nonreligious groups or 
clubs seeking access to school facilities. 
The Supreme Court has used equality, rather than autonomy, as 
the principal rationale for permitting certain forms of student-
sponsored religious speech on school property. In Widmar v. 
Vincent,266 the Supreme Court focused on First Amendment free-
speech rights in holding that a university’s policy of denying access 
to religious groups to conduct meetings in facilities generally 
available to other student groups was an unconstitutional violation of 
the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be 
content neutral. The Court reached a similar result in Board of 
Education v. Mergens,267 in which the Court held that a high school 
that makes its facilities generally available to student clubs cannot 
specifically refuse access to a religious club. In a similar vein, the 
Court held in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District268 that a religious group could show religious films on public 
school property after school hours, and in Rosenberger v. University 
of Virginia,269 the Court held that a public university could not 
discriminate in withholding funds from a school newspaper with a 
religious viewpoint. 
These cases represent a significant departure from a model of 
autonomy based on a wall of separation between church and state. 
From a strict separationist viewpoint, religious groups should be 
excluded from public schools and universities. Instead, the Court 
asserts that the state risks greater “entanglement” with religion by 
 266. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 267. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
 268. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 269. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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attempting to exclude all religious speech and religious worship from 
forums that are generally available to everyone.270 In Widmar, the 
Court noted that “an open forum in a public university does not 
confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or 
practices” and endorsed the court of appeals’ conclusion in the case 
that “such a policy ‘would no more commit the University . . . to 
religious goals’ than it is ‘now committed to the goals of the 
Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,’ or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities.”271 In a similar vein, in 
Mergens, the Court held that extending the equal access policy to 
secondary schools likewise did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.272 In Mergens the Court states that an equal access policy 
does not have the principal effect of advancing religion.273 Thus, the 
independence of the state is not jeopardized by the policy. To the 
contrary, “the message is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; 
if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, 
then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward 
religion.”274 In recognizing that some forms of separation of church 
and state would represent hostility rather than neutrality, the Court 
appears to acknowledge that autonomy is not always facilitated by 
complete independence, but rather rests on the inter-independence of 
church and state. 
Europe: I have not been able to locate any cases decided by the 
European Court concerning challenges to the permissibility of 
granting religiously affiliated student organizations access to school 
facilities. This is to be expected, given the interdependence 
perspective prevalent in Europe. 
2.  Religious expression outside of schools 
Controversies involving religious expression in the public domain 
also arise outside the public school context. Two prominent areas of 
controversy have involved legislative prayer and the display of 
religious artifacts on public property. As with religion in public 
schools, a model of autonomy based on complete independence 
 270. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11. 
 271. Id. at 274 (quoting Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
 272. 496 U.S. at 248–49. 
 273. Id. at 249–50. 
 274. Id. at 248. 
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would forbid all religious expression in the public square. A model of 
autonomy based on interdependence would permit religious 
expression by favored religious voices. A model of autonomy based 
on inter-independence would be sensitive to the implications of 
exclusion versus inclusion, as well as the possible interference with 
the independence of either religion or the state by a particular type 
of religious expression. 
United States: The Supreme Court has demonstrated concern for 
the independence of the state by placing restrictions on religious 
expression on state property outside of the school context, although 
the Court has been somewhat more willing to allow religious 
expression outside the school context. Although autonomy 
conceived as requiring independence is very influential, a conception 
based on inter-independence also asserts itself. For example, in 
contrast to the Court’s rulings on prayer in schools, in Marsh v. 
Chambers,275 the Supreme Court ruled that a state could hire a 
minister to deliver official prayers at the beginning of legislative 
meetings. Remarkably, in evaluating the constitutionality of 
legislative prayer, the Supreme Court ignored the Lemon test 
altogether, conducting instead an analysis of the longstanding 
historical precedent of allowing legislative prayer.276 
At times the line drawn by the Supreme Court between 
permissible and impermissible religious expression appears—to put it 
charitably—somewhat strained.  For example, in County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU,277 the Court ruled against the display of a crèche in a 
country courthouse. However, it reached the opposite conclusion in 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 278 when the display in question contained a 
menorah, a Santa Claus house, reindeer, and a Christmas tree as well 
as a crèche. 
Unpopular or dissenting speech that might have a religious 
component has also been given protection. In Bristol Square Review 
and Advisory Board v. Pinette,279 the Court held that the 
Establishment Clause was not violated by a Ku Klux Klan display of 
 275. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 276. See id. at 786 (“The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public 
bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”). 
 277. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 278. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 279. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
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an unattended cross on state property that constituted a public 
forum, equally accessible to all community groups. 
Europe: I have not been able to locate any cases in which the 
European Court or Commission have expressed concern for the 
autonomy of the state in nonschool settings. 
3.  Church conduct of state functions 
A model of autonomy based on independence would forbid 
churches from performing state functions. A model of autonomy 
based on interdependence would permit churches to perform a wide 
variety of functions that might be thought to fall within the state’s 
domain. A model of autonomy based on inter-independence would 
make a context-sensitive inquiry into the implications for state and 
church independence of allowing churches to perform particular 
state functions, as well as the implications for each institution of 
disallowing such activities. 
United States: Concern for state independence is evident in the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to let churches exercise powers that are 
normally reserved for the state. For example, in Larkin v. Grendel’s 
Den, Inc.,280 the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that gave 
schools and churches power to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses 
for premises within a 500-foot radius of church or school property. 
Evidencing similar concern for state autonomy, in Board of 
Education v. Grumet,281 the Court struck down a school districting 
plan that created a school district along the boundaries of an 
exclusively Hasidic Jewish community, on the grounds that the state 
had relinquished control over public education to a religious 
community. 
Europe: The European Court, in contrast, has been quite willing 
to allow churches to perform state functions and to receive state 
funding for conducting functions such as keeping records of births 
and deaths, providing welfare services, performing marriages and 
funerals, and maintaining cemeteries. The court has allowed 
mandatory taxes that apply to members as well as nonmembers of a 
Church performing such functions. Professor Evans explains, “The 
individual may be forced to pay this tax even though he or she is 
 280. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
 281. 512 U.S. 687 (1994); see Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A 
Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433 (1995). 
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strongly opposed to the relationship between the State and Church 
that these ‘secular functions’ imply.”282 Allowing church 
performance of state functions reflects a view of autonomy based on 
interdependence. 
4.  State laws and policies that converge with religious beliefs 
None of the conceptions of autonomy outlined above would 
prohibit all state laws and policies that reflect or correlate with 
religious beliefs, but each conception of autonomy would adopt a 
different approach toward assessing when laws that reflect religious 
beliefs are permissible. Autonomy conceived as requiring 
independence of church and state would be most skeptical of 
convergence, and might question state practices such as Sunday-
closing laws, or even policies that close public facilities on religious 
holidays, such as Christmas or Easter. Autonomy based on a 
conception of interdependence of church and state would be unlikely 
to find problematic clear causal connections between religious beliefs 
and state laws, even concerning controversial and morally charged 
issues such as abortion and divorce. A conception of autonomy based 
on inter-independence would be skeptical of laws and policies that 
reflect religious viewpoints, especially when there are no (or very 
weak) independent nonreligious bases for such policies and laws. 
United States: For the most part, the Supreme Court has adopted 
a view consistent with a conception of autonomy based on the inter-
independence of church and state. In the Court’s view, state 
autonomy does not demand that laws consistent with religious belief 
be deemed unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has been willing to 
tolerate government policies that coincide with religious beliefs of a 
particular religion, provided there is a legitimate secular purpose for 
the regulation and the effect is not primarily to endorse a particular 
religion. For example, in Harris v. McRae,283 the Supreme Court 
upheld federal regulations that forbade the use of federal funds for 
performing abortions under the Medicaid program, noting that “the 
fact that the funding restrictions . . . may coincide with the religious 
tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, 
 282. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 82 (citing Kustannus Oy Vapaa 
Ajattelija AB and others v. Finland, 85-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 29 (1996), 22 
E.H.R.R. CD 69 (1996) (Westlaw)). 
 283. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
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contravene the Establishment Clause.”284 In McGowan v. 
Maryland,285 the Supreme Court upheld Sunday-closing laws on the 
grounds that while such laws were originally motivated by religious 
beliefs, their contemporary purpose was to afford a uniform day of 
rest for citizens. On the other hand, in Wallace v. Jaffree,286 the 
Supreme Court struck down a law providing for a mandatory 
moment of silence in public schools, on the grounds that there was 
no plausible secular rationale for the law. 
Europe: The European Court’s jurisprudence in this area has 
reflected a conception of autonomy based on the interdependence of 
church and state. Under Article 9, one of the grounds upon which a 
state may restrict a manifestation of religious belief is for the 
protection of morals. As Professor Evans notes, “One complex 
question that arises in this area is whether a general law based on 
moral conceptions that are part of the morality of the dominant 
religion, but not of some minority religions, is a justifiable 
infringement on freedom of religion or belief.”287 Such an issue arose 
in Johnston v. Ireland,288 in which the Commission held that no issue 
arose under Article 9 with respect to a Protestant who claimed his 
religious freedom was abridged by an Irish law that reflected the 
Catholic Church’s prohibitions concerning divorce.289 
5.  Summary of state autonomy issues 
Figure 2 summarizes the issues involving the autonomy of the 
state. 
 
 284. Id. at 319–20. 
 285. 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (rejecting 
claims of Jewish merchants that Sunday-closing laws violated their free exercise rights), 
overruled in part by Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 286. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 287. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 159. 
 288. 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 E.H.R.R. CD 214 (1986) (Westlaw). 
 289. The Commission held that the case did not even raise an Article 9 issue, since Article 
12, dealing with the freedom to marry and have a family, was the lex specialis of the 
Convention relating to marriage. Id. Professor Evans notes that “[t]he case has been criticized 
for its focus on the right of the State to set out marriage and divorce regulations, without 
looking at whether such regulation, while not a limit on the right to marry, was an improper 
restriction on freedom of religion.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 160. 
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Figure 2 
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In cases involving the autonomy of the state, the jurisprudence 
of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights are based on very different conceptions of autonomy. 
U.S. cases involve a struggle between a conception of autonomy 
based on a categorical independence of church and state and a 
conception of autonomy based on inter-independence. In Europe, a 
conception of autonomy based on interdependence has prevailed, 
with a much greater institutional engagement and cooperation 
between the state and favored churches or religious viewpoints. 
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As noted above, the Establishment Clause was based in large part 
on a concern for the autonomy of the state. Today it is easy to lose 
sight of that fact, because the state has grown so large and powerful. 
Thus, it would be easy to overlook the large number of contexts in 
which concern for the autonomy of the state remains an animating 
concern in cases involving the relationship between church and state. 
Although American society is much more secular and pluralistic than 
it was two hundred years ago, concerns for the autonomy of the state 
arise in a surprisingly large number of situations. 
V.  INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 
We have seen that in cases involving institutional autonomy, the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the jurisprudence of the 
European Court are informed by very different conceptions of 
autonomy. This may come as little surprise, since this difference 
could be attributable to the fact that the U.S. Constitution includes 
not only a free exercise provision, but also prohibits an establishment 
of religion. The European Convention, in contrast, provides for 
freedom of religion or belief, but does not prohibit the existence of a 
state church and does not have an equivalent of the Establishment 
Clause. 
In cases involving individual religious liberty, in contrast, we 
might expect greater convergence in the approaches and outcomes in 
the United States and Europe.  After all, Article 9 of the European 
Convention contains a clear guarantee of religious liberty that is 
much more explicit and detailed than the Free Exercise Clause and 
would appear to guarantee at least as broad a protection of religious 
freedom as exists in the United States. Thus, while we might expect 
that cases involving institutional autonomy, which are more likely to 
be categorized in the United States as Establishment Clause cases, 
are likely to have different outcomes, we might expect that cases 
involving individual religious freedom will have similar outcomes in 
the United States and Europe. 
Such an expectation is not, for the most part, borne out by the 
cases. In cases involving the freedom of religion or belief of 
individuals, we see that the same conceptions of autonomy are 
prevalent. U.S. free exercise jurisprudence (at least until quite 
recently) has exhibited quite a high degree of concern for a 
conception of individual autonomy based on the idea of 
independence. In contrast, cases decided under the European 
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Convention have reflected a view of autonomy based on the idea of 
interdependence, exhibit a higher degree of deference to state goals 
and can more often be described as paternalistic. Because its 
jurisprudence often reflects a view of autonomy based on 
interdependence, the European Courts do not see individual 
autonomy being infringed when the state directly supports, or 
interferes with, church affairs. 
I will briefly survey six categories of cases that raise religious 
freedom issues involving the autonomy of the individual: (a) whether 
a state can impose oaths and religious requirements for office; (b) 
whether there is a right to conscientious objection; (c) whether an 
individual has a right not to work on his or her Sabbath; (d) whether 
there is a right to religious education; (e) the scope of the right to 
proselytize; and (f) whether and upon what grounds an individual 
may receive an exemption from a generally applicable law that 
burdens his or her religion or belief. 
A.  Oaths and Religious Requirements for Office 
A conception of autonomy based on independence of church and 
state would prohibit all oaths and religious requirements for public 
office. A conception of autonomy based on interdependence, in 
contrast, would allow oaths and religious requirements for public 
office. A conception based on inter-independence would be very 
suspicious of such requirements, although it would be more likely 
than a view based on independence to tolerate a practice of taking 
oaths that are religious in nature if nonreligious variations are 
permissible or if such oaths are not mandatory. 
United States: Religious oaths are specifically prohibited by the 
U.S. Constitution.290 In 1961, in Torcaso v. Watkins,291 the Supreme 
Court invalidated a requirement that candidates for public office 
profess a belief in God. In McDaniel v. Paty,292 the Court ruled that 
a Tennessee state constitutional requirement that certain public 
officials could not be “minister[s] of the Gospel, or priest[s] of any 
denomination whatsoever”293 was unconstitutional. Thus, religion 
 290. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”). 
 291. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 292. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
 293. Id. at 620 (citing TENN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1796)). 
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may not be used as either a requirement or as the basis for excluding 
someone from holding public office. These holdings reflect a view of 
autonomy based on the independence of church and state. On the 
other hand, oaths that invoke God are permitted for those taking 
public office or giving evidence in a legal proceeding, but exceptions 
are available for those who object to making such an oath.294 This 
reflects a view of autonomy that does not require stark independence 
of church and state, but rather one that envisions a degree of inter-
independence. 
Europe: In Buscarini v. San Marino,295 the European Court ruled 
that the requirement of taking a religious oath to hold political office 
may be an impermissible limitation on the manifestation of religion. 
The court, quoting the Commission, stated that “it would be 
contradictory to make the exercise of a mandate intended to 
represent different views of society within Parliament subject to a 
prior declaration of commitment to a particular set of beliefs,” thus 
making the requirement of the religious oath unnecessary in a 
democratic society.296 However, in Kalac v. Turkey,297 the Court, 
reversing a Commission decision, held that Article 9 was not violated 
when a military judge was dismissed from his job because he 
belonged to a fundamentalist Islamic group, even though there was 
no evidence that his religion was interfering with his performance of 
 294. “In response to pressures from atheists and other religious objectors, courts in 
recent years have gone beyond traditional oaths and affirmations and have allowed other 
alternative formulations such as ‘declarations’ or ‘promises’ to tell the truth.” Jonathan 
Belcher, Note, Religion-Plus-Speech: The Constitutionality of Juror Oaths and Affirmations 
Under the First Amendment, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 287, 289 (1992). For example, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the following: 
[W]hen a judge is confronted with a prospective juror’s refusal, on grounds of 
constitutionally protected beliefs, to swear or affirm to answer voir dire questions 
truthfully, the judge should either allow the person to withdraw from jury duty 
without penalty or allow the prospective juror an alternative that requires him or her 
to make some form of serious public commitment to answer truthfully that does not 
transgress the prospect’s sincerely held beliefs. 
Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 295. App. No. 24645/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), 30 E.H.R.R. 208 (2000) (Westlaw) 
(invalidating a requirement that members of parliament swear an oath “on the Gospels” on the 
grounds that this “required them to swear allegiance to a particular religion”). 
 296. Id. at 221. 
 297. 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1199 (1997-IV), 27 E.H.R.R. 552 (1997) (Westlaw). 
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his role as a military judge.298 In Kalac, religious status was viewed to 
be a permissible basis for disqualifying someone from certain types of 
public office. These holdings exhibit a degree of concern for 
individual religious independence, but are broadly consistent with a 
view of autonomy based on a conception of interdependence. 
B.  Conscientious Objection 
A constitutional guarantee of the right of conscientious objection 
would be unlikely under any of the three conceptions of autonomy. 
If autonomy is based on the independence of church and state, we 
would expect the state to disallow conscientious objection on the 
grounds that matters of self defense and national security fall 
squarely within the sphere of the state, and religious preferences and 
convictions are irrelevant to a determination of whether an individual 
is obliged to serve in the military. Stark independence would view 
religious conviction as irrelevant to a determination of civic 
obligation. A conception of autonomy based on inter-independence 
might be more willing to accept or accommodate conscientious 
objectors, since religion is not seen as being totally separate from and 
unconnected with the concerns of the state. Nevertheless, the 
parameters of conscientious objection will likely be carefully 
circumscribed and would be set by the state with an eye towards 
protecting the state’s ability to defend itself and its interests. A 
conception of autonomy based on interdependence would not be 
likely to guarantee rights of conscientious objection, unless a religion 
favored by the state had a strong doctrinal basis for guaranteeing 
conscientious objection. For basic reasons of self-preservation, it 
seems unlikely that a state would ally itself with a church that is 
strongly passivist, or one that asserts a robust guarantee of each 
individual’s right to assert a claim of conscientious objection. 
United States: While the United States recognizes conscientious 
objection, it receives statutory rather than constitutional protection. 
 298. Professor Evans notes that this case seems to fall into the category of forum 
internum, or religious beliefs that are to receive absolute protection, but the Court in reversing 
the Commission’s finding that his dismissal constituted a breach of Article 9 
used such a narrow definition of freedom of religion or belief that it is difficult to see 
how any but the most totalitarian State could breach it. Thus, in most cases, the 
State can make it unpleasant or burdensome to hold a religion or belief without 
actually intruding on the forum internum. 
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 78–79. 
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Conscientious objectors have been the beneficiaries of a long history 
of legislative recognition reaching back as early as 1661 in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony299 and continuing to the present day by 
federal statute. The United States Code permits a conscientious 
objector to avoid combat service if his opposition is based on 
“religious training and belief.”300 
Scholars disagree on whether a free exercise right to 
conscientious objection exists, but it seems fairly unlikely the 
Supreme Court would recognize a free exercise exemption for three 
reasons.301 First, while the Court has never squarely addressed the 
question, there is dictum indicating that there is no such 
constitutional right.302 Second, the Court has granted a high degree 
of deference to Congress and the military on matters of national 
 299. CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTION IN AMERICA, 1757–1967, at 17 (Lillian Schillissel ed., 1968). 
 300. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000). 
 301. The basic framework of the arguments presented in this paragraph can be found in 
Spencer E. Davis, Jr., Comment, Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace? The Status of 
Conscientious Objection Exemptions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191 (1991). 
 302. In United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), the Court stated: 
The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience 
to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it 
has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him. . . . The privilege of 
the . . . conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the 
Constitution but from the acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the 
exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the . . . conscientious 
objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible 
with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war powers. 
 Id. at 623–24. 
Several years later, in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 
(1934), the Supreme Court quoted that language approvingly. Id. at 264. Neither case dealt 
directly with conscientious objectors nor free exercise claims (Macintosh concerned an alien’s 
refusal to comply with naturalization requirements, while Hamilton dealt with the 
unwillingness of religiously sensitive students to attend a university-mandated class on military 
science and tactics) but they have given rise to the assumption that “[i]t is well settled that 
‘exemption from military service is a matter of legislative grace and not a matter of right.’” 
Korte v. United States, 260 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1958). Beyond the dicta in Macintosh and 
Hamilton, the Court came closest to squarely addressing a conscientious objector’s free 
exercise claim in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), but in that case the petitioner 
was a selective (opposed to a particular war) as opposed to a general (opposed to fighting in all 
wars) conscientious objector, and the Court’s free exercise analysis was extremely cursory. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s rejection of a selective conscientious objector’s free exercise claim in 
that case is also probably indicative of the Court’s attitude towards general conscientious 
objector claims as well. 
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defense and security.303 The third reason to suspect that the Court 
would not recognize a constitutional exemption from military service 
on religious liberty grounds is the Court’s relatively recent decision 
in Oregon v. Smith,304 which eliminated requiring strict scrutiny of 
generally applicable laws that burden religion. In sum, while 
conscientious objection receives statutory recognition in the United 
States, it is unlikely that there is a constitutional right to an 
exemption from military service. Statutory rather than constitutional 
protection of conscientious objection is consistent with a view of 
autonomy based on inter-independence of church and state. 
Europe: There is no right to conscientious objection under the 
European Convention, and it is left to individual states to provide, or 
to choose not to provide, exemptions from military service for 
conscientious objectors. As early as 1966, and consistently since, the 
Commission has held that there is no right under Article 9 that 
covers conscientious objectors.305 This holding was based on Article 
4 of the Convention, which prohibits slavery or forced or 
compulsory labor, but which specifically creates an exception in cases 
of “conscientious objectors in countries where they are 
recognized.”306  The Commission emphasized that because Article 4 
contemplated that countries might not recognize conscientious 
objectors, there could be no obligation for countries to recognize 
them.307 
Nevertheless, a sea change may be afoot. A more liberal approach 
to conscientious objector claims appears to be evident from two 
 303. See Davis, supra note 301, at 205–06; C. Thomas Dienes, When the First 
Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other Special Contexts, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779 
(1987). “[J]udicial deference to . . . congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee when 
legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules 
and regulations for their governance is challenged.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 
(1981). This deference means the Court does not probe constitutional challenges in the 
military context with the same level of scrutiny. Id. at 70–71 (citing numerous representative 
cases); Dienes, supra. Military interests simply carry more weight in any balancing analysis than 
do governmental interests in most other areas. Any petitioner fighting for recognition of a 
constitutional right to conscientious objection will have to overcome this barrier. 
 304. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 305. Grandrath v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 626 
(1966), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int; N v. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, 40 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203 (1984), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (upholding the practice of allowing 
exemptions from military service only to Jehovah’s Witnesses). 
 306. Id. (citing European Convention, art. 4(3)(c)). 
 307. Id. 
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recent cases. In Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece,308 the European 
Court held that while ministers do not have a right to conscientious 
objection, lengthy imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witness ministers 
violated their Article 9 rights, since under the law providing 
exemption for members of a “known religion,” Orthodox ministers 
had no difficulty obtaining exemptions. In an unreported case, 
Thlimmenos v. Greece,309 the European Court held that a Jehovah’s 
Witness who passed a public exam to become an accountant, but was 
denied entry into the profession based upon a criminal conviction for 
refusing to serve in the armed forces, had his Article 9 rights violated 
since there was no option of substitute service available at the time of 
his conviction for a serious criminal offense. These recent decisions 
reflect a higher degree of concern for individual equality and 
autonomy rights, perhaps signaling some movement away from a 
conception of autonomy based on interdependence to a conception 
based on inter-independence. 
C.  Sabbath Work 
A conception of autonomy based on independence would 
probably not permit Sunday-closing laws (since such laws use state 
power to further religious ends), but might recognize a right to have 
one’s work schedule structured to accommodate Sabbath-day 
observance.310 In contrast, autonomy based on interdependence 
would likely allow Sunday-closing laws and would also allow laws 
that protect religious adherents from Sabbath work. These 
protections and guarantees, however, while likely protecting 
preferred churches and their adherents, would not necessarily afford 
similar protections to religious believers who do not observe the 
same Sabbath day as the preferred churches.  Autonomy based on 
inter-independence would be suspicious of Sunday-closing laws, 
 308. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1997-III), 25 E.H.R.R. 198 (1998) (Westlaw). 
 309. App. No. 34369/97 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 4, 1998), 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 
(2001). 
 310. As noted above in the discussion of religious-based claims for an exemption from 
generally applicable laws, while it might seem that independence would require a broad 
recognition of claimed exemptions, if the sphere of religious life is limited to “belief” and the 
sphere of government oversight is said to encompass everything that includes “action,” then 
independence will be viewed as requiring very little recognition of claims for an exemption from 
generally applicable laws, including the claims of Sabbatarians for an exemption from 
requirements to work on their Sabbath day. 
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although if such laws had a credible secular basis, and if such laws 
had an appropriate set of exemptions and exceptions, they might be 
permitted. Autonomy based on inter-independence might also 
recognize that the state’s failure to accommodate Sabbath-day work 
preferences imposes a burden on individual religious freedom, and 
state policies that burden religious observance might be subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny. 
United States: In 1961, in Braunfeld v. Brown,311 the Supreme 
Court held that the free exercise rights of Jewish merchants were not 
violated by Sunday-closing laws, although the Court suggested that 
the state could enact an exemption from such laws for merchants 
whose religious beliefs required them to close on another day.312 
This case represents one of the few early instances in which a 
conception of autonomy based on interdependence seems to underlie 
the Supreme Court’s analysis. In Braunfeld, the Court upheld a state 
law that was intended to protect and further the interests of a 
majority religious viewpoint, finding reciprocal benefits to the state 
for providing this preference and protection, while being dismissive 
of the burdens that such a law placed upon adherents to another 
Sabbath day.313 
A few years later, the Supreme Court modified its approach to 
laws that burden religious freedom by subjecting such laws to 
heightened scrutiny. In Sherbert v. Verner,314 the Court held that a 
Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied unemployment 
 311. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 312. However, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), the Supreme 
Court invalidated an effort to follow such an approach, striking down a statute providing 
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. 
 313. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 599, 605 (“[T]he statute at bar does not make unlawful any 
religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as 
applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more 
expensive.”) The court also asserts that the legislation “imposes only an indirect burden on the 
exercise of religion.” Id. at 606. The Court further states: 
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or 
is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid 
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the State 
regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect 
of which is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect 
burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by 
means which do not impose such a burden. 
Id. at 607. 
 314. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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compensation because she refused to work on Saturday was entitled 
to receive unemployment benefits because the denial of benefits 
constituted a “substantial infringement”315 or “coercive effect on her 
religious beliefs.”316  In so holding, the Court exhibited a high 
degree of concern for the autonomy of religious believers whose 
religious convictions put them at odds with state law. If a petitioner 
could demonstrate that a law created a “substantial burden” on his 
religious liberty rights, then the state was required to show that the 
burden was justified by a “compelling state interest” and that the 
government’s program was the “least restrictive means” to vindicate 
that interest.317  In Sherbert, the Court held that the state failed to 
prove either a compelling state interest (the Court rejected the 
argument that the law prevented spurious claims by “claimants 
feigning religious objections to Saturday work”)318 or that the law 
was the least restrictive means for combating such alleged abuses. 
Following Sherbert, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Commission,319 the Court declared unconstitutional a denial of 
unemployment benefits to an employee who refused to work on 
Saturdays after converting to the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. In 
1989, in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,320 the 
Court required the State of Illinois to provide unemployment 
benefits to a man who refused to work on Sunday because it was the 
“Lord’s day,” even though the petitioner who said he was a 
Christian did not claim membership in a particular religious group. 
These outcomes are consistent with a conception of autonomy 
based on the inter-independence of church and state. One of the 
strategies that will often be adopted under a conception of inter-
independence is heightened scrutiny, where under the autonomy 
interests of individuals (Is there a substantial burden placed on 
religious observance?) will be weighed against the autonomy 
interests of the state (Is there a compelling state interest and is the 
state policy narrowly tailored to accomplish that interest?). In Oregon 
v. Smith,321 decided a year after Frazee, the Court signaled a sharp 
 315. Id. at 406. 
 316. Id. at 404. 
 317. Id. at 402–10. 
 318. Id. at 407. 
 319. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
 320. 489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
 321. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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retreat from subjecting facially neutral laws to heightened scrutiny 
when the autonomy interests of religious adherents are burdened by 
such laws. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that neutrally 
applicable laws that burden religion are not subject to heightened 
scrutiny, implicitly adopting a conception of autonomy based upon 
the interdependence of church and state.322 
In these cases, we see the Supreme Court taking positions that 
rely on shifting conceptions of autonomy. In Braunfeld, the Court 
relies on a conception of autonomy based on interdependence. The 
Court sees a high degree of integration and cooperation between the 
goals of the state and those of a preferred religious group, and the 
Court is very deferential to state action that has a negative impact on 
the religious liberty of individuals who do not belong to that group. 
In Sherbert and Frazee, the Court reflects a greater sensitivity to 
burdens that facially neutral laws may place on religious observance 
and subjects such situations to heightened scrutiny, reflecting a 
conception of autonomy based on inter-independence. In Smith, the 
Court abandons heightened scrutiny and returns to a conception of 
autonomy based on the interdependence of church and state, with the 
state being trusted to adequately protect religious rights and 
interests. State action is presumed to protect religious freedom unless 
it overtly discriminates against a religious group. 
Europe: The European Court’s stance on Sabbath-day work has 
not been fully tested.  In Konttinen v. Finland, 323 the issue of 
Sabbath work was raised by the applicant Konttinen, who worked for 
the State Railway for several years before becoming a member of the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church. As part of his new religious 
conversion, Konttinen was required to “refrain from working on the 
Sabbath (Saturday) which starts at sunset on Friday.”324 At certain 
times of year, based upon the time of sundown, Konttinen left work 
early to avoid working on the Sabbath day.  Despite informing his 
employer of his religious convictions and his need to leave early on 
 322. Id. at 882–89. One might think that the Supreme Court in Smith relies upon a 
conception of autonomy that reflects independence, since churches are not given special 
treatment. Such an interpretation of independence, however, is possible only if the wall of 
separation is moved very far into the realm of religious practice. If religious practice is isolated 
and marginalized sufficiently a government can always claim that it leaves religion alone within 
its very constricted sphere. 
 323. App. No. 24949/94 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 3, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
 324. Id. 
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occasion, Konttinen was dismissed by the Railway for leaving work 
early.325 The Commission ruled that because the applicant was a civil 
servant of the State Railway, he had an obligation to his employer to 
observe the rules governing his work hours. The Commission also 
found that Konttinen was not dismissed because of his religious 
beliefs but rather because of his failure to comply with his specified 
work hours.326 The Commission also emphasized that the applicant’s 
dismissal was not a violation of his right to freedom of religion 
because the applicant was free to relinquish his post.327 Thus, to date 
the European Court has not exhibited a high degree of concern for 
individual religious needs in cases involving Sabbath-day work, and 
the limited jurisprudence in this area seems to reflect a conception of 
autonomy based on interdependence. 
D.  The Right to Religious Education 
A conception of autonomy based on independence might not 
recognize the right of parents to send their children to church-
sponsored schools, since education could be viewed as a secular 
function of the state. Even if there is a right to receive religious 
education, autonomy based on independence would forbid the state 
from providing funding and other support for religious schools. In 
contrast, a conception of autonomy based on interdependence would 
recognize the right of parents to send their children to church-
sponsored schools, at least to schools sponsored by preferred 
churches.  Autonomy based on interdependence would also permit 
the state to provide financial and other forms of direct aid to schools 
sponsored by preferred churches. A conception of autonomy based 
on inter-independence would be sensitive to the implications for the 
state, for churches, and for children of being sent to religious 
schools. While the autonomy interests of parents, children and 
churches might weigh in favor of guaranteeing a right to attend 
church-sponsored schools, direct financial aid to church-sponsored 
schools would not be allowed, since this would jeopardize the 
independence of church and state. In addition, the state’s autonomy 
interests will weigh in favor of giving the state a voice in the content 
and character of the education provided. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
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United States: In the United States, parents have a constitutional 
right to send their children to parochial schools,328 but private 
schools may not receive direct state aid.329 In a highly anticipated 
decision handed down in the summer of 2002, the Supreme Court 
upheld a voucher program that allows parents to use vouchers to 
send their children to parochial schools.330 In cases involving 
parochial schools, the Supreme Court has exhibited a trend from a 
view of autonomy based on independence to a view of autonomy that 
reflects the assumptions of inter-independence. Indeed, if the recent 
voucher case is a precursor of things to come, the Supreme Court 
may be poised to allow programs that indirectly provide significant 
quantities of financial benefits to churches, which would mark a 
significant move in the direction of a conception of autonomy based 
on the assumptions of interdependence. Recently, the Supreme Court 
decided Locke v. Davey, 331 which dealt with a provision in the 
Washington State Constitution that prohibited a student from using 
a particular state scholarship program in pursuit of a degree in 
theology. In considering the case, the Supreme Court held that a 
state may provide scholarship funds to a student in pursuit of a 
degree in theology without violating the Establishment Clause, but a 
state was not obligated to make those funds available by the Free 
Exercise Clause.332 Such an approach is indicative of inter-
independence; the state may provide funding if it chooses, and even 
under the Washington plan, the scholarships may be used by 
students attending religious schools without pursuing a degree in 
theology. However, it is also sensitive of the concerns of 
independence by not requiring that the states use taxpayer funds to 
support religious ministry. The sort of balancing evident in Davey is 
suggestive of an inter-independence approach. 
Europe: In Europe, parents have the right to send their children 
to church-sponsored schools. Additionally, under the European 
Convention states can subsidize religious schools or pay for certain 
types of religious education in public or religious schools, although 
minority religions have no basis to claim a right to state funding for 
 328. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 329. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
 330. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 331. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
 332. Id. at 1311. 
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their schools.333 Parents are quite limited in their ability to insulate 
children from types of teaching in public schools that they find 
objectionable from a religious point of view.334 Even the ability to 
receive an exemption from religious instruction is limited.335 These 
outcomes reflect a view of autonomy based on the interdependence of 
church and state. 
E.  The Right to Proselyte 
A conception of autonomy based upon independence would 
provide a broad guarantee of the right to engage in proselyting 
activities and other forms of religious persuasion. A conception of 
autonomy based upon interdependence would provide protection for 
public dissemination of preferred religious viewpoints, although 
equal access would not necessarily be guaranteed to less favored 
religious groups. Inter-independence would provide broad protection 
for religious persuasion, but some narrow limitations might be 
allowed that would not be permitted by a view of autonomy based 
upon independence, particularly when the autonomy interests of 
other individuals or of the state were significantly compromised by 
such activities. 
United States: In a series of cases decided in the 1940s, Cantwell 
v. Connecticut,336 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,337 and Follett v. McCormick,338  
 333. See EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 89 (citing cases). 
 334. Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 26, 
para. 53 (1982), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. In Kjeldsen, the court held that Denmark could 
impose integrated sexual education curriculum over parents’ religious objections, although it 
“must take care that information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an 
objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of 
indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’ religious and philosophical 
convictions.” 
 335. Angeleni v. Sweden, 51 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41 (1986), 10 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. CD 123, 125–26 (1988) (Westlaw) (denying an exemption from religious instruction to 
an atheist on grounds that Sweden had entered a reservation to Article 2 of the First Protocol 
stating that exemptions from teachings in Christianity could be granted only to “children of 
another faith than the Swedish Church in respect of whom satisfactory religious instruction had 
been arranged”). 
 336. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness convicted 
under a statute forbidding solicitation without a license). While the Cantwell Court invoked 
the belief/action distinction, and reiterated that actions may be regulated for “the protection 
of society,” it stated that such regulation must not “unduly infringe” upon religious practice. 
Id. at 296, 304. 
 337. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down a license tax imposed on door-to-door 
proselytizers). 
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the Supreme Court struck down license and occupation taxes imposed 
on Jehovah’s Witnesses who sold religious reading materials through 
door-to-door proselytizing. In the summer of 2002, in another case 
involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Supreme Court held that a 
city regulation requiring religious door-to-door solicitors to receive a 
state license violated their free exercise rights.339 The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in this area reflect a conception of autonomy based 
upon independence. 
Europe: The first case in which the European Court held that 
there had been a violation of the right to freedom of religion and 
belief was Kokkinakis v. Greece,340 which involved a Jehovah’s 
Witness convicted of violating the Greek law prohibiting 
proselytism.341 Minos Kokkinakis was convicted of proselytism after 
he went to the house of the local Greek Orthodox cantor and told 
his wife about the Jehovah’s Witnesses. While the cantor’s wife was 
not persuaded by Mr. Kokkinakis’ appeals and did not even 
remember much about the conversation, which she said had not 
affected her religious beliefs, and even though there was no evidence 
that she was particularly naïve or vulnerable, Mr. Kokkinakis was 
convicted of improper proselytism, and his conviction was upheld in 
a series of appeals through the Greek courts. The European Court 
ruled that the Greek law violated Article 9 on the grounds that the 
law was an unnecessary limitation on Mr. Kokkinakis’s right to 
manifest his religious beliefs. 
This holding reflects a view of autonomy based upon inter-
independence. The court did not hold that Mr. Kokkinakis’s 
proselyting activities were absolutely protected by Article 9(1), which 
states that everyone has the “freedom to change his religion or 
belief.”342 Such a holding would have reflected a view of autonomy 
 338. 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (reversing a conviction for selling religious tracts door-to-door 
without a license). 
 339. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 340. 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993), 17 E.H.R.R. 397 (1994) (Westlaw). 
 341. The Greek law in question defined proselytism as: 
in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a 
person of a different religious persuasion (eterodoxos), with the aim of undermining 
those beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or 
moral support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage 
of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety. 
Id. at 404. 
 342. European Convention, supra note 72, art. 9, para. 1. 
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based upon independence. Instead, the Court held that the case 
involved an impermissible limitation on the ability of Mr. Kokkinakis 
to manifest his religion and belief because the limitation was not 
“necessary in a democratic society.”343 The Court noted that “the 
Greek courts established the applicant’s liability by merely 
reproducing the wording of section 4 [of the governing Greek law] 
and did not sufficiently specify in what way the accused had [violated 
the law].”344 Thus, it was not “shown that the applicant’s conviction 
was justified in the circumstances of the case by a pressing social 
need.”345 In Kokkinakis, the European Court balanced the state’s 
autonomy interests in protecting public safety, order, health, and 
morals on the one hand against Mr. Kokkinakis’s autonomy interests 
in manifesting his religious beliefs, and the balance was found to 
weigh in favor of Mr. Kokkinakis. This type of balancing analysis is 
what one would expect from a conception of autonomy based upon 
inter-independence. 
The Kokkinakis case, however, brought to the fore strong 
differences of opinion in the European Court about the scope of the 
freedoms protected by Article 9, including the right to change one’s 
religion. Judge Martens, in a concurring opinion, noted that under 
the Convention, freedom of religion is an “absolute” value and 
stated that the Convention “leaves no room whatsoever for 
interference by the State” in freedom to have or change religions.346 
 343. Kokkinakis, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).  
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 436. Judge Martens goes on to note that teaching is explicitly protected in the 
Convention, and that such teaching may “shade off into proselytizing” and cause some conflict 
with the rights of others to maintain their beliefs.  
In principle, however, it is not within the province of the State to interfere in this 
‘conflict’ between proselytizer and proselytized. First, because—since respect for 
human dignity and human freedom implies that the State is bound to accept that in 
principle everybody is capable of determining his fate in the way that he deems best—
there is no justification for the State to use its power ‘to protect’ the proselytized (it 
may be otherwise in very special situations in which the State has a particular duty of 
care but such situations fall outside the present issue). Secondly, because even the 
‘public order’ argument cannot justify use of coercive State power in a field where 
tolerance demands that ‘free argument and debate’ should be decisive. And thirdly, 
because under the Convention all religions and beliefs should, as far as the State is 
concerned, be equal. 
Id. at 436–37. The dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, which goes beyond what the majority 
of the Court was willing to hold, evidences a real concern for the independence-based 
autonomy of the individual that is mostly missing in European Court cases. 
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Judge Martens would have placed Mr. Kokkinakis’s activities within 
Article 9(1)’s sphere of absolute protection, which would reflect a 
conception of autonomy requiring a high degree of independence 
between the state and individuals’ decisions with respect to religious 
belief and association. The Greek member of the panel, Judge 
Valticos, in a dissenting opinion, expressed a broad willingness to 
permit the suppression of the evangelical efforts of Mr. Kokkinakis.347 
He described Mr. Kokkinakis’ activities as a “rape of the belief of 
others” and concluded that his behavior did not constitute a 
manifestation of religion or belief.348 This view reflects a particularly 
strong take on the interdependence of church and state, where the 
interests of a favored church are seen as being highly integrated with 
the state’s interest. Thus, in the set of opinions in the Kokkinakis 
case we see all three conceptions of autonomy reflected in the 
respective opinions of the majority, concurring, and dissenting 
judges. 
A few years later, in Larissis v. Greece,349 the European Court 
upheld limitations on proselytizing activities of military superiors of 
their subordinates.  According to Professor Evans, “In this case, the 
Court was willing to accept that any attempt at proselytism by senior 
officers was an abuse of power, despite the arguments in the 
dissenting judgment of Judge Van Dijk, who considered this 
absolute approach to be disproportionate.”350 Although the outcome 
 347. Id. at 429–32 (Valticos, J., dissenting). 
 348. Judge Valticos characterized the situation in the Kokkinakis case as follows:  
Let us look now at the facts of the case. On the one hand, we have a militant 
Jehovah’s Witness, a hardbitten adept of proselytism, a specialist in conversion, a 
martyr of the criminal courts whose earlier convictions have served only to harden 
him in his militancy, and, on the other hand, an ideal victim, a naïve woman, the 
wife of a cantor in the Orthodox Church (if he manages to convert her, what a 
triumph!). He swoops on her, trumpets that he has good news for her (the play on 
words is obvious, but no doubt not to her), manages to get himself let in and, as an 
experienced commercial traveler and cunning purveyor of the faith he wants to 
spread, expounds to her his intellectual wares cunningly wrapped up in a mantle of 
universal peace and radiant happiness. Who, indeed, would not like peace and 
happiness? But is this the mere exposition of Mr. Kokkinakis’s beliefs or is it not 
rather an attempt to beguile the simple soul of the cantor’s wife? Does the 
Convention afford its protection to such undertakings? Certainly not. 
Id. at 430–31 (Valticos, J., dissenting). 
 349. 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 363 (1998–V), 27 E.H.R.R. 329 (1999) (Lexis). 
 350. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 145. Judge Van Dijk felt 
there should be a presumption of abuse in such cases but that it should be 
rebuttable. He decided that the presumption should have been rebutted in regard to 
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in Larissis is opposite of the outcome in Kokkinakis, the Larissis case 
also reflects a conception of autonomy based upon inter-
independence. The European Court weighed the autonomy interests 
of the state against the autonomy interests of the individuals 
involved. In the military context, however, the autonomy interests of 
the state and of individuals are weighed differently than in the 
civilian context. In Larissis, the European Court justified limitations 
on proselyting based upon the state’s autonomy interests of 
maintaining order and discipline, which in the military are 
particularly acute, and upon individual autonomy interests, which 
also have a different complexion in the military context, where 
subordinate military personnel might feel pressured or coerced to be 
positively responsive to the proselytizing activities of superior 
officers. The court notes that because of the hierarchical structure of 
the military, “what would in the civilian world be seen as an 
innocuous exchange of ideas which the recipient is free to accept or 
reject, may, within the confines of military life, be viewed as a form 
of harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse of 
power.”351 
F.  Exceptions to Generally Applicable Laws 
A conception of autonomy based upon independence would 
provide broad exceptions to generally applicable laws based upon 
religious belief, with possible limitations based only upon the serious 
threat that granting an exemption would pose to the autonomy of 
others or the autonomy of the state. A conception of autonomy 
based upon interdependence would not recognize exceptions to 
generally applicable laws, although laws that accommodate the 
religious beliefs and needs of adherents of preferred faiths would be 
expected. Autonomy based upon inter-independence would subject 
laws that placed burdens upon religious belief or practice to 
heightened scrutiny, examining carefully the effects upon the 
autonomy of other individuals and the state of failing to recognize an 
exemption. 
one junior officer who claimed that he first approached the senior officers, that they 
never pressured him, and that he converted to the Pentecostal Church of his own 
free will. 
Id. (citing Larissis, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 363 (1998–V) (Van Dijk, J., dissenting)). 
 351. Larissis, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 363, para. 51 (1998–V). 
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United States: Early U.S. free exercise jurisprudence was very 
skeptical about recognizing exemptions based upon religious 
conviction from generally applicable laws.  For example, in Reynolds 
v. United States,352 the Court rejected the argument of a Mormon 
who claimed that the Free Exercise Clause provided an exemption 
from laws prohibiting polygamy because the practice was mandated 
by church doctrine. The Court cited Jefferson’s letter to the 
Danbury Baptist association that made a distinction between beliefs 
and actions and held that while religious beliefs receive absolute 
protection, religious actions are not protected when they are “in 
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”353 This 
outcome was consistent with a view of autonomy based upon the 
inter-independence of church and state, with the balance found 
weighing in favor of state autonomy,354 which appeared to be 
jeopardized by the practice of polygamy. Individual autonomy 
interests were discounted because they were limited to the sphere of 
belief and held inapplicable to the sphere of action.355 
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court for a time adopted a 
different approach to free exercise claims for exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. Beginning in Sherbert v. Verner,356 a case 
involving a Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied unemployment 
compensation for refusing to work on Saturday, the Court subjected 
state action that placed a substantial burden on religion to 
 352. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court also upheld Congress’s right to seize the Church’s 
property, calling the claim that polygamy is a religious belief that falls under the Free Exercise 
Clause “altogether a sophistical plea,” and stating, “No doubt the Thugs of India imagined 
that their belief in the right of assassination was a religious belief; but their thinking so did not 
make it so.” Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341–42 (1890) (“Bigamy and 
polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries,” and “[t]o call their 
advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind.”). 
 353. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
 354. Id. at 166–67 (“So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive 
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a 
man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would 
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in 
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”). 
 355. This holding reflected strong Protestant assumptions about the centrality of belief in 
contrast with action to religious obligation, since upon a Protestant view salvation can be 
accomplished through proper belief alone. In other religious traditions, including Catholicism, 
protecting only belief and not action might not be sufficient to enable an adherent to do 
everything necessary to assure his or her salvation. 
 356. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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heightened scrutiny if it placed a substantial burden on religion. This 
meant that the state was required to show that its actions were 
justified by a compelling state interest and that there was no less 
restrictive means for affecting that interest. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,357 
this approach resulted in an exemption for Amish schoolchildren 
from state compulsory education beyond the eighth grade, and, in 
Thomas v. Review Board,358 it resulted in unemployment 
compensation for a Jehovah’s Witness who quit his job because his 
religious convictions prevented him from participating in the 
production of war materials. These cases also reflect a view of 
autonomy based upon inter-independence, although the outcomes 
favored the autonomy interests of those seeking passive exemptions 
based upon religious beliefs. 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court became more reluctant to 
recognize exceptions to general and neutral laws based upon 
religious freedom claims.359 For example, in Goldsboro Christian 
Schools, Inc. v. United States,360 the Court rejected the free exercise 
claim of a school that refused admission to blacks based upon a 
reading of the Bible; in Bob Jones University v. United States,361 the 
Court held that the state had a compelling interest in preventing 
racial discrimination and rejected the free exercise claim of a 
university that did not allow interracial dating or marriage; in 
Goldman v. Weinberger,362 the Court upheld a military regulation 
that forbade the wearing of a yarmulke while on duty; in Bowen v. 
Roy,363 the Court denied an exemption for religiously motivated 
objections to the use of Social Security numbers in welfare programs; 
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,364 the Court 
allowed the U.S. Forest Service to build a road through a Native 
American burial ground in spite of the religious objections of three 
tribes that used the grounds for religious rituals; and in Hernandez v. 
 357. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 358. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 359. For a discussion of the Court’s pattern of rejecting such claims, see Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1410 (1990); see also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the 
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989). 
 360. 454 U.S. 1121 (1981). 
 361. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 362. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 363. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 364. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
3SCH-FIN 12/1/2004  7:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1322 
 
Commissioner,365 the Court rejected a claim by members of the 
Church of Scientology who argued their free exercise rights were 
violated when the Internal Revenue Service denied a tax deduction 
for their payments for “auditing” on the grounds that the payments 
did not represent a contribution but rather a quid pro quo exchange. 
Although religious exemptions were not permitted in these cases, the 
analysis was nevertheless based upon the inter-independence of 
church and state, with the Court usually subjecting laws burdening 
religious beliefs to heightened scrutiny. While these cases illustrate 
that heightened scrutiny does not guarantee that a religious claim 
will be vindicated, the cases weighed state autonomy claims against 
individual autonomy claims as one would expect from a conception 
of autonomy based upon inter-independence. 
About a decade ago, the Supreme Court abandoned altogether 
its method of subjecting claims for an exemption from general and 
neutral laws to heightened scrutiny.  In Employment Division v. 
Smith,366 the Court held that a law that burdens religion is 
constitutional as long as it is general and neutral. This standard is not 
entirely incapable of protecting religious liberty interests, as 
demonstrated a few years later in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah,367 in which the Supreme Court held that 
ostensibly neutral laws setting standards governing animal slaughter 
violated the Free Exercise Clause because they had been drafted to 
apply only to the ritual sacrifice of animals by the Church of Lukumi. 
Nevertheless, the Court in Smith moved sharply toward a conception 
of autonomy based upon the interdependence of church and state. 
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA),368 designed to restore the compelling state interest test 
to free exercise jurisprudence. The Supreme Court, however, 
declared the RFRA unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores369 and 
rejected the claim of a church seeking a free exercise exemption from 
a prohibition on enlarging its church, in contravention of a historic 
landmark preservation ordinance. Under the Supreme Court’s 
 365. 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
 366. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 367. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 368. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb). 
 369. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional because it 
exceeded Congress’s remedial authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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current view, general and neutral laws that burden religion are 
permitted. Thus, concerning religion-based exemptions, the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has shifted from a view of autonomy 
based upon inter-independence to a view that reflects a conception of 
autonomy based upon interdependence. 
Europe: According to Professor Evans, the Commission and the 
Court have adopted three different approaches for dealing with 
neutral and general laws that have the effect of burdening religious 
belief or observance. “The first approach is to hold that, as long as a 
law is genuinely neutral and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, 
it cannot breach Article 9.”370 A second approach “is to hold that 
restricting a person’s freedom of religion under a general and neutral 
law could breach Article 9(1), but that this breach could be justified 
in appropriate circumstances under Article 9(2).”371 A third 
approach, illustrated in cases involving conscientious objection to 
military service, is to deal with such issues by “specific reference to 
another article of the Convention.”372  I will focus here primarily 
upon the second approach, in which the limitations clause of Article 
9(2) is invoked to determine whether a restriction on a 
“manifestation” of religious belief is permissible. 
In deciding whether to grant an exception to a generally 
applicable law based upon freedom of religion or belief, the 
Commission and the court have developed a test which focuses upon 
whether a particular manifestation is necessary in order for someone 
to practice his or her religion (in which case an exemption is 
available), as opposed to situations in which the behavior in question 
is simply inspired by religious motives or beliefs (in which case an 
exemption is unavailable). This test was first articulated by the 
Commission in Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom,373 a case 
involving the right of a pacifist to distribute leaflets to soldiers urging 
them to refuse a tour of duty. In Arrowsmith, the Commission 
 370. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 169. 
 371. Id. For example, in Seven Individuals v. Sweden, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 104 (1982), 5 E.H.R.R. 147 (1983) (Westlaw), parents were unsuccessful in arguing for 
a religious exemption from a state law prohibiting corporal punishment based upon a 
biblically-based belief that corporal punishment of children was biblically mandated, on the 
grounds that a prohibition of corporal punishment was permitted by Section 9(2)’s limitation 
on manifestations of religious belief on the grounds of health and safety. 
 372. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 169. 
 373. 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5 (1978), 3 E.H.R.R. 218 (1978) (Westlaw). 
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concluded that distributing leaflets did not constitute a “practice” of 
pacifism, but rather political opposition to a particular government 
policy.374 
According to Professor Evans, 
[t]here have been a large number of claims made in relation to 
general and neutral laws (such as laws on taxation, compulsory 
vaccination, pension schemes, and planning) on the basis that they 
interfere with religion or belief.  In the vast majority of these cases, 
the Commission has utilized the Arrowsmith test to hold people 
claiming exemptions from such laws were merely influenced or 
motivated by religion or belief rather than practicing their religion 
or belief.375 
For example, in Khan v. United Kingdom,376 the Commission 
upheld the criminal conviction of a twenty-one-year-old man who 
was married in an Islamic ceremony to a fourteen-year-old girl 
against her parents’ wishes. Under Islamic law, a girl is permitted to 
marry without the consent of her parents at age twelve, whereas 
under British law the age is eighteen. In dismissing his complaint 
that his conviction for abducting the girl violated his rights of 
religious freedom, the Commission reasoned that his actions did not 
constitute a manifestation of religious belief because while Islamic 
law permitted marriage at an earlier age than British law, it did not 
require it.377 
On other occasions, the Commission seems to distort the 
necessity test in order to reach outcomes that are deferential to state 
actions that burden religious expression. In Karaduman v. Turkey,378 
a Muslim woman who declined to remove her headscarf for an 
identity photograph was refused the right to graduate from a 
university.  Departing from the approach outlined in the Arrowsmith 
case, the Commission did not focus, as one might expect, upon 
whether wearing the headscarf was necessary under Islam. Rather, 
the Commission focused on the taking of the photograph, stating 
that “[t]he purpose of the photograph affixed to a degree certificate 
 374. Id. at 228–30. 
 375. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 116. 
 376. 48 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 253 (1986), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
 377. Id. 
 378. 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. 
3SCH-FIN 12/1/2004  7:07 PM 
1217] The Autonomy of Church and State 
 1325 
 
is to identify the person concerned. It cannot be used by the person 
to manifest his religious belief.”379 
One difficulty that arises under Arrowsmith’s necessity test is that 
the Commission and the court are put in the position of determining 
whether a particular action is required by one’s religion or belief, or 
whether an action is merely motivated by one’s religion or belief. In 
practice, this has resulted in the Commission and the court being 
dismissive of petitioners’ claims about whether an action is required 
by their religious beliefs.380 A second difficulty under the Arrowsmith 
approach is that it may be more difficult to establish necessity for 
petitioners who base their claims on beliefs or religions that are 
nonhierarchical, or when petitioners’ beliefs depart from those of 
their church.381 A final difficulty that arises is that despite a general 
law’s ostensibly neutral language, a law may actually be targeted at 
limiting particular religious practices, either as the law is written, or 
as it is enforced.382 
 379. Id. at 109. Evans notes that, 
While the decision was ultimately made on other grounds, the Commission 
indicated that the refusal of the University to allow Miss Karaduman to wear a 
headscarf in her photograph was probably not a restriction on her right to manifest 
her religion. . . . The normal, Arrowsmith approach to this question would have 
been to question whether the wearing of the headscarf and refusing to remove it for 
a photograph was required by Islam. The shift of emphasis away from the issue of 
religious apparel, which seemed to be at the heart of the application, and on to the 
taking of the photograph, suggests a level of conceptual confusion within the 
Commission as to the appropriate way to apply the Arrowsmith case. 
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 118. 
 380. See, e.g., Valsamis v. Greece, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 2312 (1996-VI), 24 E.H.R.R. 
294 (1996) (Westlaw); Efstratiou v. Greece, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 2347 (1996), E.C.H.R. 
24095/94 (Lexis) (upholding the suspension from school of Jehovah’s Witness children who 
refused to participate in a Greek National Day parade on the grounds that doing so violated 
their pacifist beliefs, stating that the Court saw nothing in the parade that could offend 
petitioners’ religious convictions, and discounting evidence from petitioners that participating 
in such a parade conflicted with their religion); cf. D. v. France, 35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 199, 202 (1983), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (relying upon expert evidence in State court 
from religious leaders to support the conclusion that certain action was not a necessary 
manifestation of religious belief); cf. also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943). 
 381. See EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 122–23. 
 382. See, e.g., Manoussakis and others v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1347 (1996–
IV), 23 E.H.R.R. 387 (1996) (Westlaw) (planning laws regarding places of worship used to 
discriminate against some religious groups); Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) (1993), 17 E.H.R.R. 397 (1994) (Westlaw) (law against improper proselytism used only 
against members of unpopular religious groups); Tsavachidis v. Greece, App. No. 28802/95 
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The Arrowsmith necessity test looks like a paradigmatic balancing 
test that would be expected from a conception of autonomy based 
upon inter-independence, but in practice the European Court has 
weighed state interests so heavily that the jurisprudence seems to 
reflect a conception of autonomy based upon the interdependence of 
church and state. 
G.  Summary of Individual Autonomy Issues 
Issues involving religion and individual autonomy are 
summarized in Figure 3. 
 
(Eur. Comm’n H.R. Mar. 4, 1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (state used general national 
security surveillance laws to target minority religious groups). 
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The story with respect to individual autonomy issues is more 
complex than that regarding institutional autonomy. In Europe, 
while a conception of autonomy based upon interdependence is still 
dominant, at least with respect to several issues including whether 
the state can require religious oaths and the availability of exceptions 
to generally applicable laws based upon religious belief, the 
European Court has relied upon a conception of autonomy that 
reflects the concerns of inter-independence. 
In the United States, the story is also more muddled. With 
respect to some of the most significant issues involving the 
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autonomy of individuals, the Supreme Court has moved sharply 
away from a conception of autonomy based upon independence, or 
even inter-independence, toward a conception of autonomy based 
upon interdependence.  There are two areas where this movement is 
most evident. The first involves the right to religious education, 
where the Court has moved from the view that there is a right to 
religious education to a view that the state can indirectly provide 
large amounts of funding to support religious education. This would 
seem to rest upon a significant discounting of the core Establishment 
Clause concern that financial appropriations from the state to 
churches jeopardize both the autonomy of churches and the 
autonomy of the state. The second area involves the availability of 
exemptions from generally applicable laws based upon religious 
grounds. With the Smith decision, the Supreme Court has moved 
away from subjecting claims for a free exercise-based exemption from 
generally applicable laws to heightened scrutiny, as suggested by a 
conception of autonomy based upon inter-independence, toward 
presuming that such burdens are permissible as long as they are 
based upon laws that are neutral and general. These developments 
represent significant movement in the direction of a conception of 
autonomy based upon interdependence that, while influential in 
Europe, has for the most part not been influential in the United 
States, due to fears that it runs counter to the core Establishment 
Clause concerns about independence of church and state. 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CONCEPTIONS  
IN AREAS OF DISPUTE 
Parts IV and V addressed the implications of the three 
conceptions of autonomy on a number of issues involving 
institutional and individual autonomy. I also discussed the 
approaches taken to these issues by the Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights and the conceptions of autonomy 
that underlie these outcomes. In this Part, I will discuss five 
significant current controversies in the United States involving the 
interactions of church and state and consider how each of the three 
conceptions of autonomy addresses these issues. These highly 
charged issues include school prayer, the use of educational vouchers 
at religious schools, charitable choice, public displays of the Ten 
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Commandments, and the constitutionality of the words “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.383 
A.  Prayer in Public Schools 
Daily classroom prayer raises significant issues for the autonomy 
of the state as well as of individual children. As noted above,384 the 
centrality of public education to the state’s mission, the possibility of 
religious domination, and the vulnerability of children combine to 
make public schools a particularly interesting context to consider the 
implications of different conceptions of autonomy for church-state 
and religious liberty issues. This is in part due to the importance of 
public schools in the state’s mission of educating children and 
inculcating in the rising generation a set of attitudes and attributes 
that will be conducive to good citizenship. Additionally, public 
schools are a place where the state is particularly vulnerable to the 
influence or even domination by a particular religious group, since 
even in a large and religiously pluralistic society such as the United 
States, many particular locales are very religiously homogeneous. The 
possibility of one religious perspective dominating is heightened 
when the religious convictions of individual teachers are taken into 
account, and because for the most part there is very little oversight 
or supervision of what takes place within individual classrooms. 
Given the age and impressionability of young children, autonomy 
concerns about the individual children also loom large in primary 
and secondary school classrooms. 
In contrast, it might seem that graduation prayer would present 
much less of a threat to the autonomy of the state. Adult supervision 
and oversight of the school’s practice is assured, the possibility of 
ensuring that a broad spectrum of religious viewpoints are 
represented in invocations and benedictions is much easier, and the 
solemn and ceremonial nature of the occasion might seem to make 
prayer an appropriate component of the proceedings. Graduation 
 383. My discussion of the Pledge of Allegiance issue is somewhat more detailed than my 
discussion of other issues because this issue was the subject of an important recent Supreme 
Court case, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), and remains 
unsettled, since the Supreme Court in Newdow dismissed the case for lack of standing and did 
not address the merits of the case. In addition, I believe the Pledge issue is an area where the 
value of focusing upon autonomy and competing conceptions of autonomy is a promising way 
to break the doctrinal logjam that surrounds establishment and free exercise issues. 
 384. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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prayer would also seem to pose less of a threat to the religious 
autonomy of children, since a large number of adults are present and 
aware of what is taking place, and since the possibility of 
indoctrination through daily repetition of a particular viewpoint does 
not exist. 
From the perspective of independence, both daily classroom 
prayer and graduation prayer would be prohibited, since each would 
represent an intrusion of religion into the public sphere. From the 
perspective of interdependence, both daily classroom prayer and 
graduation prayer would be unproblematic, since approved prayer 
would be viewed as supportive of the purposes and roles of both 
church and state. In addition, interdependence might not object to 
preferences being granted to one or a small number of select 
churches in deciding whom to invite to offer prayers. 
From the perspective of inter-independence, however, daily 
classroom prayer and graduation prayer might be treated differently, 
since each has different implications for the autonomy of the state 
and of individuals present in classrooms and at graduation 
ceremonies. Inter-independence would focus upon the context and 
the specific implications for the independence of the state, of 
churches, and of individuals. Rather than entirely excluding prayer 
from ceremonial occasions such as public school graduation (as an 
independence model would dictate), or including only prayers of a 
religious majority (as an interdependence model might allow), an 
understanding of autonomy based upon inter-independence would 
recognize the importance of independence, of inclusion, of mutual 
respect, of commitment to a discourse of public reason and 
justification, and of empowerment of all members of the political 
community.  Rather than striving completely to exclude religion 
from public life, or seeking a lowest common denominator that is 
designed to offend no one (and probably succeeds in offending 
nearly everyone), such a vision would encourage each of us to listen 
with reverence and respect to the prayers of others with religious 
backgrounds and faith traditions to which we do not belong. A 
vision of autonomy based upon inclusion would replace a vision of 
autonomy based upon separation. 
The Supreme Court’s case law on the subject of school prayer 
has not been sensitive to such possible distinctions but has hewn a 
separationist course based upon a conception of autonomy requiring 
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independence of church and state. In 1962, in Engel v. Vitale,385 the 
Supreme Court held that a state-composed prayer read aloud in 
public school classes violates the Establishment Clause. A year later, 
in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,386 the Court held 
that daily Bible reading and daily recitation of the Lord’s Prayer 
violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. And two 
decades later in Wallace v. Jaffree,387 the Court held that a state law 
authorizing a moment of silence at the beginning of the school day 
in public schools violates the Establishment Clause. These cases all 
reflect a conception of autonomy based upon independence of church 
and state. From these cases it was clear that daily classroom religious 
observances violated the Establishment Clause. What remained 
unclear was whether prayer on occasions such as school graduation 
or at sporting events was permissible or impermissible. 
The Court answered the question regarding graduation prayer in 
1992, in Lee v. Weisman,388 holding that a nonsectarian prayer 
offered by a Rabbi at a middle-school graduation ceremony violated 
the Establishment Clause because it was impermissibly coercive. The 
Court reasoned that “[s]tate officials direct the performance of a 
formal religious exercise at [the] graduation ceremonies,” and 
students’ “attendance and participation in the state-sponsored 
religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the 
school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt 
of the diploma.”389 The emphasis on the coercive nature of the state 
action illustrates the Court’s underlying autonomy concerns. In a 
subsequent case, the Supreme Court held that student-sponsored 
prayer at a high school football game also violated the Establishment 
Clause.390 The outcome in these cases reflects a conception of 
autonomy based upon the independence of church and state. 
B.  Vouchers and Other Forms of Indirect Aid to Churches 
One very controversial issue over the past several decades 
involving the relationship of church and state has centered on 
 385. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 386. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 387. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 388. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 389. Id. at 586. 
 390. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
3SCH-FIN 12/1/2004  7:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1332 
 
whether parents should be able to utilize education vouchers to send 
their children to schools sponsored by or affiliated with a church, or 
that reflect a particular religious viewpoint. An extensive literature 
has been written assessing the advantages and disadvantages of 
voucher programs and the constitutionality of including religiously 
affiliated schools in such programs.391  In 2002, the Supreme Court 
held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris that religiously affiliated schools 
could be included in a city voucher program.392 The key to the 
Supreme Court’s analysis was the concept of neutrality and the fact 
that the vouchers were issued to parents who in turn decided 
whether or not to use the vouchers at religiously affiliated schools.393 
While the Court acknowledged that in Cleveland ninety-six percent 
of vouchers would be used to send children to religiously affiliated 
schools, that seventy-six percent of the religiously affiliated schools 
participating in the program are affiliated with the Catholic Church, 
and that this would constitute a significant indirect benefit to 
religion, vouchers were permitted.394 As noted above, in 2004, the 
Supreme Court decided that a student studying for religious 
ordination can be excluded from a state-funded scholarship 
program.395 
Autonomy based upon independence of church and state would 
not allow religiously affiliated schools to participate in voucher 
programs, since indirect as well as direct benefits to schools would be 
prohibited. While certain very general benefits, such as police and 
fire protection, and inclusion in public utilities, are not prohibited 
under independence, programs that result in public funds ending up 
 391. See, e.g., Allen M. Brabender, The Crumbling Wall and Free Competition: Formula 
for Success in America’s Schools, 79 N.D. L. REV. 11 (2003); Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers: 
The Answer to a Failing Public School System, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 73 (2001); Mark 
V. Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2002). 
 392. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). The Court reasoned that the government aid program was 
neutral with respect to religions because the funding was dispersed to the parents who then 
directed the funds to religious schools in accordance with their private choice: “The incidental 
advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is 
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends 
with the disbursement of benefits.” Id. at 652. 
 393. For a critique of the concept of neutrality in religion clause jurisprudence, see Steven 
D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No 
Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987). 
 394. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 681. 
 395. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), overruling 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
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in the hands of church-sponsored institutions would be prohibited. 
Autonomy based upon interdependence would allow public funding 
of religiously affiliated schools, both indirectly and directly.  In 
Europe, where a model of autonomy based upon interdependence 
prevails, the European Convention does not prohibit a broad array 
of types of state aid to religious schools. 
Autonomy based upon inter-independence would be very 
skeptical of indirect aid to religiously affiliated schools, since financial 
aid affects the core autonomy value of independence. From the 
perspective of inter-independence, indirect aid to parochial schools 
would be critically evaluated based not upon the principal of 
neutrality or whether parents served as an intervening mechanism, 
but based upon the possible effects such aid would have upon the 
independence of the state, the independence of churches and 
church-sponsored schools, and individual autonomy. A variety of 
threats to the independence of both institutions might militate 
against including parochial schools in such programs. For the state, if 
a large percentage of voucher recipients opt for religiously affiliated 
schools, this might have a negative impact upon the state’s ability to 
conduct the core public function of educating children and 
inculcating in children the attitudes and attributes deemed desirable 
for good citizenship. Poorly performing public schools, in particular, 
might be further incapacitated or killed by a reduction in funding. 
The state’s autonomy could also be undermined if a particular 
religious constituency wielded sufficient political power to enact 
voucher programs that resulted in significant financial resources 
being channeled to one or a few religions. For churches, their 
autonomy could be seriously undermined if they become dependent 
upon state largess, in which case they may become vulnerable to 
demands upon the curriculum and teaching that conflict with or 
even directly contradict religious tenets. 
On the voucher issue, the Supreme Court has not only eschewed 
a conception of autonomy based upon independence, it has also been 
quite dismissive of the core autonomy concerns raised by a 
conception based upon inter-independence. In allowing religiously 
affiliated schools to participate in state-funded programs, and in 
allowing a large percentage of available funds to be channeled to a 
small number of religious groups, the Court has moved towards a 
conception of autonomy based upon interdependence. 
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C.  Charitable Choice 
Many of the same issues that come up in the voucher context are 
mirrored in the charitable-choice context. Excluding religiously 
affiliated service providers from participation in social service 
programs would seem to violate the principle of neutrality.  On the 
other hand, allowing religiously affiliated organizations to receive 
direct state aid in furtherance, at least indirectly, of their religious 
mission raises significant concerns for both the autonomy of the state 
and of the religious groups. 
A conception of autonomy based upon the independence of 
church and state would not allow religiously affiliated groups to 
receive direct or indirect funding to participate in social service 
programs. A conception of autonomy based upon interdependence 
would welcome such cooperation and integration of efforts to 
address serious social ills. A conception of autonomy based upon 
inter-independence would analyze the issue based upon the principles 
of independence, inclusion, mutual respect, and empowerment. 
D.  Public Displays of the Ten Commandments 
In August of 2001, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme 
Court, Judge Roy Moore, placed a 5200-pound statue of the Ten 
Commandments in the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial 
Building396 and later refused to obey an injunction from the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama to remove it.397 As 
a result of Judge Moore’s actions, a highly publicized controversy 
erupted over whether the public display violated the Establishment 
Clause.398 On one side of the debate, Judge Moore and his 
supporters argued that “[t]he real purpose of the First Amendment 
was and is to protect the states’ and their citizenry’s rights to 
 396. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Ten Commandments 
Display in Alabama Judicial Building Violates Constitution, Say Civil Liberties Groups (Oct. 
30, 2001), at http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=pr&page=NewsArticle&id= 
6008&security=1002&news_iv_ctrl=1384. 
 397. See William H. Pryor, Christian Duty and the Rule of Law, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2003) (citing Glassroth v. Moore, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (final judgment 
and injunction)). 
 398. Judge Moore’s prominent supporters felt so strongly about the issue that “they 
surrounded the State Judicial Building in hopes of preventing the removal of the 
monument . . . compar[ing] their struggle with that of the civil rights movement led by Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.” Id. at 2. 
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acknowledge God according to the dictates of their own 
conscience.”399 Others argued that a strict separation between church 
and state prohibits a religious display in a public building, especially 
one that favors a particular religion.400 Before Judge Moore placed 
the statue in the rotunda, he had already sparked an earlier 
controversy by displaying the Ten Commandments in his courtroom 
and inviting local clergy to open court sessions with prayer.401 
Responding to public reaction following Moore’s original actions, 
Governor Fob James even “vowed to call out the militia to defend 
the Commandments if necessary.”402 Moore was eventually removed 
from office for his defiance. 
A conception of autonomy based upon independence would 
prohibit all religious displays on public property, including the Ten 
Commandments. A conception of autonomy based upon 
interdependence would permit religious displays on public property 
and would not demand equal treatment of minority religious 
viewpoints. Some religious viewpoints could be included and others 
excluded, based upon the state’s assessment of whether the display 
was desirable or not. A conception based upon inter-independence 
would focus upon the impact of the display on the autonomy of the 
state and of religion, based upon the principles of independence, 
inclusion, mutual respect, and empowerment. 
Jurisprudence based upon inter-independence might result in 
nuanced differences between situations that might appear similar. 
For example, in the case of a state supreme court justice who is 
aggressively trying to make a political statement about the supremacy 
 399. See Hon. Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 347, 349 
(1998). Moore’s supporters justified disobeying the federal court injunction because they were 
under a higher “legal and moral duty to acknowledge God.” Pryor, supra note 397, at 2. 
400. One commentator noted: 
If we do yield to a system such as Moore’s, we quickly are relegated to a system in 
which the Christian majority determines what type of prayers or documents will be 
posted, the result of which is a continuation and enlargement of Christian privilege. 
Moore’s idea that it is coercion to require Christian majority silence is mistaken. 
Requiring the majority, and everyone for that matter, to be silent in regards to religion 
in public settings is simply the removal of a privilege unsupported by any right. 
Joseph R. Duncan, Jr., Privilege, Invisibility, and Religion: A Critique of the Privilege That 
Christianity Has Enjoyed in the United States, 54 ALA. L. REV. 617, 633 (2003). 
 401. See id. at 630. 
 402. See Jonathan P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth 
Amendment Does Not Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1998). 
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of God’s law over the Constitution—and the idea that judges 
consider themselves to be subject to a law higher (one that is not 
democratic) than the Constitution, which could reasonably be 
interpreted as an effort to communicate to dissenters and those of 
minority faiths that they are not equal before the law—by placing a 
large monument conspicuously in a state courthouse, such a display 
might be deemed unconstitutional based upon the effect it has on 
the independence of the state from the undue influence of  a 
particular religious viewpoint.403 
On the other hand, a relatively inconspicuous Ten 
Commandments monument in a public park or other place where 
state judicial or legislative authority is less omnipresent might be 
permitted. Allowing such a monument would not necessarily create a 
public forum in which all “religious” expressions, no matter how 
odious and harmful, must be allowed.  The Supreme Court will have 
an opportunity to address a comparable situation in Van Orden v. 
Perry,404 in which it will consider whether a monument displaying 
the Ten Commandments on the state capitol’s grounds violates the 
First Amendment.  The monument, according to the district court 
and Fifth Circuit decisions, is one of many monuments on the 
grounds displaying the secular and religious history of the state.  It 
might be the type of situation in which the Supreme Court might 
conclude, “a reasonable viewer would not see this display either as a 
State endorsement of the Commandment’s religious message or as 
excluding those who would not subscribe to its religious 
statements.”405 
If a view of autonomy based upon inter-independence were 
adopted, a complete elimination of religion from public life is not 
required, as would be demanded by a view of autonomy based upon 
total independence of church and state. Indeed, complete content 
neutrality might not be required under inter-independence, either. 
Rather, religious monuments and other forms of religious expression 
in public life would be assessed based upon the effect they have upon 
 403. The Supreme Court will be taking up a similar issue when it decides ACLU v. 
McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6693 (Oct. 
12, 2004). In McCreary, the Sixth Circuit held that the Ten Commandments had been posted 
in the courthouses not for a secular purpose, or as part of some historical display, but to 
promote a particular religious belief. Id. at 449. 
 404. 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6691 (Oct. 12, 2004). 
 405. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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the independence of the state and the independence of churches and 
of individuals. If a type of religious expression jeopardizes or 
threatens the independence of the state, then that would be a 
ground for excluding it.  If excluding a type of religious expression 
jeopardizes or threatens the independence of churches or their ability 
to be reasonably included and accommodated in public life, then 
that would be a ground for including such an expression. If the 
autonomy of speakers is unduly thwarted by excluding a type of 
religious expression, then that would be a ground for including it. If 
the autonomy of unwilling listeners is unduly thwarted by including 
a type of religious expression, that would be a ground for excluding 
it. Of course, some of these considerations will push and pull in 
different directions, and reasonable people will disagree about where 
lines should be drawn. But the likelihood of reaching appropriate 
answers in such disputes is enhanced if we are focusing upon the 
right questions. 
E.  The Pledge of Allegiance 
In 1954, at the height of the cold war, Congress amended the 
text of the Pledge of Allegiance to add the words “under God.”406 In 
a response to a perceived threat of the spread of communism, 
Congress intended “the inclusion of God in our pledge . . . [to] 
further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our 
Government upon the moral directions of the Creator.”407 Including 
a reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance would also “serve to 
deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism.”408  
Congress indicated that the phrase “under God” was not intended 
to promote the establishment of religion, emphasizing that “[a] 
distinction must be made between the existence of a religion as an 
institution and a belief in the sovereignty of God.”409 A Supreme 
Court decision cited in the congressional reports was used to support 
 406. The revised Pledge of Allegiance now reads, “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the 
United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, 
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). 
 407. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 2340 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 
2339. 
 408. Id.  
 409. Id. 
3SCH-FIN 12/1/2004  7:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1338 
 
the idea that a reference to God does not necessarily establish 
religion.410 
1.  The Newdow bombshell 
In June 2002, in Newdow v. United States Congress, a three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a split 
decision that California’s policy requiring the recitation of the Pledge 
of Allegiance in public school classrooms was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause because of the inclusion in the Pledge of the 
words “under God.”411 
Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle condemned the ruling as 
“outrageous,” “nuts,” and “stupid.”412 In the immediate aftermath 
of the decision, “[t]he U.S. Senate was so incensed by the decision 
that it passed a resolution 99-0 ‘expressing support for the Pledge of 
Allegiance’ and asking Senate counsel to ‘seek to intervene in the 
case.’”413 The House of Representatives passed a resolution 416-3 
protesting the decision.414 Republican House Speaker Dennis Hastert 
of Illinois opined, “Obviously, the liberal court in San Francisco has 
 410. The Court reasons that the First Amendment 
[D]oes not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church 
and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there 
shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the common 
sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—
hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly . . . Prayers in our legislative halls; the 
appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations 
making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; “so help me God” in our courtroom oaths—
these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public 
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312–13 (1952). 
 411. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), petitions for reh’g and petitions for reh’g en banc 
denied, 321 F.3d 772 (2003). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite 
conclusion in a factually similar case. See Sherman v. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437 (7th 
Cir. 1992). For commentary on the correctness of the Ninth Circuit decision, see, for example, 
Peter Brandon Bayer, Is Including “Under God” In the Pledge of Allegiance Lawful? An 
Impeccably Correct Ruling, 11 NEV. L. 8 (2003) (defending the Ninth Circuit decision). But 
see, e.g., Lisa Trinh, Note, Newdow v. U.S. Congress: One Nation Indivisible, 24 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 807 (2003) (arguing that contrary to the Newdow court’s holding, the 1954 Act and the 
school district’s policy should have passed scrutiny under the Lemon test). 
 412. Lawmakers Blast Pledge Ruling, June 27, 2002, at http://archives.cnn.com/ 
2002/LAW/06/26/pledge.allegiance/index.html?related. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Jesse J. Holland, U.S. Lawmakers Stand Up To Show Support for Pledge; House OKs 
Resolution Protesting Decision, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 28, 2002. 
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gotten this one wrong.”415 Democratic Senate Majority Leader 
Thomas Daschle called the ruling, “just nuts.”416 
According to one news account, “[c]ritics of the decision were 
flabbergasted and warned that it calls into question the use of ‘In 
God We Trust’ on the nation’s currency, the public singing of 
patriotic songs like ‘God Bless America,’ even the use of the phrase 
‘So help me God’ when judges are sworn into office.”417 Other 
commentators focused attention on the source of the ruling, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a reputation for liberal 
activism and which has the highest rate of reversal by the Supreme 
Court of any of the circuits.418 
“Where’s a San Francisco earthquake when you really need one?” 
cracked the New York Post in a lead editorial titled “Left Coast 
Lunacy.” Even the New York Times, which editorialized that the 
circuit court decision was “well meaning,” dismissed the bombshell 
ruling saying it “trivializes” serious constitutional debates about the 
separation of church and state.419 
In the wake of the public furor, the author of the opinion, Judge 
Alfred Goodwin, stayed the panel’s ruling pending a review by the 
entire Ninth Circuit. In March 2003, the Ninth Circuit denied 
applications to review the case en banc and issued a modified opinion 
upholding the decision.420 
 415. See Lawmakers Blast Pledge Ruling, supra note 412. 
 416. Flap After Court Rules Pledge of Allegiance Unconstitutional, June 27, 2002, at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0%2C2933%2C56310%2C00.html. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Brad Knickerbocker, One 9th Circuit Appeals Court, Under God, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0808/p02s01-usju.html (Aug. 8, 2002). 
 419. Josh Getlin, In New York, It’s Outrage Followed by ‘Consider the Source,’ L.A. TIMES, 
June 28, 2002, at A20. 
 420. See Newdow v. United States Congress, 321 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying 
petitions for rehearing and denying petitions for rehearing en banc). The Washington Post 
reported: 
Over the public dissent of nine members, the 24-judge U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 9th Circuit, based in San Francisco, rebuffed requests from the Bush 
administration and a California school district to have the court reconsider its 
decision last June. . . . The court did take one step back, however. Its original ruling 
not only barred schools from sponsoring the pledge but also struck down the 1954 
federal law that officially added the words ‘Under God’ to the pledge—thus making 
the pledge itself unconstitutional. That was omitted from an ‘amended’ version of 
the court’s opinion issued yesterday. 
Charles Lane, Pledge of Allegiance Ruling Is Upheld, WASH. POST, March 1, 2003, at A01. 
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2.  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis 
While one can dispute whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision was a 
correct interpretation of the Establishment Clause,421 the panel and 
its defenders can claim that it represents a faithful, unremarkable 
application of what can only be described as the Supreme Court’s 
confusing and chaotic doctrine in this area of the law.422 As Professor 
Jamin Raskin said, “the case is going to have an explosive effect on 
public opinion but from the legal perspective, I think it’s firmly 
rooted in the logic of prior cases.”423  Indeed, the panel covers all 
bases by going to great lengths to analyze the case from every 
possible doctrinal perspective. 
In a dissent from the denial of rehearing in banc, Judge O’Scannlain argues that the 
Ninth Circuit should have reheard the case en banc, 
not because it was controversial, but because it was wrong, very wrong—wrong 
because reciting the Pledge of Allegiance is simply not ‘a religious act’ as the two-
judge majority asserts, wrong as a matter of Supreme Court precedent properly 
understood, wrong because it set up a direct conflict with the law of another circuit, 
and wrong as a matter of common sense. 
321 F.3d at 776–77 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). Judge O’Scannlain also characterizes the 
panel’s work as “an exercise in judicial legerdemain which, not surprisingly, produced a public 
outcry across the nation.” Id. at 776. Judge Reinhardt, who was a part of the original two-
member majority in the Newdow case, writes an opinion concurring in the order to deny en 
banc review, in which he blasts Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent on the grounds that it “reflects a 
serious misconception of fundamental constitutional principles and the proper role of the 
federal judiciary.” 321 F.3d at 772 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in the order). According to 
Judge Reinhardt, “The dissent suggests that this court should be able to conclude that the 
panel’s holding was erroneous by observing the ‘public and political reaction’ to its decision.” 
Id. at 775. Judge Reinhardt states that “Article III judges are by constitutional design 
insulated from the political pressures governing members of the other two branches of 
government.” Id. “When the federal judiciary is so firmly separated by constitutional structure 
from the direct influence of politics, we must not undermine that structure by allowing 
political pressures, polls, or ‘focus groups’ to influence our opinions, even indirectly.” Id. at 
776. 
 421. A number of interesting articles have been written about the constitutionality of the 
Pledge. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, “Under God,” The Pledge of Allegiance and Other 
Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865 (2003); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of 
Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995). 
 422. See, e.g., Philip N. Yannella, Stuck in the Web of Formalism: Why Reversing the Ninth 
Circuit’s Ruling on the Pledge of Allegiance Won’t Be So Easy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 79, 80 (2002) (“On its own terms, the opinion is a cogent and proper application of 
existing Supreme Court case law.”). 
 423. Oliver Libaw, Is the Pledge of Allegiance Religious? Supreme Court Likely to Have 
Final Say on First Amendment Issue, at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=91507&page=1 
(June 27, 2002). 
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The Newdow panel begins by noting that, “[o]ver the last three 
decades, the Supreme Court has used three interrelated tests to 
analyze alleged violations of the Establishment Clause in the realm of 
public education.”424 The first approach is the three-prong test set 
forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.425 The second approach is the 
“endorsement” test first articulated by Justice O’Connor in her 
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly426 and later adopted by a 
majority of the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.427 The third 
approach is the “coercion” test first used by the Court in Lee v. 
Weisman.428 
Rather than attempting to divine which approach the Supreme 
Court would adopt in analyzing the constitutionality of the Pledge 
of Allegiance, the panel considered each approach seriatim and 
concluded that the Pledge violates each of the three tests.429 
 
a.  The Lemon test. In order to survive scrutiny under the Lemon 
test, the challenged conduct or policy (1) must have a secular 
purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive 
entanglement with religion.430 If any prong of the Lemon test is not 
satisfied, the Establishment Clause is violated. 
In assessing the purpose of the words “under God” in the 
Pledge, the Ninth Circuit focused on the 1954 Act, which added the 
words to the Pledge of Allegiance, and concluded that, 
“[h]istorically, the primary purpose of the 1954 Act was to advance 
religion, in conflict with the first prong of the Lemon test.”431 While 
defendants argued that the pledge “as a whole” has a secular 
 424. Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 425. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 426. 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (allowing a crèche to be 
included in a multifaceted public holiday display). 
 427. 492 U.S. 573, 616–21 (1989) (prohibiting the display of crèche at a country 
courthouse). 
 428. 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (public school graduation prayer violates the 
Establishment Clause). 
 429. 292 F.3d at 597. “In its most recent school prayer case, the Supreme Court applied 
the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test to strike down a school district’s 
policy of permitting student-led ‘invocations’ before high school football games.” Id. at 607 
(citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310–16 (2000)). “We are free to 
apply any or all of the three tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them.” Id. 
 430. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.  
 431. 292 F.3d at 609. 
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purpose—i.e., “solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence 
in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of 
appreciation in society”—the Ninth Circuit took the view that it 
must focus specifically upon the 1954 Act432 and concluded that 
notwithstanding Congress’s statement that the inclusion of the 
words “under God” was not an establishment of religion, the 
purpose for including the words “under God” in the Pledge was 
entirely religious rather than secular, and thus a violation of the 
purpose prong of the Lemon test.433 
 
b.  Endorsement. In a concurring opinion in the 1984 Lynch case, 
which allowed a nativity scene to be included in a city’s Christmas 
display, Justice O’Connor wrote to suggest a “clarification” of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. She argued that the 
establishment clause 
[P]rohibits government from making adherence to a religion 
relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political 
community. Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two 
principal ways.  One is excessive entanglement with religions 
institutions. . . . The second and more direct infringement is 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.  Endorsement 
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.434 
The Supreme Court later adopted this endorsement test in County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, which prohibited the display of a crèche at a 
county courthouse.435 
Applying the endorsement test, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that, “[i]n the context of the Pledge, the statement that the United 
States is a nation ‘under God’ is an endorsement of religion. It is a 
 432. Id. at 610 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984)). The panel 
notes that in Wallace v. Jaffree, which struck down Alabama’s statute mandating a moment of 
silence “for meditation or voluntary prayer,” the Court did so not because the final version “as 
a whole” lacked a secular purpose, “but because the state legislature had amended the statute 
specifically and solely to add the words “or voluntary prayer.” Id. at 610 (citing Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–60 (1985)). 
 433. Id. at 610–11. 
 434. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 435. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
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profession of a religious belief, namely a belief in monotheism.”436 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Pledge “impermissibly takes a 
position with respect to the purely religious question of the existence 
and identity of God.”437 The school district’s practice of teacher-led 
recitation of the Pledge “amounts to state endorsement” of the 
ideals set forth in the Pledge, and even though students are not 
forced to participate in reciting the Pledge, “the school district is 
nonetheless conveying a message of state endorsement of a religious 
belief when it requires public school teachers to recite, and lead the 
recitation of, the current form of the Pledge.”438 Citing Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the Pledge “is an impermissible government 
endorsement of religion because it sends a message to unbelievers 
‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
favored members of the political community.’”439 
 
c.  Coercion. In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court utilized a 
“coercion” test to find unconstitutional the practice of including 
invocations and benedictions in the form of “nonsectarian” prayers 
at public school graduation ceremonies.440 Rather than applying the 
Lemon test, the Lee Court stated that, “at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in 
a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith or tends 
to do so.’”441 The Court then held in Lee that graduation prayer was 
unduly coercive in that it put impermissible pressure on students to 
participate in, or at least show respect during, the prayer.442 
With respect to the Pledge, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
 436. 292 F.3d at 607. 
 437. Id. The panel goes on to say, 
[a] profession that we are a nation ‘under God’ is identical, for Establishment Clause 
purposes, to a profession that we are a nation ‘under Jesus,’ a nation ‘under Vishnu,’ 
a nation ‘under Zeus,’ or a nation ‘under no god,’ because none of these professions 
can be neutral with respect to religion. 
Id. at 607–08. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 440. 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
 441. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original)). 
 442. Id. at 593. 
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policy and the Act fail the coercion test. Just as in Lee, the policy 
and the Act place students in the untenable position of choosing 
between participating in an exercise with religious content or 
protesting. As the Court observed with respect to the graduation 
prayer in that case: “What to most believers may seem nothing 
more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their 
religious practices, in a school context may appear to the 
nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery 
of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.”443 
3.  Evaluating the Ninth Circuit’s analysis 
There are two primary ways to critically analyze the Ninth 
Circuit’s conclusions in Newdow. The first is to argue that the panel 
misapplied the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine 
concerning the permissible interactions of church and state in public 
schools. The second is to argue that although the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion is a faithful, or at least plausible, application of that doctrine, 
the doctrine itself is a misguided understanding of the Establishment 
Clause. 
Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s decision to 
deny an en banc rehearing of the case adopts the former approach. 
He argues that in Engel v. Vitale,444 the “fountainhead of all school 
prayer cases,”445 the Supreme Court “drew an explicit distinction 
between patriotic invocations of God on the one hand, and prayer, 
an ‘unquestioned religious exercise,’ on the other.”446 After 
reviewing the Supreme Court’s school prayer cases,447 Judge 
O’Scannlain concludes that two fundamental principles may be 
derived. First, “[f]ormal religious observances are prohibited in 
public schools because of the danger that they may effect an 
 443. 292 F.3d at 608–09 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 592). 
 444. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 445. Newdow v. United States Congress, 321 F.3d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of petitions for rehearing and denial of petitions for 
rehearing en banc). 
 446. Id. at 779 (Judge O’Scannlain, dissenting). 
 447. Lee, 505 U.S. at 580 (striking down school-sponsored prayers at graduation as an 
“overt religious exercise”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down a moment of 
silence law on grounds that the legislature’s sole purpose in enacting the law was to “return 
prayer to the public schools”); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking 
down Bible reading and recitation of the Lord’s prayer in public schools, but saying nothing 
about the recitation of the pledge). 
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establishment of religion.”448 Second, “[o]nce it is established that 
the state is sanctioning a formal religious exercise, then the fact that 
the students are not required to participate in the formal devotional 
exercises does not prevent those exercises from being 
unconstitutional.”449 Judge O’Scannlain concludes that the Pledge 
does not trigger an Establishment Clause violation because it does 
not involve the state directing the performance of a “formal religious 
exercise.”450 
Judge O’Scannlain’s argument is not without merit, and had it 
not dismissed the case on standing, it is possible that the Supreme 
Court might have followed his lead and concluded that the Pledge 
did not raise Establishment Clause issues because it is simply not a 
“formal religious exercise.” In order to do so, however, it would 
seem that the Supreme Court would have to ignore or finesse its 
own doctrinal approaches to Establishment Clause cases. From the 
perspective of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine, 
the Ninth Circuit’s arguments in Newdow appear to be quite strong. 
The Ninth Circuit stretches to conclude that the Pledge violates 
the Lemon test, since it is by no means clear that the Pledge should 
not be considered in its entirety, rather than solely from the 
perspective of the 1954 Act’s inclusion of the words “under God,” 
in which case it would seem that the primary purpose and primary 
effect of the Pledge is patriotic rather than religious. But it is less 
clear that the Pledge is not coercive, at least in the very broad sense 
that the Supreme Court has used to find graduation prayer to be 
psychologically coercive. Most tellingly, if the concepts of 
“endorsement” and “neutrality” are the lodestars for Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, then it is difficult to see how the Pledge can 
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. It seems difficult to dispute 
that the insertion in 1954 of the words “under God” in the Pledge 
“endorses” religion or is at least not “neutral” with respect to 
religious belief. If neutrality and endorsement are the appropriate 
tests for Establishment Clause cases, then the Court may be required 
to sweep religion completely outside of public life. 
 448. 321 F.3d at 778.  
 449. Id. at 782. 
 450. Id.  
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4.  Autonomy 
A second approach to evaluating the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
in Newdow is to analyze the case from the perspective of autonomy. 
If the Establishment Clause requires the independence of church and 
state, then the inclusion of the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance violates the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, if 
religious liberty rests upon the interdependence of church and state, 
then opposition to “under God” in the Pledge would be nonsensical. 
Inter-independence, in contrast, would focus upon the effects that 
school-sponsored recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance has upon the 
autonomy of the state, the autonomy of churches, and the autonomy 
of individuals. 
The Pledge, at least when viewed in its entirety and not just from 
the perspective of the 1954 addition of the words “under God,” is 
primarily patriotic in nature, rather than religious. It is difficult to 
imagine how recitation of the Pledge could undermine the 
autonomy of the state. Rather, it facilitates the state’s goal of 
inculcating unity and patriotism in its citizens. It is also difficult to 
imagine how recitation of the Pledge undermines the autonomy of 
churches, or of individuals (as long as they are not forced to 
participate).451 Listening respectfully to views we may not share, 
including in government-sponsored speech, does not violate 
individual autonomy. If I am troubled by the inclusion of the words 
“under God” in the pledge, I can abstain from reciting it, or I can 
omit those words when I participate in reciting the Pledge. From the 
perspective of inter-independence, the Pledge case is not particularly 
difficult, since allowing the Pledge does not pose a serious threat to 
the independence of either the state or of churches, and the 
constitutional right to opt out of saying the Pledge provides 
adequate protection to dissenters. 
 451. See W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (reversing 
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)) (holding that a state could compel 
public school students to participate in a flag salute). In Gobitis, the Court emphasized the 
state’s autonomy interests in facilitating national cohesion. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595 (“We are 
dealing with an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the 
basis of national security.”). On the other hand, in Barnette, the Court focused on whether 
compulsion can be used to achieve it. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in 
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Finding an adequate doctrinal framework for analyzing and 
deciding cases involving the relationship between church and state 
and religious freedom claims has proven extremely difficult, both in 
the United States and in Europe. I have suggested that the primary 
concern underlying both the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause is autonomy—of the state, of churches, and of 
individuals. But the cases decided by the Supreme Court over the 
past fifty years in this area are difficult to reconcile into a coherent 
body of jurisprudence in large part because the Court has vacillated 
among different underlying conceptions of autonomy and different 
assumptions about what is required in order for individuals or 
institutions to exercise autonomy. Two conceptions of autonomy 
have vied for preeminence in the United States, one based upon the 
ideal of complete independence of church and state, having 
separation as it goal, and the other based upon the ideal of inter-
independence, which tries to ascertain the proper manner in which 
the state can accommodate religion. The European Court of Human 
Rights has for the most part based its religious-freedom 
jurisprudence upon a different conception of autonomy, one that 
rests upon the interdependence of church and state.452 
While differing assumptions about the conditions and 
requirements of autonomy underlie jurisprudence in this area, to 
date neither the Supreme Court nor the European Court has 
devoted significant critical attention to the question of which of the 
various competing conceptions of autonomy is really the best or 
most appropriate understanding of what autonomy is, and what the 
conditions are under which it can thrive. Both courts have been for 
the most part silent about which conception of autonomy does the 
best job of capturing the conditions that will facilitate the autonomy 
of church and state, and the religious autonomy of individuals. 
 452. In several important areas of the law, however, the Supreme Court has been 
influenced in recent years by a conception of autonomy based upon interdependence. These 
include allowing parochial schools to receive significant money from the state in voucher 
programs, and eliminating heightened scrutiny over free exercise claims for exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. Similarly, the European Court has not exclusively relied on the 
interdependence model of autonomy; for example, with respect to oaths and requirements for 
office, the right to proselytize, and exceptions to generally applicable laws, the Court has 
tended toward a conception of autonomy based on inter-independence. 
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In this Article, I have argued that an important step toward 
developing a coherent approach to the interpretation of the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment and the religious liberty provisions 
of the European Convention is to think critically about the 
conditions that should exist to enable the state, churches, and 
individuals to exercise autonomy. Autonomy provides a better 
framework than existing doctrinal approaches for the resolution of 
difficult and controversial issues that arise in this area of the law. If 
one of these three conceptions of autonomy, or perhaps a different 
conception of autonomy, provides the most compelling 
understanding of the meaning of autonomy and the conditions and 
types of relationships that are necessary for autonomy to flourish, 
that would provide invaluable guidance for analysis and deliberation 
in cases involving the proper interactions of church and state and 
cases involving individual freedom of religion or belief. 
In order to effectively analyze issues involving religious liberty 
and the relationship of church and state, courts should engage in a 
three-step analytical process. First, a court should clearly identify the 
autonomy interests at stake in a particular case. Sometimes one 
autonomy interest will be predominately at issue, while at other 
times there will be more than one. Clearly identifying the autonomy 
interests and issues in a case will help define and refine what is at 
stake in a case. Second, the court should define and defend a 
conception of autonomy to be used in comparing and evaluating the 
autonomy interests at stake. Since the conception of autonomy that 
animates the court’s analysis will largely dictate the outcome in a 
case, it is important that the court understands and explicitly defends 
the conception of autonomy that it believes to be correct. Third, the 
court should then assess how the autonomy interests at stake 
coupled with the particular conception of autonomy that is 
appropriate apply to the case at hand. For the most part, both the 
Supreme Court and the European Court have failed to do this. This 
largely accounts for the fragmented, inconsistent, and ultimately 
unsatisfying jurisprudence in this area, both in Europe and in the 
United States. 
 
 
